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Maurice Robinson v. Patrick Arvonio, Superintendent, East Jersey State Prison Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey
27 F.3d 877
3rd Cir.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 25.18 We Bank directors’ Br. at case. See holding with court’s affirm the district

will duty good faith

regard to the breach Thus, we will affirm

claim on this basis. denying entirety court’s order the district

its for leave to Bathgate defendants’ motion against Bank di complaint

amend their

rectors.

III. CONCLUSION result, reaching- have not over-

In our Duhme doctrine and

looked that the D’Oench 1823(e) might can lead to

section what Nevertheless, it result.

considered a harsh precedents and to us that the federal

seems Jersey law have com- applicable New Consequently, the or-

pelled our outcome. 18, 1993, March of the district court of

ders 19, 1993, affirmed. July will be ROBINSON, Appellant,

Maurice ARVONIO, Superintendent, East

Patrick Tufo,

Jersey Prison; Del State Robert J.

Attorney of the of New General State

Jersey.

No. 92-5667. Appeals, Court of

United States

Third Circuit.

Argued Nov. 1993.

Decided June 1994. Rehearing July Petition for

Sur disposition February light allege letter. of our also that the Bath- in the 18. The Bank Directors gate Bathgate Bathgate against than have no defendants other claims defendants' third-party standing directors, to sue the Bank directors as this issue. Bank we need not reach allegedly beneficiaries of the reflected *2 (argued), L. of Public Robert Sloan Office Defender, Section, Newark, NJ, Appellate appellant. (argued), A. Catherine Foddai Office Jersey, Atty. Dept, of New of Law & Gen. Justice, Trenton, Safety, Public Div. of Cr. NJ, appellees. ALITO,

Before: SCIRICA and Circuit POLLAK, Judge Judges District *. THE OPINION OF COURT SCIRICA, Judge. Circuit Robinson, currently Petitioner Maurice J. Jersey prison, ap- confined a New state applica- peals the district court’s denial corpus a writ of under 28 tion for habeas (1988). § 2254 Robinson asserts the U.S.C. Poliak, vania, sitting by designation. *The Honorable Louis H. United States Pennsyl- for the Eastern District of District granted no should have been because the reasonable likelihood that writ the error had Jersey prosecutor judgment jury. failed to correct a affected the New perjured denial that his witness’s prosecutor’s prom-

had been secured A. *3 sentencing judge cooper- tell of his ise to the trial, In his statement at pros- ation.1 The district court found failure of jury ecutor informed that prosecution per- to correct the witness’s Melvin Shark previously guilty had been found and that an jured testimony was harmless error because agreement had been made with Shark in per- there was no reasonable likelihood the testimony return for his at jured testimony judgment Robinson’s trial. had affected the stated: jury. finding This rested the court’s jury judgment that had evi- sufficient going Mr. Shark to be a in witness this it dence before to assess the of the going and the State is to call him as a follow, witness. For reasons that we will you I witness. would like to understand at affirm the denial writ. point this day Mr. Shark has had his

in already adjudicated. court and has been why coming And terms of he would be BACKGROUND time, at you here this I’d like to know (1) guilty A of: found Robinson mur- guilt beforehand that Mr. Shark denied his (West der, § under N.J.Stat.Ann. 2C:ll-3 when subsequently he was on trial and (2) Supp.); robbery, 1982 & 1993 armed un- guilty. agreed was testify found He has (West 1982); State, § der N.J.StatAnn. 2C:15-lb promised what was for (3) possession handgun permit, of a without a merely him was kept away he would be (West 1982); § Robinson, under N.J.Stat.Ann. 2C:39-5b Mr. that is it. He will— (4) told, possession handgun of a for He any prom- unlawful was and the extent of came, purposes, § under N.J.Stat.Ann. 2C:39-4a ise made to him when his sentence (West 1982). Melvin Co-defendant Shark would be made known to granted sentencing judge, was a severance and a found but no deal in terms time, years, guilty charges. anything him like that. of the same On Febru- 24, 1984, ary Maurice J. Robinson was sen- thirty-year imprisonment tenced to a term of you I’d murder, also like to note to that Mr. years

