Thе issue before us is whether an entry by police officers into the living room of an apartment occupied by the apartment complex’s manager and his wife, in the circumstances presented, permits recovery for the tort of invasion of privacy based on a theory of “intrusion upon seclusion.” The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of defendant police officers and their employer, the City of Portland, on that claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Mauri v. Smith,
This court previously has discussed the standard for granting a directed verdict. “Normally, when a defendant mоves for a directed verdict for failure to establish a claim, the motion, in effect, asks for a dismissal of the entire case because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is insufficient to support a recovery.”
Ream v. Keen,
Although plaintiffs asserted numerous claims below, only their claim for invasion of privacy comes to us on review. 1 Therefore, we discuss only the facts relevant to that claim.
Sergio Mauri, Sr. (Senior), his wife, Noraida, and their son, Sergio Mauri, Jr. (Junior), lived together at a Portland apartment complex, where Senior was the resident *480 manager. We refer to Senior and his wife as “plaintiffs” in this case.
On the evening of July 17, 1988, defendant Smith, an employee of defendant Capitol Investigation Company, Ltd. (Capitol), went to plaintiffs’ apartment to serve a civil summons and complaint on Junior. Whеn Smith knocked on the door, no one opened it. Smith looked through a window and saw Junior asleep on a couch on the first floor of the apartment. Senior and Noraida were watching television in an upstairs bedroom. Smith began to pound on the door loudly, claimed that he was a “сourt marshal,” demanded that Junior open the door, and yelled obscenities and racial slurs. Senior then went downstairs, opened the door, and asked Smith for identification. When Smith refused to produce identification, Senior told him to leave.
Smith left the premises and called his employer frоm a nearby telephone booth to get further instructions. Meanwhile, a neighbor who had witnessed the confrontation between Smith and Senior called 9-1-1. Senior testified that, after Smith left the apartment, he stood at the door to watch Smith because, if Smith had not called the police, Seniоr would have.
Two Portland police officers, defendants Reiter and Eckhart, arrived and learned from Smith that he was trying to serve a civil summons and complaint on Junior. According to Senior’s testimony, he tried to get the officers to come to him but had to wait while they talked to Smith. The officers toоk the criminal summons and complaint from Smith. Then, when the officers approached plaintiffs’ apartment, Senior was waiting outside. The front door to the apartment was open.
Senior knew that the police officers had been called because of his altercation with Smith. Senior testified that he told the two officers not to allow Smith to enter. The two officers entered the apartment, and Senior accompanied them.
Despite Senior’s request to the two police officers to keep Smith out, Smith followed them into plaintiffs’ living room, and the officers did not stоp him. Inside the apartment, Senior asked the officers to “Take this man [Smith] out of my *481 property.” One of the officers threw the papers at Junior and called him a derogatory name. Smith shouted obscenities at the Mauris and challenged Junior to a fight. Junior chased Smith out of the apartment, bumping into Eckhart in the process. The officers chased Junior, who eventually ran back inside the apartment and into the kitchen. The officers followed him into the apartment. Meanwhile, additional officers had arrived at the scene. After a melee in the kitchen, officers arrested both Junior and Senior.
Noraida was present when the police officers entered the living room. She was present when Senior asked the officers to keep Smith out of the apartment and to take him out, but she had no conversation with the two officers at that time. Neither did she say anything to Sеnior about the officers’ entry into the living room. She testified that her husband was trying to explain things to the officers to get their help in keeping or taking Smith out.
At trial, there was no evidence that either plaintiff expressly invited or authorized defendants Reiter and Eckhart to enter their living room. There alsо was no evidence that either plaintiff expressly asked the two officers not to enter or otherwise objected to their entry, either verbally or physically.
All three Mauris filed this action against Smith, Capitol, seven police officers, and the City of Portland, asserting a claim for invasion оf privacy and several other claims. Junior voluntarily dismissed all his claims with prejudice before trial. The trial court directed verdicts for all defendants on plaintiffs’ invasion-of-privacy claim and for defendants Smith and Capitol on plaintiffs’ assault claim. The trial court concluded that an intrusion into a residence, without more, is not sufficient to sustain a claim for invasion of privacy on a theory of “intrusion upon seclusion.” The remaining claims were tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for Senior on some of his claims.
Plaintiffs appealed. As now relevant, they challenged the trial court’s granting of a directed verdict for defendants on the invasion-of-privacy claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the directed verdict for the police officers and the City of Portland, reasoning that the tort of invasion
*482
of privacy based on a theory of “intrusion upon seclusion” requires a showing of unconsented entry and that plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence of an unconsented entry.
Mauri,
The tort of invasion of privacy, in general, protects the right of a plaintiff “to be let alone.”
Humphers v. First Interstate Bank,
In
McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp.,
To analyze whether the evidence was sufficient to allow the рresent claim to go to the jury, we will examine each of those elements. We begin by noting the specific nature of plaintiffs’ claim here: They argue that defendants Reiter and Eckhart invaded their privacy by initially entering the living room of their apartment. 3
As stated earlier, the first element of thе tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion is an intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise. Until now, this court has not interpreted the concept of “intentional intrusion” in this tort.
