140 S.W. 464 | Tex. App. | 1911
The action was for damages occasioned plaintiff by negligent delay in the delivery of the following message: "San Antonio, Texas, Nov. 9, '07. Mrs. Annie Mosley, 2412 McKinney Ave., Houston, Tex, Mr. M. Maxville died to-day at 10 a. m. Be buried to-morrow 9 a. m. county poor farm unless otherwise notified. Schirhart, Supt." *465 Plaintiff alleged that Maxville was her husband; that she knew he would die of consumption, and had arranged with her mother, Annie Mosley, in Houston, and with the authorities of the county hospital in San Antonio, for the shipment of her husband's body to Houston, and according to the arrangements the above telegram was sent to Annie Mosley, who was plaintiff's agent for the purpose; that the message was not delivered until the following day, and after the hour named for the burial, in consequence of which her husband was buried in the county poor farm at San Antonio, causing her great mental suffering, etc.
Plaintiff substantially proved the facts alleged, and the court charged the jury to find for the defendant, stating that plaintiff had failed to make out her case under the law and the evidence. There was no proof that defendant had any information that the addressee was plaintiff's representative to receive the telegram. The trial judge was of opinion, evidently, that there being nothing in this telegram that informed defendant of such a consequence arising from the failure to promptly deliver same, as the damage sustained by plaintiff, and that as defendant had no such notice from the telegram, and no notice otherwise of her interest, it was not liable to her. Plaintiff was not the addressee of the message. There was nothing connecting her with it as a beneficiary, excepting the agency of the addressee, of which fact the defendant had no knowledge.
The case mainly relied on by appellant is that of Telegraph Co. v. Broesche,
Appellant also cites the case of Telegraph Co. v. Adams,
In the last-named case it was held, among other things, that while the undisclosed principal of both the sender and the addressee of a message cannot recover damages for mental anguish, she could recover such damages as the apparent sender could recover, the cost of the telegram. Such rule, however, would not render the judgment in this case erroneous. Treating Schirhart, the sender, as the agent of plaintiff, recovery of such element of damage does not appear to be asked by the petition; but, if the petition should be deemed sufficient to warrant recovery of the cost of the telegram, the testimony does not disclose what it was, and this matter is not referred to in the briefs.
We conclude that the judgment should be affirmed.