Appellants Charles and Ellyn Maxwell, et al., appeal from the judgment entered against them and in favor of Roger E. Hahn, et al., in the Kosciusko Superior Court.
This appеal arises out of a dispute over the use and ownership of land contiguous to Dewart Lake in Kosciusko County, Indiana, The pertinent facts are undisputed: Prior to Oсtober 5, 1945, Willard L. and Helen Redmon, Marion L. and Dottie Red-mon, Carl W. and Helen Redmon, Martha A. Redmon and Martha A. Redmon as guardian of Dorothy Redmon, a minor, were the ownеrs of a tract of real estate consisting of approximately 8.5 acres, situated in Kosciusko County, Indiana, the easternmost boundary of which was contiguous to Dеwart Lake. The Redmons from this 8.5 acre tract created two subdivisions and, on October 5, 1945, duly executed a plat denominated as "Redmon's Second Addition to Redmon Park," consisting of 6.17 acres of the total 8.5 acres owned by the Redmons. The plat, which was duly recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Kosciusko County, Indiana, on January 8, 1946, provided for the following:
"This addition consists of thirteen lots numbered from one to thirteen inclusively; lots one and thirteen are irregular; lots two to twelve inclusive are each fifty (50) feet wide and one-hundred (100) feet long; lake approaches between lots three and four, seven and eight, and eleven and twelve are each fifteen (15) feet wide. The area between the lake and the lots is common ground for the use of the owners of these lots or future lots that may be laid out west of this addition; however this area between the lake and this addition is not to be subdivided into lots." (Emphasis added.)
The Redmons later platted and recorded the plat of the "Third Additiоn to Redmon Park," which consisted of 19 lots. The "Third Addition to Redmon Park" lies west of and adjacent to "Redmon's Second Addition to Redmon Park" and is the only property the Redmons laid out west of the Second Addition plat. A map of these additions to Redmon Park as they exist today is as follows:
*557 [[Image here]]
The owners of the Third Addition to Red-mon Park (appellаnts) asserted before the trial court their right to use the common ground and the lake approaches, as laid out in the Second Addition to Redmon Park, for their aсcess to Dewart Lake for the general purposes of swimming, fishing and placing piers in the waters of Dewart Lake for the purpose of docking their boats. The оwners in the Second Addition (appellees) denied that the Third Addition owners had riparian rights to the common ground and further alleged in defense that they were the fee simрle owners of the common ground.
The trial court concluded that the plat proprietors had, while divesting themselves of the title of Lots 1 through 13 to the Second Addition owners, also vested the fee simple title to the common ground and the lake approaches to the Second Addition owners. After thus finding that the fee simple titles оf the Second Addition owners included the common ground and the lake approaches, the trial court granted exclusive riparian rights to erect piers or dоcks on the shores of Dewart Lake to the See-ond Addition owners and easement rights to swim and fish in Dewart Lake to Third Addition owners. From this judgment the Third Addition owners appeal, alleging that the trial court erred in its finding that the Second Addition owners are the fee simple title holders to the common ground and the lake approaches and thus the trial court incorrectly vested sole riparian rights with the Second Addition owners.
The Second Addition owners contend in their brief of appellees that the Third Addition ownеrs have waived any consideration of the alleged error because the record of proceedings presented to this Court did not include the summary judgment of the trial court, where the trial court concluded that the fee simple title to the lakeshore area was in the lot owners of the Second Addition. This waiver argu
*558
ment fаils because Ind. Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 7.2(C)(2) specifically states that incompleteness or inadequacy of the record shall not constitute a ground for dismissal of the appeal or preclude review on the merits. Also, by the filing of their petition for extension of time to file their brief for appellees without previously mentioning any problem with the record, the Second Addition owners waived any technical defect or omission in the trial record. Leuck v. Goetz (1972),
When findings оf fact and conclusions of law are tendered by the trial court, as was the case here, this Court will only set aside the judgment premised thereon if the findings do not disclose a valid basis for the legal result reached in the judgment. Campins v. Capels (1984), Ind. App.,
The Second Addition owners cite this Court to several instances where the Supreme Court and this Court have found that strips of land abutting against a highway or body of water should have fee simple title vested to the adjacent landowners.
See, e.g., Ross et al. v. Faust et al. (1876),54 Ind. 471 , 478 and Earhart v. Rosenwinkel (1940),108 Ind.App. 281 , 291,25 N.E.2d 268 , 272.
While it is true that the presumption thаt these strips of land should belong to the adjacent landowner has been invoked in this state, the Earhkort court specifically stated that that presumption is rebutted "when it clearly appears from the language of the conveyance that the contrary was actually intended[.]"'
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Reversed.
Notes
. The trial court did not rule and the Second Addition owners did not argue on appeal that they had acquired title to the common ground and lake approaches by means of adverse possession. (Aithough there was evidencе in the record thatthe Second Addition owners had taken physical. care of and paid taxes on this land for a mi" ber of years, the testimony of two Second 'Midition owners at trial that they only recently believed that Third Addition owners did not have the right to put their piers and docks in the water seems to indicate that one of the requiremеnts for proving a claim of adverse possession, that the adverse owners were exercising exclusive claim of rights, could not have been fulfilled. See, Poole v. Corwin (1983), Ind. App.,