for with a minimum of fifteen testifying Shark will be under what’s parole. without He also received a concur- immunity, known as because he has been fifteen-year robbery, rent term for armed recently yet convicted and he has not been years a pa- with minimum of seven without sentenced, as I said earlier. role. added.) (Emphasis remedies,2 exhausting After state Robin- petitioned son corpus trial, however, for habeas relief in initially At Shark denied United States District Court. The district promised anything that he had all agreed court failed to return for his On direct examina- tion, testimony, correct the witness’s but it found Shark testified: prosecutor’s unreported per opinion, August 1. Robinson contends the conduct filed curiam deprived process of due law him and a fair Appellate hearing found Division Fifth, trial under Sixth and Fourteenth should not have been conducted in Robinson's Amendments of the United States Constitution. hearing. absence and remanded for another Af- hearing, ter the second at which Robinson was appealed Superior 2. Robinson Court of counsel, present represented by the trial Division, Jersey, Appellate New which affirmed again petition. ap- court denied his Robinson unreported per opin- his conviction in an curiam 1, 1990, pealed, unreported on October in an February Jersey ion filed on 1986. The New per opinion, Appellate curiam Division af- Supreme request Court denied Robinson's post-conviction firmed the denial of relief. The pro petition certification. He then filed a se relief, Supreme Jersey post-conviction New Court denied Robinson's which was denied after a hearing appealed, petition in his absence. He and in an for certification on December promised to Only thing was me Shark, your A. Yes. testi- Q. reference Mr. I’d be taken care of. today, there a was mony in this courtroom testify? you you would so deal made prosecutor, em- On redirect A. No. protective promised phasized he had been testimony: custody exchange for his why understanding of Q. your isWhat gain you expect to you were —what Shark, during your Q. cross- Mr. earlier testifying result of here? examination, response to one of [defense attorney’s] you were time, questions about what you repeat one more A. Can something along the promised, you said please? you be taken care of. line that testify Q. prompted you to at this What *4 does that mean? What your trial after own trial? particular custody. Protective A. hoping I that— A. was Shark, you be Q. do know what will Mr. your trial and you as a result done you? Q. does that mean to And what your conviction? to A. Means a lot me. going long I’ll for a time.

A. I know Q. Why? your you law- Q. Did discuss that with here, going on A. Behind the fact what’s yer? know, jail, you get word can back Yes, A. I did. know, that, something you I that did anything in you promised Q. And were jail against regulations rules and inside the testifying exchange for here as a result of seriously doing I hurt some- and can be your trial? thing like this. No, I

A. wasn’t. acknowledged prosecutor Shark never today? Q. you telling the truth sentencing judge Are agreed to inform the prosecutor failed to cooperation, his and the Yes, A. I am. perjured correct his The defense cross-examination, Shark acknowl- On attorney closing revived the issue his immunity edged promised that he was for his by referring prosecutor’s statement to testimony: promise speak judge. to to Shark, you Q. is it not a fact that Mr. He stated: . immunity Prose- promised from have saying You recall this wit- [Shark] anything you said in court cution based on stand, just get “I to the truth ness want today? here say? did he Uncon- out”? What else Yes, A. it is. said, help myself.” sciously he “I want to I the man who included Then asked him—this is But he still denied the said, “Did sen- now wants to tell the truth —I making cooperation known to the you anything?” judge: promise the Prosecutor tencing recall, you gentle- I’m sure mil ladies and fact, sir, Q. Is it not a that the men, made his that when the Prosecutor you get promised you that if on that remarks, indicated, and he stated testify today stand and for the State truthfully you, to that he had made cer- Robinson, they against would tell the Mr. promises On this tain to this defendant. your cooperation? Judge of witness stand —a man who’s worried about Well, to promise A. he didn’t me he’d talk going forget his survival is not to some- Judge about that. that, thing any promises if were made like say Q. He didn’t that? him, stand, help but on this witness to go promise A. He didn’t me he’d back Bible, taking that I asked after the oath on Judge coop- and tell him I and talk to the him, you?” any promises made to “Were nothing to me. promised erated. Was promise that “No.” “Did the Prosecutor your Q. Judge on that’s the truth? he’d talk to the And behalf?” Judge and, (cid:127)promises up you made.” That’s what makes his own “No. No mind know, said. Sentencing that’s true. is for the recall, Judge. The Prosecutor can’t tell you’ll gentle- if And ladies recess, say. to men, what took a and when we came said, back, him, I I “Did the asked Prose- But, gentlemen, you ladies and don’t immunity?” promise you did cutor What think some little trying weasel who’s say “Oh, yes, promise he did me im- he — and, save himself will take those words munity.” desperate, he is so because make those say things they

