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Maurer v. Maurer
623 N.W.2d 604
Minn.
2001
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*1 Rosemary Ann Marriage In re the

MAURER, Respondent, MAURER,

Michael Patrick

Petitioner, Appellant.

No. C7-99-1319.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March

1997. Maurer was 49 years old and Galvin years old when their marriage was dis- time, solved. At the Maurer owned the following retirement assets: State Minnesota Deferred Comp. 6,377.88 Plan $ Comp. Supp. MSRS Deferred $22,074.13 Investment Fund Comp. Minn. Life Deferred $21,841.71 Account Cloud, Zupanc, plaintiffs. Thomas St. Payment MSRS Termination Cloud, Kay Snyder, R. St. for defen- $48,112.00 Plan dants. $98,406.001 TOTAL Maurer, seeking to have the trial court distribute in plans the four value, based on their after-tax offered the OPINION testimony public accountant, of a certified PAGE, Justice. Hinnenkamp, David to establish that value. The trial court presented testimony The in allowed this over sole issue this mar- objection Galvin’s riage speculative. dissolution case is whether the trial Hinnenkamp court abused testified that he regularly its discretion when it consid- in performing values assets ered future tax in business valua- valuing (“Maurer”) personal tions and appellant preparing Michael financial Maurer’s re- statements. He further tirement assets. The trial court testified that both awarded (“Galvin”) personal business respondent valuations and Rosemary Galvin financial Maurer) statements take into account (formerly Rosemary anticipat- known as $77,846 paid ed tax to be property valued at asset when it and Maurer $77,840. converted property According to cash. valued at The Hinnen- award to kamp, professional general- Maurer included standards and funds he held three ly accepted plans accounting principles require deferred and one re- plan. tirement The trial that current court used the income tax rates be used to assets, plans after-tax value of the four in calculat- calculate the tax on op- these as parties’ posed the value of prop- making assumptions marital about what erty. plans pre-tax might The four had a the rates when value be the asset is con- $98,406 and an after-tax value of verted cash. $63,964. appeals The court of held Hinnenkamp also testified that he was because there was no evidence that a tax- familiar with Maurer’s retirement assets required by able event was the dissolution governing and the laws the taxation of thereafter, shortly or certain to occur Hinnenkamp, those assets. According engaged speculation compensa- funds from Maurer’s deferred plans used the after-tax value of the can in only be withdrawn four Maurer v. property. the marital retirement, disability, circumstances: Maurer, (Minn. 183-84 death, or an emergency. unforeseeable App.2000). appeals The court of reversed Hinnenkamp further testified that court and remanded for reconsid- funds withdrawn from Maurer’s retire- eration distribution be- subject ment assets taxation Id. at 184. We re- parties. tween the income, ordinary and that verse. combined federal and state ap-

Maurer and Galvin were married on rate for such withdrawals would be 9, 1971, July proximately Hinnenkamp separated March of 35%. testified dollar, figure appears 1. This to reflect nearest rounding court’s of the total value to motion for it denied Galvin’s ap- findings, penalty would that an additional findings change trial and did Maur- new made from any withdrawal ply to Maurer’s de- to the value of respect Plan be- Payment Termination er’s MSRS plans. compensation and retirement ferred of 59 age Maurer reached fore 1/2. rate, Hinnen- marginal tax the 35% Using appeals court of appeal, On *3 value of the the after-tax kamp calculated con- versed, the trial court’s holding that $63,964. establishing the In to be tax rate marginal of the 35% sideration rate, Hinnenkamp used marginal there was evi- speculative because was pro- and a taxable income Maurer’s 1997 taxable that a presented at dence income, in addi- jection of Maurer’s or by the dissolution required event in- that Maurer’s assuming tion Maur- shortly thereafter. certain to occur and that his not fluctuate come would er, The court of at 183-84. would income and deductions other with instructions remanded appeals Hin- testimony, In his main consistent. property settle- court “revisit the the deferred acknowledged that nenkamp of the tax the consideration ment because divided be- plans could be division of rendered the consequences the dissolu- parties part tween the inequitable.” Id. property tax conse- without immediate tion laws party; that the tax to either quences I. the effec- change; and