Although courts in other jurisdictions often use the phrase “intentional intrusion” in this context, few define it. A notable exception is O’Donnell v. U.S., 891 F2d 1079 (3d Cir 1989). The plaintiff in that case, a former patient of the Veterans Administration (VA), sued the VA for intrusion upon seclusion when it released a summary of his psychiatric treatment to his employer without having received authorization. Id. at 1081. The trial court granted the VA’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1080.
On appeal, the Third Circuit set out to define “intentional intrusion.” It gave “intent” the meaning stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965): “that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.” Id. at 1083. 4 Because the Restatement does not *484 define “intrusion,” the court looked to its ordinary meaning; the dictiоnary “defines ‘intrude’ to mean to thrust oneself in without invitation, permission, or welcome.” O’Donnell, 891 F2d at 1083 (referring to Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1187 (1966)). The court then analyzed the Restatement’s discussion of intrusion upon seclusion in the light of those definitions:
“The comments and illustrations to Section 652B disclose that an ‘intrusion upon seclusion’ claim usually involves a defendant who does not believe that he has either the necessary personal permission or legal authority to commit the intrusive act.” O’Donnell, 891 F2d at 1083.
The court then held that there was no intrusion, primarily because it was undisputed that the VA believed that it had the plaintiffs permission to release the disputed record.
Ibid.
Accordingly, summary judgment for the VA was proper.
Ibid.
To similar effect, see
Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc.,
Because its analysis is sound and is based on the Restatement — thе same source from which we derive a definition of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion — we are in general accord with the above-described reasoning of O’Donnell. A person intrudes by thrusting himself or herself in without invitation, permission, or welcome. A person acts intentionally when he or she either desirеs to cause the consequence of an act or believes that the consequence is substantially certain to result from the act. By definition, then, an actor commits an intentional intrusion if the actor either desires to cause an unauthorized intrusion or believes that an unauthorized intrusion is substantially certain to result from committing the invasive act in question. 5
*485
A plaintiff bears the burden to establish each element of a tort. That principle applies equally to elements that involve a defendant’s state of mind.
See, e.g., McGanty v. Staudenraus,
With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to a consideration of the record in this case. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the record reasonably can be read to establish (a) that the officers lacked plaintiffs’ consent to enter their apartment or had consent to enter, but only for a particular purpose, and (b) that the officers either desired to cause an unauthorized intrusion or believed that an unauthorized intrusion wаs substantially certain to result from their entry. On the issue of “intentional intrusion,” then, the record is sufficient to create a question of fact for the jury.
The second element of this tort is that the intentional intrusion be upon the plaintiffs solitude or seclusion or private affairs or concerns. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a jury could find that their apartment was a private area in which they had secluded themselves.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652B, cmt
b
(1977) (physical intrusion into a place where a plaintiff has secluded himself or herself — such as the plaintiffs home or hotel room — can support this tort);
Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
The third and final element of the tort is that the intentional intrusion upon a plaintiffs private affairs or concerns be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, this element also is met.
See McLain,
In summary, there was evidence from which a jury reasonably could have found in plaintiffs’ favor, and against defendants Reiter and Eckhart and their employer, on each element of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. That being so, *486 the trial сourt erred in directing a verdict in favor of those defendants on this claim.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court for Smith and Capitol, and for Reiter, Eckhart, and the City of Portland, on plaintiffs’ claim of invasion of privacy is reversed and remanded; the judgment against defendants Walker, Carneau, Pace, Lorz, and Bunch on plaintiffs’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is reversed; the supplemental judgment is reversed; and the judgment is otherwise affirmed.
Notes
The Court of Appeals’ disposition of the remaining claims is reflected in the decisional paragraph at the end of this opinion.
We do not address the invasion-of-privacy claims against Smith and Capitol, because neither of those parties sought review.
At trial, plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that the officers’ second entry was for the purpose of arresting Junior but challenged the first entry. Counsel argued that the officers initially “walk[ed] in an apartment uninvited.” On appeal, plaintiffs carried the same argument forward when they stated:
“The trial court erred in not allowing the jury to determine whether defendants!’] intrusion into plaintiffs’ apartment (by way of еntering the apartment over plaintiffts’] objections) was offensive.”
That definition of “intent” is consistent with the definition that this court has given to the element of intent with respect to intentional torts generally. In
McGanty v. Staudenraus,
We emphasize that the parties have brought the case to us only on a theory of consent. Defendant police officers and their employer have not argued before us that they had a separate justification — such as law-enforcement authority — for the initial entry, in the absence of consent.
“Consent is willingness in fact fоr conduct to occur. It may be manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892(1) (1979). “One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it.” Id. § 892A(1). See also id. § 892A(3) (conditional or restricted consent is effective only within the limits of the condition or restriction).