Opinion by
The Freeport bank was incorporated under the Act of May 13, 1876, P. L. 161, with an original capital of $50,000, divided into shares having a par value of $100 each, and, by 1922, had accumulated a surplus of equal amount, with undivided profits of $20,000, or more. It determined to acquire the right's and privileges of a trust company, and, instead of taking advantage of the provisions of the Act of July 17, 1919, P. L. 1032, a new corporation was formed under the Act of 1874, amended by the Act of May 9, 1889, P. L. 159, with a capital of $125,000. The stockholders agreed to transfer to it the assets of the bank, taking in payment two shares of the new company for each one of the old, the remaining 250 being reserved for sale at $120, the funds so received to be used in the development of the business.
At a meeting of the stockholders duly convened, holders of nineteen shares in the bank, of which plaintiff owned sixteen, protested against any sale. Ninety per cent or more favored the proposal, and voted affirmatively, when a resolution to that effect was presented by the directors. To prevent the consummation of the plan, this bill was filed. A preliminary injunction was refused, upon condition that a bond in the sum of $20,-000 be given to protect Maxler’s interest, and this appeal was then taken from the decree entered.
The question now presented is the right of the banking corporation to dispose of its property, notwithstanding objection by a dissenting stockholder. If the company came within one of the classes named in the General Cor
The Act of May 13,1876, P. L. 161, regulating banking companies, makes no express provision for the sale of the entire property to another corporation, though section 6 directs that its officers may fix the manner in which “its property [may be] transferred and general business conducted,” and section 26 permits the liquidation of such a company on vote of two-thirds of the stockholders, the surplus, after the payment of indebtedness, to be distributed pro rata.
But we do not think express statutory permission is required to authorize the disposal of all the assets, not including, however, franchises acquired by virtue of the original charter granted. “A corporation has full power to alienate its property, both real and personal, unless restricted by its charter. Ownership of property, whether real or personal, carries with it the same general power of disposition in corporations as in individuals, except where that power is restrained by statute or by considerations of public policy”: 7 R. C. L. 571. This rule was early recognized in Pennsylvania, and forcefully declared, in a well-considered opinion (Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R. Co.,
If the Freeport Bank could be classed as a public, rather than a private, corporation, and attempted to re
In making tbe sale, tbe rights of tbe public are not adversely affected, and those of tbe plaintiff are amply protected by tbe bond to insure him payment in cash of a just valuation of tbe few shares be owns: Barnett v. Phila. Market Co.,
It is to be remembered that tbe interposition of tbe equity court is to prevent tbe working of some real injury. No such possibility appears here, and tbe injunction was therefore properly refused: Hamilton v. Foster,
The assignments of error are overruled, and the decree is affirmed at the costs of appellant.
