124 Ind. 592 | Ind. | 1890
The appellants set forth in their complaint a note and mortgage, and ask a decree of foreclosure. The appellees pleaded facts constituting an equitable estoppel, and the finding of the trial court fully sustains the allegations of the answer setting up that defence. We think it unnecessary to give a synopsis of the answers, for the facts exhibited in the special finding are substantially the same as those stated in the answer, and in deciding the questions presented upon the special finding we effectually dispose of all the questions in the record.
The facts, as they appear in the special finding, are substantially these: On the 22d day of July, 1858, Vincent Voisinett was the owner of the real estate described in the
“ Whereas, on or about the 22d day of July, 1868, Vincent Voisinett and wife did execute and deliver to H. H. Allen, S. M. Cummins and Brown a conveyance conveying a portion of the water-power of Elkhart river, situate on the east bank of said river and south of Jackson street, in the town of Elkhart, Indiana. The sáid conveyance being in the following words, to wit: ‘ Said gi'antors also convey water to the amount of six hundred inches, to be furnished from the head race of the flouring-mill of the said Voisinett; ’ said
Prior to and at the time the contract was entered into
The trial court’s conclusion of law was, “ That the plaintiffs are not entitled to any decree against the defendants, Lane & Lane.”
The appellants acquired the mortgage which they seek to foreclose for the purpose of perfecting a title for which they had previously bargained, and they do not occupy the position of ordinary indorsees. Nor have they been induced to part with money upon the faith of the validity of the mortgage, for they obtained it simply for the purpose of using it to perfect the title for which they had previously bargained. It is quite clear, therefore, that they do not occupy any better position than their assignors, and if the latter, could not have foreclosed the mortgage, had they remained the holders of it, against the appellees, the appellants can not.
The appellants are bound by the acts and representations of their assignors, and if those acts and representations worked an equitable estoppel against the assignors that estoppel operates against them. In our judgment the representations and acts of Sage & Sage worked an estoppel which precludes the appellants from foreclosing the mortgage upon the interest of the appellees. Those representations secured the written, contract which conferred a benefit upon Sage & Sage, and induced the appellees to lay out a large sum of money. As the representations have been acted'upon, money parted with, and the position of the appellees changed in an essential particular, the holders of the mortgage can not gainsay the representations of their assignors to the injury of the parties who, relying upon them, changed their position and
The principle which rules here is precisely the same as that which prevails in the class of cases which we have mentioned. A party may be concluded by inferences which naturally arise from his conduct as well as by express words. Irvine v. Scott, 85 Ky. 260. This principle was applied in Risien v. Brown, 73 Tex. 135, to a case very like the present.
It is not necessary in order to create an estoppel that the person who makes the representations upon which another acts should, at the time of making them, intend to defraud' the person to whom they are made, for the fraud consists in subsequently attempting to gainsay o.r deny the representations to the injury of the person who acted upon them. Wisehart v. Hedrick, supra; Babcock v. People’s Savings Bank, 118 Ind. 212; Kelley v. Fish, 110 Ind. 552; Ward v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 108 Ind. 301; Quick v. Milligan, 108 Ind. 419, and cases cited; Anderson v. Hubble, 93 Ind. 570 (47 Am. Rep. 394); Humphreys v. Finch, 97 N. C. 303 (2 Am. St. Rep. 293); Bynum v. Preston, 69 Texas, 287 (5 Am. St. Rep. 49).
Judgment affirmed.