55 Ga. App. 241 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1937
Mrs. Helen Mavrikis, as beneficiary, brought suit
For each $300 of face amount.
Years. Cash or loan value. Paid-up insurance.'
8 $77 $196
9 $90 ■ $225
10 $103 ‘ $251”
A total and permanent disability contract was issued in connection with the policy here sued on, containing the following provisions: “In consideration of the continuance of policy No. 7Í303 on the life of Charles Peter Mavrikis, the company agrees to pay for the insured the premiums thereafter becoming due thereon, if the insured, before attaining the age of sixty years, after.paying at_ least one full annual premium and before default in payment of any subsequent premium, shall furnish satisfactory proof to the company at its home office, accepted by it in writing, that he has become wholly and permanently disabled by bodily injury or disease, so that he is and will be for life continuously and wholly prevented thereby from performing any work or transacting any business, for compensation or profit, or from following any gainful occupation. Premiums so paid by the' company shall continue, said policy in force, and all values therein provided shall increase, in the same manner and to the same extent as if paid by the insured, shall constitute no lien or indebtedness against the policy, and shall not be deductible from any settlement thereunder. . . Provided: That notwithstanding proof of disability may have been accepted by the company as satisfactory, the insured shall at any time, but not oftener than once a year, on demand, furnish the company satisfactory proof, including physical examination by a physician of the company’s selection, if required, of the continuance of such disability; and if the insured shall fail to furnish satisfactory proof, or if it shall appear to the company that the insured is able to perform any work, transact any business or to follow any occupation whatsoever for compensation, gain or profit, the company’s obligation to pay such premiums shall cease and all
The petition was in two counts. In the first count it was alleged that the premium payable on said policy on August 1, 1934, was paid, and that the deceased had failed to pay the quarterly premium that was due on November 1, 1934, either at that time or within the period of grace, which expired on December 1, 1934; that in August, 1934, the insured had not attained the age of sixty years, and had become wholly and permanently disabled by bodily disease so that he became for life continuously and wholly prevented from performing any work or transacting any business for compensation or profit, or from following any gainful occupation, and that, in addition to the entire and permanent disablement by bodily disease, he had also become incapacitated by reason of a brain disease so that he became incompetent and it was impossible for him to furnish proof to the defendant at its home office of his having become wholly and permanently disabled by such bodily disease; that neither the plaintiff nor any member of her family, had any knowledge of the existence of the total and permanent disability rider to said policy until after the death of the insured; that the insured never recovered from his physical or his mental disability, and that he died on January 9, 1936; that due proof of death has been filed with the defendant, and that it failed and refused to pay the amount of the policy; that by reason of the mental disease with which the insured became afflicted prior to his default in the payment of said premium, he was legally excused and relieved from the requirement of such total and permanent disability rider that he should furnish proof to the company of his disablement; that except with regard to furnishing proof to the company, as provided for in said disability rider, all provisions of said policy and said rider were fulfilled by the insured, and that his mental disability excused him legally from furnishing said proof, and that under the provisions of said rider
In the second count the plaintiff seeks to recover less than the face value of the policy under the non-forfeiture provisions thereof, as above set forth. It is alleged that the policy ran from August 1, 1925, to December 1, 1934, before the default finally occurred, a period of from nine to ten years; that under the table of values above set forth the cash or loan value at nine years would be $90 for each $500 of the face amount of the policy, and for ten years the sum of $103 for each $500 of the face amount of the policy; the policy being for $2500, the cash or loan value for nine years would be $450, and for .ten years it would be $515; that according to this same table the paid-up insurance for nine years would be $225 for each $500, or $1125, and for ten years $251 for each $500 of insurance, or $1255; that the insured had borrowed $399.11 on this policy, and a judgment for $855 was prayed for under the second count. In this count it was alleged that the defendant had tendered and offered to pay the plaintiff $152, this' being the amount it claimed that it owed the plaintiff, as beneficiary, under this policy. The defendant filed general and special demurrers to both counts of the petition. The court sustained the general demurrer to each count, and the plaintiff excepted.
The court properly sustained the general demurrer to count one of the plaintiffs petition. This feature of the case is controlled by Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 43 Ga. App. 67 (157 S. E. 878), Dean v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 175 Ga. 321 (165 S. E. 235), and by Smith v. Travelers Insurance Co. 177 Ga. 589 (171 S. E. 121).
The policy contained provisions for its commutation into fully-paid, non-forfeitable life insurance in accordance with the provisions and stipulations contained in paragraphs 11, 13, and 14 thereof, and the controversy between the parties hereto grows out of the different constructions they place on these provisions of the contract which are set out in the foregoing statement of facts. Paragraph 13 provides, in part: "After premiums have been paid hereon for three full years, in case of default in the payment of any premium or instalment thereof at the expiration of
Judgment affirmed.