words really that did not say, maybe, maybe, this is a yesterday say him chance You heard re- this, get that, me to out of my sponse question “I was men- myself,” tioning years ladies added.) (Emphasis closing statement, In his gentlemen, you if face kind time referred to Shark’s sentenc- out, you buy your way can do it. He protective custody: got up did it. He on that witness stand Yes, the him State called as a witness but perjured “I you, myself, and said to all of expect? what did Melvin opened I liar,” help I’m a Fine. To Do himself. *5 you you to and told things certain were man, streetwise, young you think that that him, promised yes. to What his [was] wouldn’t have certain ideas about what it big deal? lawyer His deal? His was said, speak a Prosecutor “I will means if present when we discussed it. And he Judge you? gentle- to the Ladies and explained his answers.... “I know that men, sinking. up he was And it was to Judge can sentence me and I know the he his nose and he reached out and any power Prosecutor doesn’t have over grabbed immunity try that to to straw of Judge because the me found what he I save That’s did. And himself. guilty. plea bargaining. Jury No ver- suggest you you to that cannot believe dict, guilty. So the Prosecutor does not anything him. You can’t believe that he power anything have the to recommend to said. Judge anymore years, in terms of ” months, days. testify So what did he for? He said on that that the witness stand coming And this is where it’s out now: very day first when he was arrested he Well, say facing what did he was him over getting was concerned about out himself code, code, there in the a different not the yester- this. He said on the witness stand here, by jail code we live but in the here: himself, day trying help that to he was Subjected physical beatings to some if the said, job, in order to do his he even “Noth- gets word out. So what did he want from me,” ing promised was to and either he protective custody. “I State? want thought better it or that he would be felt subject being severely I’m to beaten if I entrapped suddenly and then he admitted testify against another defendant.” promised what was him. to And the Pros- added.)3 (Emphasis “Yes, say you, prom- I ecutor would did ” but, speak Judge, jury, him I’d ise to the ladies his final instructions to the gentlemen, only immunity independent, referred to the sentencing hearing, operation testifying against 3. At Shark's his codefendant leniency and codefendants. asked for for Shark and stressed the importance testimony critical of Shark's in ob- testimony, proving the case taining [W]ithout conviction: Robinson’s against [Robinson] his codefendant would have Mr. Shark was told me in all candor that I difficult, impossible if speak respect for him in this at his sentence, your that Honor would note his co- punished pun- He should be and he will be ..., ished but his in both the trials be noted because we [of co-defendants] has to opportunity would have not had the to convict Floyd had been shot. Sanders jury K.O. and reminded the part of men, sitting elderly had been Floyd, were not both closing statements opening noted, however, the bar. a club next door As we have outside social evidence. statement, young past ac- men walk in his noticed three prosecutor, Sanders speak knowledged promised at him as he saw the first one look them and behalf, (He and the judge on Shark’s they by. later identified Shark as went closing argument, attorney, in his man.) defense people no other He saw Therefore, acknowledgement. built on young stopped a short The three men area. of the terms was made aware elderly had a past men and distance attorney made a agreement and the defense frightened of the Sanders was conversation. lack of strong for Shark’s case men; Floyd they young he told should leave conflict- agreement and Shark’s based on the Floyd’s car. The and started to walk toward and surrounded the young men came back elderly saw the two men. When Sanders B. young pull gun out of the three men second testimony important for Rob- Shark’s Ridgewood pocket, ran to the New of his only other wit- because one inson’s conviction time, At that pounded Bar and on the door. place Robinson near the scene ness could Floyd help and heard a he heard call for testify could the crime and no other witness door, Conaway opened the shot. Just before part in it. will recite Robinson had taken We Floyd lying around and saw Sanders turned the relevant facts. running and the men the street three away. Floyd died of his wounds. May between 1:30 a.m. and On a.m., night manager of the New 1:45 years shooting, two after the Sand- Some Newark, N.J., Robert Ridgewood Bar in *6 talking in front of the ers was to a friend Conaway, doors and admitted unlocked the he noticed someone same social club when Shark, by he knew a customer whom Melvin staring seeing at him. After the same man companion. male A third man sight, and his occasions, recognized him other he several Conaway, In bar- outside. addition to waited Floyd’s three men involved as one Evans, her friend Constance maid Barbara police murder. He contacted the and Shark Brooks, two others were the bar. being present was arrested. Shark admitted purchased and asked Shark beer Evans murder, firing gun. but He denied change cigarette machine. her for for the him as identified the other two men with companion at conferring with his After and Robinson’s brother Maurice Robinson machine, change, asked her for more Shark (a murder). minor at the time of the Charles Conaway asked which she refused. Shark companion it was and his to leave because trial, At Robinson’s neither Sand- Maurice opened closing time. When he almost manager, Conaway, could ers nor the bar door, they appeared, asking if the third man identify as someone he Maurice Robinson Conaway gotten the saw the three beer. night But had seen on the of the murder. away. young men walk Brooks, patron, Constance the bar testified later, Conaway recognized one of Approximately five minutes she Maurice Robinson as Benjamin purchased before pounding on the the two men who had beer heard Sanders shouting shooting.4 in. He said that bar door to be let actually pulled trigger year year mandatory person a 20 term with a 10 who ceived Robinson; help term without the of Melvin minimum. Robinson's concurrent for Maurice Shark, himself, longer help exchange robbery but in armed was also than Shark's. albeit to concrete, really nothing did Mr. Shark tes- Conaway tify, identified Shark whom he knew and I think that should be noted to the bar, sight patron a of the but he could not court. noted, identify and Shark were Robinson. Constance Brooks identified As we have Robinson offenses; however, Robinson, although guilty she had not of the same Rob- both Shark found before; memory given longer a sentence. For the known either of them her visual inson was murder, Conaway's year may with a 15 have been better than because he received a 30 term Evans, barmaid, minimum, year mandatory an whereas Shark re- she was artist. Barbara ments, following: night, prosecutors testified to the and the Shark failed to correct perjured testimony. near his resi- their he met the Robinson brothers bar; and went with them to the he and dence Napue, In the Court a held conviction is buy Robinson went in to while Maurice beer through evidence, obtained the use of false outside; Charles Robinson waited when leav- and therefore violates the Fourteenth bar, they saw two men outside a Amendment, state, “although when the not club; men, they past social walked evidence, soliciting go false it allows uncor- lead, down; in the and slowed Shark Shark 269, appears.” rected when it 360 U.S. at him, shout, scuffling, heard sounds behind a S.Ct. at 1177. The Court elaborated: shot; gun he turned and one of and a saw principle may that a State not down; the men fall Maurice Robinson was evidence, knowingly including use false standing away gun few feet with a testimony, false to obtain a tainted convic- hand; up money lying picked some tion, implicit any concept of ordered next to the fallen man and fled with his liberty, apply merely does cease to money companions; gave half the to Mau- testimony goes only because the false rice Robinson and went home. of the witness. The reliability estimate of the truthfulness and DISCUSSION given may of a witness well be determina- innocence, guilt tive of upon or and it is A. such possible subtle factors as the interest of the corpus petition, testifying falsely In witness a habeas if the that a evidentiary hearing, liberty may depend. defendant’s life or district court held an error, findings review its of fact clear Id. Cir.1989), Owens, (3d 44, v. Lesko 881 F.2d 50-51 Giglio, government’s ease de denied, 1036, rt. 493 U.S. 110 S.Ct. ce pended entirely testimony almost on the of a (1990), 107 L.Ed.2d 775 but if it relied government promised witness whom the it record, ple on the court our state review prosecute would not if he testified. The trial Fulcomer, nary. Zettlemoyer v. 923 F.2d agree had not himself made the — (3d Cir.), denied, U.S. -, cert. it, ment and was unaware of but Court (1991); 116 L.Ed.2d 232 Reese charged knowledge agree him with Cir.1991), Fulcomer, (3d 946 F.2d 253-54 *7 predecessor. ment made The Court — denied, U.S. -, rt. 112 S.Ct. ce 1679, held that because the evidence was relevant (1992). case, 118 In L.Ed.2d 396 this to the assessment of the of evidentiary the district court did not hold an witness, required new would be if hearing, plenary. so our review is re We “ testimony any ... in ‘the false could rea novo, view the trial record de as did the judg sonable likelihood have affected the district court. ’” Giglio, ment of the 405 U.S. at