periodically discretion A trial court has broad depend on the dollar tax rate would tive of a property upon dissolution dividing plans. any withdrawal from amount of Rutten, 347 E.g., Rutten v. marriage. (Minn.1984). Determining trial, that he was N.W.2d At Maurer testified finding a specific value of an asset is Termi- cashing in his MSRS “considering” 144, 145, Minn. Plan, fact. Hertz v. he did not but that Payment nation curiam). (1975) (per that, al- 229 N.W.2d if would. He indicated know he fact, made without findings of when plans, he was “Such he had no definite though clearly aside unless jury, a shall not be set terminating his em- “thinking about” also record as a whole.” Id. erroneous on the allow him to with- ployment, which would be appropriate deference is compensa- Such broad his deferred draw funds from necessarily approxi “valuation is cause plans. Accordingly, Id. many mation in cases.” court found that the The trial byat the trial court need the value arrived upon distribution. would be taxable assets a reasonable only fall “within combined federal Applying the 35% figures.” Id. trial court also marginal tax state the trial court’s contends of Maurer’s re- Galvin found the after-tax value here $63,964. consequences of tax par- consideration to be Both tirement assets speculation un- impermissible findings and Gal- constituted ties moved for amended trial, beginning court’s cases der a line of this alternatively moved for new vin Aaron, trial with Aaron v. things, other that the arguing, among (Minn.1979). essence, argues In Galvin not have considered future court should progeny establish that Aaron and Maur- income tax that, event unless a taxable bright-line rule response In er’s retirement assets. motions, by likely or to occur required is either the trial court alternative Galvin’s dissolution, the consider- after the shortly evidence before “[t]he stated specu- future tax tax rate is what ation of is that the Court argues impermissible. Maurer lative and possible apply. While does not es- Aaron line of cases that the apply, tax rate could no evidence higher According rule. bright-line such a ap- tax rate would tablish that a lower suggests Maurer, merely cases establish those court amended its ply.” Although the trial where no evidence of conse- sale of real is required estate or is introduced, has been a court en- to occur within a short time after the dis- speculation by considering gages solution, that should not consider consequences. tax consequences it should.” Id. —indeed argues, at 153. Galvin and the have, occasions, We several ad- appeals agreed, language dressed the issue of whether a trial court Aaron that only establishes two situations permit court to consider future con- dividing marital mar- sequences a sale the property —when riage dissolution See cases. required either certain occur within a 153; N.W.2d at Miller v. Maurer, short time of the dissolution. O’Brien v. *4 183; Hattstrom, N.W.2d at v. Hattstrom O’Brien, 850, 343 N.W.2d 854 332, 385 N.W.2d 336 (Minn.App.1986); Johnson, 208, 277 Johnson N.W.2d Brockman, 664, Brockman v. (Minn.1979). Aaron, In appellant the hus- fact, (Minn.App.1985). In that not is band was awarded a 25% interest in cer- what in any we held Aaron. Nor have of apartment properties. tain 281 N.W.2d at our subsequent so cases held. To so have argued 152. He that the trial court erred held would have been with inconsistent by failing to consider that he would have to recognition our that “it within is the trial pay significant capital gains taxes when court’s discretion to consider the tax con- apartment properties the were sold. Id. at sequences of its award.” 152-53. it within We stated that was the Miller, 153; 744; at N.W.2d 352 N.W.2d at discretion to court’s consider the tax Johnson, 277 N.W.2d at 213. a Such consequences of at At its award. Id. bright-line little, any, rule would leave if time, expressed the same our agree- room for the exercise of discretion. jurisdictions ment with cases from other “ that court not to required specu- ‘the is Moreover, analysis our in Aaron not did late about what either or of both the turn upon satisfy the husband’s failure to spouses do with his or possibly her rule, bright-line upon but rather the evi- equal engraft share and therefore to dentiary record and our standard of adjustments the division further reflecting view. The in simply husband Aaron failed theory situations based on rather than ” to introduce evidence at trial that rendered (quoting Marriage fact.’ Id. In re of refusal court’s to consider the Fonstein, Cal.Rptr. 17 Cal.3d consequences future tax an of award (1976)). 552 P.2d thenWe ob- abuse of in discretion. Our decisions that the served husband failed to show similarly O’Brien and Miller demonstrate that he needed or intended sell his that speculation our concern Aaron was interest in the properties. Id. We also form generally of reliance on insuffi- noted that the husband testified that the cient evidence rather than determin- were properties long-term investment bright-line whether a rule had been until probably and would not be sold fully O’Brien, (“[T]he met. at 854 N.W.2d depreciated. Id. in light We held precludes law consideration evidence, where the trial court did not abuse speculate court must because the evidence its discretion when it refused consider lacking nonspecific.”); possible upon is (“The properties. Id. at 744 must suffi- sale court have cient information that the actual tax liabili- added, however, ty resulting can that we from division We were case, proper not “that in holding degree where be calculated with reasonable “[bjecause it, Johnson, a virtual put is cer- aptly also certainty.”); see not tainty [the will receive his owner] (finding no in trial court’s at 213 error of income lia- retirement free [assets] refusal only question proba- bility, the is what pre- no evidence on the issue “where Alexander, liability be.” ble will trial”). at sented reasoning persua- P.2d at 64. We find this bright-line A rale is also inconsis also to note that important It sive. pronouncements proper with our tent such as de- retirement assets approxima an ty necessarily “valuation is ferred cases, only necessary many and it is tion until the little or real value have value at lies within a arrived withdrawn, which, them are ironi- within figures.” reasonable triggers the event their taxa- cally, is Minn, 44; 145, see also N.W.2d at conclude that would tion. We therefore Johnson, (noting 277 N.W.2d at 211 a trial inequitable preclude of the trial required “[e]xaetitude considering valuation in a dissolu of assets when the court has a “reasonable and jur proceeding”). note that other We supportable making basis for informed question are divided on the isdictions judgment probable liability.” [the] a trial court consider future whether Id. *5 juris consequences. in some

