Appeal, 158 | Pa. Super. Ct. | Apr 21, 1944
Argued April 21, 1944.
This is an appeal by the State Workmen's Insurance Fund from judgment entered in favor of John Mavroulias for compensation under section 306 (a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended by the Act of April 13, 1927, P.L. 186, § 1,
Claimant was injured on December 16, 1937,1 in Pennsylvania, while employed by defendant employer, D. Mugiana, a contractor for the painting of structural steel. Claimant, while working as a painter for defendant employer in Bridgeville, Pa., sustained an *575
injury to his left leg — a fracture of the left femur with comminution and displacement of fragments. The parties entered into a compensation agreement for the payment of compensation on the basis of total disability beginning December 23, 1937. On July 10, 1939, the compensation agreement, as a result of a petition by claimant, was modified to provide for the loss of use of claimant's left leg, and requiring payment of compensation for 215 weeks. Section 30(c) of the Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended by the Act of April 13, 1927, P.L. 186, § 1,
On June 25, 1931, claimant, while employed in Ohio by another employer, had suffered an injury to his right foot and ankle, for which he received compensation for *576 temporary partial disability under the Ohio law until March 20, 1942. Claimant was required to file with the Industrial Commission of Ohio monthly wage statements showing earnings and industrial activities.
The court of common pleas affirmed the board and entered judgment for claimant. The State Workmen's Insurance Fund then appealed to this court.
The issue presented is whether claimant, who suffered a compensable injury in the state of Ohio and later suffered a distinct injury in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania while working for another employer, which latter injury resulted in total disability, may obtain the compensation for total disability provided by the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, without at the same time giving credit for the amount concurrently received for disability from the accident in Ohio under the Ohio law.
Appellant contends that claimant is not entitled to compensation which would exceed the maximum provided for total disability under our statutes. Appellant argues that claimant seeks to receive the maximum under the Pennsylvania Act, to wit, § 15 per week, even though during the same period he was being paid compensation under the Ohio law at the rate of $9.48 or $7 per week, whereby he would receive on account of both accidents compensation for partial and total disability in weekly maximums of $24.48 or $22 per week; that this cannot be permitted under the law of this state; and that credit must be given to it for the amounts which claimant received on account of the prior injury in Ohio.
Appellant's argument seems to confuse what occurred in the present case with entirely different situations. In the first place, Ingram v. W.J. Rainey, Inc.,
It is obvious that those cases where one accident is involved and where the compensation authorities of two different states may have jurisdiction over the accident are likewise inapplicable. But in the present case each accident happened in the state of hiring; each accident happened in a different state and while claimant was employed by a different employer. Consequently, it is not a matter of allowance of compensation either in the state of injury or the state of hiring, or *578 of limitation to the excess of what the state of hiring may have allowed over an award in the state of injury.3
Claimant's rights arising out of the accident in Pennsylvania in 1937 were, under the circumstances, governed by the law of this state. Here he was hired, and here he was accidentally injured in the course of his employment. He was totally disabled as a result of that accident. Hence he was entitled to compensation at the weekly rate provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, § 306(a), as amended by Act of April 13, 1927, P.L. 186, § 1,
Nothing has been presented to us to indicate that the Ohio injury which claimant sustained in 1931 could possibly come under the jurisdiction of the compensation authorities of Pennsylvania. The Industrial Commission of Ohio ordered compensation paid to this claimant for temporary partial disability resulting from the *579 accident in that state. On what ground could he be required to virtually surrender those payments? His injury in Ohio did not incapacitate him so that he could not work, or prevent him from subsequently entering into a contract of employment in Pennsylvania at $8 per day. Furthermore, his total disability is due to and the result of the accidental injury in Pennsylvania in 1937. For this he is entitled to the compensation provided by our act, and there is no basis in law or reason to require that credit be given for the Ohio payments although concurrently made. The practical aspects of the case disclose the fallacy of appellant's position. If claimant had received in full the compensation for disability resulting from the Ohio accident in 1931 before he became employed by defendant employer, there certainly would be no reduction in the amount of compensation which he is entitled to receive as a result of the accident in Pennsylvania. The mere fact that the Ohio payments had not been completed before the accident in this state does not change the situation. The possible generosity of the Ohio authorities does not inure to the advantage of a Pennsylvania employer or its insurance carrier. Claimant is not receiving under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act more than the maximum payments provided therein for total disability. An application of appellant's theory might deprive claimant, as pointed out by the court below, of virtually all compensation for the overlapping periods.
Judgment is affirmed.