154, 766, (quoting Napue, 92 at S.Ct. 360 B. 1178) (alteration 271, U.S. at 79 S.Ct. at in original). Giglio embody Napue Both right process A defendant’s to due is knowing per the rule that the state’s use of implicated when the state obtains a convic jured testimony to obtain a conviction is con upon testimony tion based the state knows is error, stitutional but that does not automati Illinois, 264, perjured. Napue v. 360 U.S. cally petitioner entitle to relief. The court 269, 1173, 1177, 79 S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 must also decide the error is not harmless. (1959); States, Giglio 150, v. United 405 U.S. 153-55, 765-66, 763, Supreme 92 S.Ct. 31 L.Ed.2d 104 Court has distin (1972). Napue Giglio, prosecu guished kinds of constitutional at two error agreements tion made in witnesses ex trial: structural error and trial error. A trial; change compromises for their Both witnesses structural error the entire falsely agree- requires denied it the existence of the reversal because it involves a men; identify they apprehended.

was not called to she died at about the time were 884 (4th 447, Paderick, 451 541 F.2d v. protection Boone so of a constitutional deprivation denied, 959, Cir.1976), 430 97 S.Ct. cert. U.S. absence, ‘“a criminal trial its

basic (1977). 1610, 51 L.Ed.2d 811 function as a vehicle reliably its cannot serve innocence, guilt or for determination C. may regarded be as punishment no criminal ” assessing recently, the standard Until Fulmi fundamentally Arizona v. fair.’ and collateral on both direct harmless error 1246, 279, 310, nante, 111 S.Ct. 499 U.S. “beyond a appeared whether it review was (1991) (citation 1265, omit 302 113 L.Ed.2d complained the error doubt that reasonable ted). are a Examples of structural error obtained.” contribute to the verdict did not Ohio, 510, Tumey 273 judge, v. U.S. biased 18, 24, California, 386 U.S. 87 Chapman v. (1927), 437, 749 or 71 L.Ed. 47 S.Ct. (1967). 824, Chapman, the 828 Under S.Ct. counsel, Wainwright, v. of trial Gideon denial harmless rested proving error an burden 792, 335, L.Ed.2d 9 799 83 S.Ct. 372 U.S. Id. with the state. (1963). A is one which “occurred trial error — Abrahamson, U.S. In Brecht v. of the case to the during presentation (1993), -, L.Ed.2d 353 113 123 S.Ct. quantita may be jury, therefore and which a new standard for the Court announced context of other evi tively in the assessed wheth on collateral review: harmless error presented in order to determine dence whole, er, as a the error light of the record was harmless-” its admission whether prejudice” to the defen in “actual resulted Fulminante, 307-08, 111 at 499 at S.Ct. U.S. Brecht, at -, at 113 S.Ct. dant. -U.S. trial error Examples of constitutional prejudice occurs when the con 1722. Actual misstating an element are instructions “ injuri error substantial stitutional ‘had Clark, offense, v. 478 U.S. Rose determining or influence ous effect (1986), L.Ed.2d 460 or 92 106 S.Ct. ” — at -, jury’s verdict.’ U.S. defendant’s silence at improper comment on States, v. (quoting 1722 United Kotteakos 499, 103 trial, Hasting, S.Ct. 461 U.S. U.S. 1239, 1253, 750, 776, 66 90 S.Ct. U.S. (1983). Structural error 76 L.Ed.2d (1946)); Beyer, Kontakis v. L.Ed. 1557 harmless; trial error can be. Ful cannot Cir.1994). (3d 110, 116 F.3d minante, 310, 111 at 1265. S.Ct. 499 U.S. at stan By introducing a more deferential was trial error. The The error this case review, empha the Court on collateral dard testimony be assessed must therefore cor the writ of habeas historically sized of the other evidence determine context regarded extraordinary an pus has been was harmless. whether its admission grievous wrongs. remedy to afford relief — at -, Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1719. U.S. speak prosecutor’s A “‘[fjederal intrusions It reasoned that into sentencing judge a witness’s behalf in criminal trials both States’ state frustrate testimony especial- return for the witness’s *8 punish sovereign power offenders and credibility. ly likely to create an issue of As constitu good-faith attempts to honor their Appeals of States the the United Court ” — at -, 113 rights,’ id. U.S. S.Ct. tional Fourth Circuit noted: Issac, 107, (quoting Engle v. 456 U.S. at 1720 [Rjather weakening significance the than 1558, 1572, 128, L.Ed.2d 71 783 102 S.Ct. of an of purposes (1982)), allowance of and stated liberal treatment, may in- tentativeness favorable “‘degrades prominence of writ ” — relevancy. This is because a crease its at -, itself,’ id. U.S. 113 (without leniency promise to recommend Engle, (quoting 456 U.S. at at 1720-21 S.Ct. it) by may interpreted assurance of be 1571), encourages 127, habe- 102 S.Ct. at contingent upon quality promisee as relitigate claims on petitioners to their as — at -, produced review, id., more uncer- evidence U.S. 113 collateral —the Thus, greater the incen- agreement, the considerations of feder tain the at 1721. S.Ct. in testimony pleasing comity, state’s interest final to the alism and tive to make ity that have survived direct of convictions promisor.

