56 Mich. 129 | Mich. | 1885
The plaintiffs are builders in the city of Manistee, and brought the suit in this case to recover for a balance claimed to be due to them for the erection of store buildings. The declaration counted upon a certain written contract under which the work was to be done, and the com-
The defendant brings the case into this Court by writ of error, relying upon the claimed erroneous rulings of the court on the admission of testimony for a reversal of the judgment. The court allowed the plaintiffs to put in evidence specifications not signed by the parties, but such as were claimed to have been agreed upon by them when the contract was made; also testimony as to “what kind - of a front the building was to have.” This testimony was objected to on the ground that these things occurred before the written contract was made, and that the testimony contradicted the written contract. We do not think the objection well taken. Without this testimony the contract was imperfect. The plans and specifications were already understood, but had not been written out by the architect. It was no fault of the plaintiff that they were not, and the only evidence of what they were, was given, and it was proper. The other evidence
Counsel for defendant, under their plea of recoupment, gave testimony tending to show that poor lumber was used in a particular part of the work; that the doors were not made •of first-class material; and that the hard-wood flooring was not such as it should have been; and the plaintiffs were permitted to put in rebutting testimony upon these subjects. The defendant claimed that this was improper. We cannot ■accede to this view. It appears from the record that many ■and material changes were made in the construction of the building from those contemplated and agreed upon when the ■contract was signed, some of them requiring a different character of work, — a different front was ordered, and the inte-. rior changed from that of a store to that of a bank, — -and that the work was all done under the supervision and direction of defendant and his architect. Under such circumstances, we think the rebutting testimony offered and received was properly under the contract, and within the discretion of the court.
There is, however, another view of this case presented by the record, which renders several of the exceptions we have just noticed of no importance. After the testimony had been taken, at the suggestion of counsel for the defendant* the jurors, under the charge of the sheriff, were permitted to view the building and work complained of by the defendant. On their return to the court-room, the cause, by agreement of the parties, without argument by counsel or charges from the court, was submitted to them for consideration and verdict, with the result above stated. It is difficult to see, after such a submission agreed to by the parties, upon what ground either could except to the rulings of the court other than those relating to the contract of the parties. We find no error in the record, and
The judgment must be affirmed.