375 N.E.2d 72 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1977
In 1966 defendant Leonard Trusnik (hereinafter referred to as defendant) bought a television set and a refrigerator from plaintiff, The May Company. These purchases were charged to defendant's account at The May Company. When defendant became delinquent on his account, The May Company and defendant's attorney negotiated an "Installment Agreement." It was executed by defendant on February 13, 1968. Under the terms of the agreement, defendant was to pay to The May Company twenty-six monthly installments of Thirty Dollars each commencing on February 15, 1968. In a letter accompanying the installment agreement, The May Company's collection agent stated:
"* * * [U]pon any delinquency regarding the terms of the installment agreement, the mortgaged property should be repossessed and sold at public auction, and any resultant deficiency balance would be charged to the aforementioned debtor."
Defendant defaulted on the installment agreement some time after May 1969.
Thereupon The May Company sued defendant on the *72 account in the Cleveland Municipal Court on June 26, 1973. Through an amended complaint, The May Company changed its cause of action and claimed defendant breached the installment agreement. Defendant answered, denied the allegations of the complaint, asserted the statute of limitations as a defense and counterclaimed for breach of warranty. Upon cross motions, the court entered summary judgment for The May Company.
Defendant appealed, but this court dismissed the appeal because counterclaims were still pending. The lower court amended its judgment entry dismissing the counterclaims. Defendant again appeals, assigning three errors:
"I. The trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the plaintiff because its claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
"II. The trial court's entry of summary judgment for the plaintiff was error contrary to Civil Rule 56 where there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute.
"III. It was error for the trial court to dismiss the defendant's counterclaims when there was no motion to dismiss before the court."
In his first assignment of error, defendant contends the lower court erred in applying the fifteen-year statute of limitations in R. C.
"Except as provided in Section
R. C.
The novel question presented by this case is whether the installment agreement, executed two years after the original sale, is also governed by the four-year statute of the U. C. C. The May Company argues the installment agreement did not fall within the scope of Article 2 of the U. C. C. because it was not executed contemporaneously with the original contract of sale. However, under R. C.
The phrase "transactions in goods" was construed in Skinner
v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. (1963),
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the oral modification under U. C. C. 2-209. That section (R. C.
The May Company argues it was no longer a seller of goods in the context of the installment agreement. However, an action brought by a merchant for the price of items purchased by a customer on his or her charge account is governed by the four-year statute of limitations in U. C. C. 2-725 (R. C.
It is only when the purchase money is advanced by a third party that an action to recover a balance due is removed from Article 2 of the U. C. C. In Harris Trust and Savings Bank v.McCray (1974),
In summary, we view the installment agreement executed by the defendant as a modification of the original contract of sale. This modification, enforceable under R. C.
The parties disagree on when the cause of action in the present case arose. It was claimed by The May Company in its answers to interrogatories that defendant made a payment on the note *76
as late as January 1970. If true, the complaint filed in June 1973 would not be barred by the four-year statute of limitations. However, defendant stated in his affidavit that he made no payments after May 22, 1969. If true, the action would be barred. The records of defendant's account produced by The May Company were confusing and did not resolve this issue. Even if they did, summary judgment would have been improper. Documents in support of motions for summary judgment are to be used not to resolve issues of fact but to determine if issues of fact exist. United States, ex rel. Jones, v. Rundle (C. A. 3, 1971),
The first assignment of error is well taken.
In his second assignment of error, defendant claims that other genuine issues of material fact existed rendering the court's summary judgment erroneous under Civ. R. 56(C). We agree. The documents presented by defendant indicate he (1) claims to have made payments not reflected in The May Company's records; (2) disputes the date of the last payment; and (3) claims not to owe plaintiff the sum demanded or any other amount.
The second assignment of error is well taken.
In his third assignment of error, defendant claims it was error for the trial court to dismiss the defendant's counterclaims when there was no motion to dismiss before the court. After the first appeal in this case was dismissed, The May Company filed a motion in the municipal court to amend its judgment entry in order to make it final and appealable. The motion requested an amendment showing "that the Counter-Claims of the Defendant, Leonard E. Trusnik, have been dismissed." This, in effect, was a motion to dismiss which defendant could have contested. Thus, it was within the court's discretion to grant the motion, thereby dismissing the counterclaims.
The third assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment reversed.
CORRIGAN, P. J., and PARRINO, J., concur.
"(A) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
"(B) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance, the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
"(C) Where an action commenced within the time limited by division (A) of this section is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach, such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
"(D) This section does not alter sections