885 review, retrying review, and the social costs defen standard for collateral “[petitioners] original years after the conviction out dants are not entitled to habeas relief based on Chapman weigh any additional effect the they trial error unless can establish that it ” — deterring would have state standard Id., prejudice.’ resulted in ‘actual U.S. failing fully courts from enforce constitu -, 113 at (citing S.Ct. 1722 United — at -, rights. Id. tional U.S. Lane, 438, 449, States v. 474 U.S. 106 S.Ct. at 1721-22. 113 S.Ct. (1986)).6 725 standard, The new announced exception Robinson an *9 difference, easy ignore but one when the burden, saying in Brecht the state bears the but guilt strongly sense of comes from the record. Lowery explicitly adopt do not Collins, that view. v. Brecht,-U.S. at-, (Ste- 113 S.Ct. at 1724 770, (5th Cir.1993) (quot- 996 F.2d 773 vens, J., Kotteakos, concurring) (quoting 328 U.S. Stevens, J., Dixon, ing concurring); Smith v. 996 764, (citation omitted)). at 66 S.Ct. at 1247-48 667, (4th Cir.1993) (quoting F.2d White, J., 677 n. 13 Stevens, dissenting). Only opinion states concurring, one separately 6. Justice wrote burden, Court, outright that the state has the Stoner v. understanding to set forth his that the Sawders, 209, (6th Cir.1993), standard, adopting and a adopted the 997 F.2d 213 Kotteakos also placing pros- opinion by the Kotteakos later the same court stated that the Court's the burden on (- prove referring petitioner ecutors to harmless error U.S. at burden is on the without 886 by failing to call it to the knowing waive the error use the obtained conviction

“[A] court, the fundamentally un- the an error which testimony attention of is perjured of any if there is at trial fair, attorney aside could have corrected and must be set defense testimony the false integrity likelihood that of the likely reasonable “to infect the is — judgment of the Brecht, the have affected could at - n. U.S. proceeding_” (footnotes 103, 96 S.Ct. at 2397 jury.” Id. at 9, n. 9. at 1722 113 S.Ct. omitted). charged the with prosecutor must The apply the have us would Robinson advantage of to take he failed error because Agurs of standard likelihood” “reasonable exami on direct and re-direct opportunities injurious and than the “substantial rather perjured correct nation to Brecht, pre- and he cites of effect” standard nor neither deliberate error was But “materiality” in the evaluating cases Brecht statement, prose in his planned; ap misconduct and prosecutorial of context agree aspects all of the referred to cutor pre-Brecht “reasonable likelihood” plying the custody, immunity, protective ment: v. error. Landano of harmless standard judge promise to inform the (3d Cir.1988), cert. Rafferty, 856 F.2d 569 Presumably, neither cooperation. Shark’s 1127, 1014, denied, 103 109 S.Ct. 489 U.S. testimony would perjured counsel knew (1989) (habeas appeal); Brown 189 L.Ed.2d occur, occur, as soon as it did and both knew Cir.1986) (11th Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 v. judge.7 We conclude the the trial as did Wallach, (habeas v. appeal); United States especially a “deliberate error was neither (direct (2d Cir.1991) appeal). 445 935 F.2d type, one [n]or of the trial egregious error Agurs still Regardless standard whether prosecuto- pattern a that is combined with any vitality in cases after habeas retains “might infect the so rial misconduct” Brecht, in this case find the error we do not to warrant the integrity proceeding of the the Brecht stan departure a warrants relief, if it did not grant habeas even dard. jury’s verdict.” substantially influence the — little doubt the There is 9, Brecht, 113 at U.S. at - n. S.Ct. testimony perjured should have corrected Therefore, apply the we will 1722 n. 9. duty of the This was the of his witness. peti whether to determine Brecht standard “ Giglio, attorney. prosecutor, not the defense the error ‘had substantial tioner has shown 766; at United 405 at 92 S.Ct. U.S. injurious or influence determin effect (3d Harris, F.2d — States Id. U.S. at jury’s verdict.’”8 denied, Cir.), 95 S.Ct. cert. U.S. Kotteakos, -, (quoting at 1722 113 S.Ct. (1974). Nonetheless, 655, 42 L.Ed.2d 665 1253). at at 328 U.S. had that the it became clear when emphasized court district The testimony, perjured not corrected the agree jury testified under an knew Shark attorney could have alerted defense by which he would bene with the state ment remedy that have judge sought ample evidence to fit and that there was prejudice to his any possibility of eliminated credibility. It cited the fol assess Shark’s client, an instruction stipulation such as a or lowing evidence: Instead, the agreement. on the details was a was aware the mis attorney sought to counter defense perjured had himself convicted felon who leading impression through cross-examina Furthermore, appar- it trial. at his own Although we closing argument. tion and from the record that attorney did not ent agree Robinson that his Brecht, Morris, presum- opinion, out before opinion. which came O’Neal v. 3 F.3d the earlier ably Chapman when it denied standard used applied petition. the new Brecht If it argument, counsel acknowl- 7. At oral Robinson's standard, to the habeas which is less favorable trial, attorneys edged and the trial that at both certainly petitioner, would have denied the it between knew what was in the petition does not matter to our re- also. That Robinson and the state. however, view, we look at the record de because *10 reviewing denial of the district court’s novo in apply same stan- we is not the 8. The standard petition. petitioner’s habeas The district court’s dard the district court used. noted, apprised conflicting testimony have in determining Shark’s the effect of this point error, at Robinson’s trial. Shark at one which during pre- “occurred promised that he had been immuni- denied sentation jury,” of the case to the we must ty protective custody exchange in assess it “in the context of other evidence [testimony], yet his he later admitted to presented in order to determine whether its these facts. Fulminante, admission was harmless.” bringing agreement out this under at U.S. S.Ct. at 1264. We conclude cross-examination, direct and both the there was sufficient evidence to undermine prosecution conveyed and the defense credibility. Shark’s The evidence of the testifying subject that Shark was prosecutor’s promise sentencing to tell the agreement to an with the State from which judge of cooperation Shark’s would have add- attorney he would benefit. The defense only ed incrementally to pre- the evidence questioned regarding agree- Shark this agreement sented on the and Shark’s credi- in impeach credibility. ment an effort to his bility. relating all of With these factors to Shark’s duty had a to correct the credibility jury, before the this Court finds perjured testimony of his witness. In these that there is no reasonable likelihood that circumstances, however, agree with the perjured testimony regarding Shark’s district court that the error was harmless. agreement with the State could have af- We conclude the absence of the evidence of judgment jury. fected the prosecutor’s promise speak argument Robinson contended at oral sentencing judge did not result in “actual the evidence Shark was a convicted felon prejudice” because it did not have “substan- perjured who had himself at his own trial is injurious tial and effect or influence in deter- qualitatively different from the evidence the mining jury’s verdict.” prosecutor improperly agree withheld. We jury’s knowledge just that a witness has lied CONCLUSION gain testifying about what he stands to foregoing reasons, For the we will affirm generally damaging is more to his the district court’s denial of the writ of habe- knowledge than the that he has lied corpus. past. ease, however, In this knew Shark POLLAK, LOUIS H. District

had lied to it gain about what he stood to (dissenting). First, agreement from the aas whole. all; promised anything

denied he had been then, cross-examination, I. he admitted he promised immunity; finally, had been on re- principal When Melvin Shark —the state’s direct, promised he admitted he had been against witness Maurice Robinson —was sen- protective custody. Significantly, unlike the part killing tenced for his in the of K.O. prosecutors in Napue Giglio, prose- Floyd, told the here, statement, cutor his ac- judge: knowledged promise his to tell the sentenc- fact, bring what, That will us around to ing judge cooperation. of Shark’s The de- Mr. told Shark was me in all candor attorney acknowledgment fense built on that speak that I him in respect this arguing not a credible witness. sentence, at his that Your Honor would unlikely We think it that further evidence against note in testifying his misrepresenting Shark was his codefendant and codefendants. changed jury’s would have evaluation of his whether, Honor, inquiry

The crucial under it is true that without [Y]our Brecht, Robinson has testimony proving against shown the error “had the case his injurious difficult, substantial and effect or influence codefendant would have if determining impossible.... verdict.” As we *11 of, and stand, existence about the denied trials has in both the cooperation [H]is testimony. The no other there was which would not have had we noted because to be the closing, did not tell in his prosecutor, person who to convict the opportunity the bargain had that a denial jury that Shark’s Kayo trigger on Mr. the actually pulled Instead, prose- the perjury. Robinson, struck was that was Maurice Floyd, and reshaped bargain: the cutor, closing, in his Shark, albeit help of Melvin the without help himself.... but Yes, him as a witness called the State Robinson, pros- opened the I expect? of Maurice At the trial did Melvin Shark what things informed you statement certain were you in his and had told ecutor told, the him, “was his yes. [was] Shark What jury promised that Melvin the his lawyer pres- to him when was any promise made His big of His deal? extent deal? came, would be cooperation it. And he ex- his sentence when we discussed ent sentencing judge but the no “I know that to the plained made known his answers.... time, years, anything I the like me and know of Judge deal terms can sentence put prosecutor any power Shark over the have that.” But when Prosecutor doesn’t stand, from his star jury not elicit found me Judge he did the on the because the verdict, bargain he Jury the had bargaining. guilty. plea confirmation No witness when, on cross- And does not have the about. Prosecutor guilty. told So the examination, inquired about anything counsel to the defense power to recommend months, falsely, years, and un- bargain, Judge anymore Shark in terms denied— bargain had been any testify for? And such did he days.” der oath —that what So Well, coming out now: it’s struck: this is where him say facing over there was what did sir, fact, prosecutor that the Q. it not a Is code, code, the code not a different get on that you you if would that promised here, jail here: in the Sub- live but today testify State stand beatings if the physical jected to some Robinson, they tell against Mr. want what did he gets out. So word your cooperation? custody. protective “I want the State? Well, promise me he’d talk to he didn’t A. severely if I being beaten subject to I’m Judge about that. defendant.” testify against another say that? Q. He didn’t go back in promise me he’d A. He didn’t coop- I Judge and tell him II.

and talk nothing promised to me. Was erated. prose acknowledges “[t]he that court truth? Q. that’s the And perjured duty to correct had a cutor thing promised to me Only was A. Yes. prose duty the testimony of his witness” —a of. I’d be taken care con The court not to fulfill. cutor elected of,” testified, meant Being “taken care Shark cludes, nonetheless, that Robinson Maurice Later, also custody.” ac- “protective curative writ of habeas entitled to the not promised immunity knowledged that he was “error was prosecutor’s corpus because the testimony against Robin- respect to his harmless? Why was error harmless.” today in this say anything court- I son—“if prosecutor’s evidence “[t]he Because ” room, against me.... be used it wouldn’t sentencing judge of promise to tell perjured denial never recanted his But Shark only added would have cooperation Shark’s promised that “when that the presented incrementally to evidence came, his sentence [Shark’s] credibility.” Shark’s known to the would be made reasons, can Therefore, the error the court ...” “‘had substantial said to have determining injurious influence counsel, effect or closing, undertook in his Defense ” Abrahamson, v. had, Brecht verdict.’ to remind 1710, 1722, 123 - U.S. -, -, promise made to opening, described (1993) (quoting Kotteakos Shark, L.Ed.2d 353 on the witness promise Shark —a

889 States, 750, 776, against being United 328 U.S. 66 S.Ct. highway” drunk on a him — (1946)). 1253, 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 dropped exchange “had been prom- for his speak ise to prosecutor with the about the agree. I am unable to 676, murder.” Id. at S.Ct. 1434. The prosecutor, closing, As the his elected to Court, speaking through Rehnquist, Justice reshape bargain the he had made with agreed with the Supreme Delaware Court Shark, “promise to him ... [that] the made judge’s ruling contravened the would be made known to the rights accused’s under the Confrontation sentencing judge” away faded and was re- Clause, prevented since it engag- him “from placed by promise: another “So what did he appropriate in otherwise cross-examina- protective want from the State? ‘I want designed tion prototypical to show a form of custody. subject being severely I’m beat- witness, on part bias thereby testify against en if I another defendant.’” expose jury ‘to to the the facts from which protective Of course Shark wanted custo- jurors ... appropriately could draw inferenc- not, however, dy. custody Protective was an ” relating reliability es to the of the witness.’ protective end itself. Shark wanted custo- Id. at 106 S.Ct. at 1436.1 dy give testimony against so that he could reprisal Robinson with little risk of from In Delaware v. Van Arsdall the constitu Indeed, other inmates. Shark would have was, course, tional error of unintended. In protective custody had no need for—or bar, the case at prosecu the action of the immunity from adverse use his testimo- compounding perju his chief witness’ tor — ny comply not decided —had ry advertent. And it was calculated to —was prosecutor’s proposal testify that h.e jury’s major obscure from the part view the against exchange prose- Robinson in for the jury might what the pro have deemed “a undertaking cutor’s to tell totypical form of Accordingly, bias.” I can short, judge cooperation. about Shark’s agree truth, with the court that the which prosecutor’s promise speak to the prosecutor helped hide, Shark to “would sentencing judge on Shark’s behalf was the only have incrementally added to the evi quid quo real for the of Shark’s presented dence on the And to do what the did—to lead credibility.” Shark’s With matters in this promise protective to focus on the posture, I do not share the court’s confidence custody centerpiece as the of what Shark prosecutor’s conduct did not have “want[ed] the State” —was to draw the “ injurious ‘substantial and effect or influence jury away paramount, per- from Shark’s ” determining jury’s verdict.’ Brecht denied, juriously objective testifying — Abrahamson, at -, U.S. 113 S.Ct. against By applying Robinson. cosmetics to Presumably, prosecutor’s at 1722. it was the perjured testimony, Shark’s exactly intention that his conduct would have beclouded defense counsel’s efforts to show determining such “influence in ver magnitude the true of Shark’s incen- dict.” give testimony pleasing prose- tive to

cutor. Therefore, I dissent. Arsdall, In Delaware v. Van 475 U.S. SLOVITER, Judge, Present: Chief (1986), 89 L.Ed.2d 674 BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, Supreme Court reviewed a state court mur- GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, der conviction in which the trial re- COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, permit elicit, fused to defense counsel to McKEE, important prosecu- Judges, cross-examination of an LEWIS and Circuit witness, POLLAK**, charge tion the fact that “a Judge. criminal District Arsdall, ruling 1. In Delaware v. Van the Delaware Su- termination whether the erroneous preme doubt, Court had concluded that the trial court’s beyond pre- harmless a reasonable ruling required erroneous reversal of the convic- Brecht standard. Supreme tion. The Court vacated the Delaware ** panel rehearing only. As to Supreme judgment, remanding Court's for a de- REHEARING PETITION FOR SUR

July by appel- rehearing filed petition *13 having case in the above-entitled

lant judges participated in who

submitted to all the other of this Court

the decision regu- of the circuit judges circuit

available service, con- no who

lar active having for re- asked in the decision

curred judges circuit majority of the

hearing, and a having service regular circuit petition for rehear- rehearing, the

voted banc, panel the Court grant re- Stapleton would

denied.

hearing. America STATES

UNITED HANNIGAN, Appellant.

Eugene 93-1596.

No. Appeals, Court

United States Circuit.

Third

Argued Feb. 23, 1994.

Decided June notes to the Brecht Kotteakos, Brecht and derived from does not rule, set forth in a footnote in that case. require showing a that “but for” the error Declaring that the Kotteakos harmless-error would have rendered a verdict applies standard with constitutional error “of Singletary, favor of defendant. Duest v. 997 type,” the trial the Court noted: (11th 1336, Cir.1993) (citing F.2d 1338 Kot holding Our possi- does not foreclose the teakos, 1247). 763, 328 U.S. at 66 S.Ct. at bility case, that in an unusual a deliberate it reviewing Nor is relevant whether especially egregious error of the trial persuaded guilty. court is the defendant is type, or one that is pat- combined with a The court must stand the shoes of the — prosecutorial misconduct, might tern of so Id., -, jury.5 U.S. at 113 S.Ct. at integrity infect the proceeding as to question 1724. The it must consider is: Did grant relief, warrant the of habeas even if “substantially the constitutional [and error substantially it did not influence the injuriously] influence” verdict? Id. at verdict. 765, so, petitioner If 66 S.Ct. at 1248. entitled to habeas relief. — Brecht, 9, U.S. at - n. 113 S.Ct. at n. 1722 9. Robinson announcing In addition contends the error in a new standard, magnitude this case is of such the Brecht that it consti Court shifted the bur proof petitioner. exception tutes an den of The Court to the new rule. He that, circumstances, Chapman, argues noted under the state bore these proving beyond the burden of should resort harmless error to the standard of United — Brecht, 97, 2392, a Agurs, reasonable doubt. at States v. U.S. 427 U.S. 49 -, (1976), stated, 113 S.Ct. at 1717. Under the new L.Ed.2d 342 where the Court -, explained, 1723-24). 5. As the Court in language Kotteakos the issue is 113 S.Ct. at jurors however, not whether the were opinion, clearly puts of the the burden right judgment, regardless petitioner, in their of the error on the habeas not on the state. Most upon appeals or its effect the verdict. It is rather what applied courts of that have the new reasonably may effect the error had or Brecht standard have or stated that the assumed upon jury's taken to have had decision. proof petitioner. Kyles burden of is on the v. thing impact thing 806, The crucial is the (5th Cir.1993); Whitley, 5 F.3d 818 O’Neal men, wrong done on the minds of other not on Morris, 143, (6th Cir.1993); Tague v. 3 F.3d 145 own, setting. one’s in the total Richards, (7th Cir.1993); v. 3 F.3d 1140 This must take account of what the error Estelle, (9th Henry v. 993 F.2d Cir. them, singled standing meant to out and 1993); (9th Blodgett, 5 F.3d Jeffries alone, happened. but in relation to all else that Cir.1993); Stainer, Castillo v. 997 F.2d And one must others' reactions not (9th Cir.1993). Some do not discuss who has the own, but allowance for how others Collins, (5th burden. Vanderbilt v. 994 F.2d 189 might regarded generally react not be Cir.1993); Duest, (11th Cir.1993). 997 F.2d 1336 acting important without reason. This is the quote concurring dissenting opinion A few or

Case Details

Case Name: Maurice Robinson v. Patrick Arvonio, Superintendent, East Jersey State Prison Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Jul 14, 1994
Citation: 27 F.3d 877
Docket Number: 92-5667
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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