tax Courts II. have held that the consideration of dictions valuing retire Having rejected the notion that speculative is too because tax ment assets progeny bright- Aaron and its created subject change.2 rule, are to Courts in rates line must now determine whether however, jurisdictions, have conclud other trial court discretion the abused its outweighed uncertainty by ed that such is valued Maurer’s deferred that, fact while the tax rate will using the and retirement their after-tax actually applied Testimony be to a retirement asset at trial established that value. unknown, practically proper it is certain to future income taxes be assets; professional that the asset will be taxed.3 As one court when Wilkins, 541, 401(k) plan’s N.C.App. plan the v. 111 before she could use 2. See Wilkins 891, funds’’); 155, (1993) (holding Day App.3d Day, 897 v. 432 S.E.2d the 40 Ohio 532 201, (1988) that, considering hypothetical (concluding trial court erred in N.E.2d 205-06 predict although to variables the tax at the tax because time the structure, government’s including tax the his husband withdraws funds from retirement condition, ascertained, plaintiffs the date speculative financial and plan are too to be years into plaintiffs retirement several the properly apply pres the "the trial could engage "requires the future trial court to considering tax rates in the tax ent conse Hovis, impermissible speculation”); because, v. Hovis quences” "[gjiven the current 137, 1380, 1378, rates, Pa. 541 A.2d applied say by we cannot rates that the (1988) (reversing unreasonable, the court's deduction they even if are pen- rate”); value of and a of the certain stock highest 10% In re applicable be the Mar 259, plan Alexander, court could sion because the trial riage Or.App. P.2d liability that, reasonably predict 63, (1987) "be- future (concluding where the constantly change”). cause tax rates presented expert testimony husband withdrawn his retirement account 45%, Dodson, 902, taxed would be between the 35% 3. See Dodson 955 P.2d 909-10 (Alaska 1998) properly trial court considered tax conse (concluding that the trial court because, "[although the amount acknowledging by did not abuse discretion liability frequently cannot be (k) the tax deter plan to the that the transfer a 401 wife her, expert complete certainty, tes liability by apply mined a tax to also shifted timony provides a stating, in this reasonable and case "[al supportable making an though informed precise magnitude of the tax basis liabil * n * probable judgment unpredictable husband’s lia ity [the] [the wife] bility”). pay would have deferred taxes generally accepted standards and account- occur within a short time after the dissolu- tion, ing principles require that current income and that court did not abuse tax rates be used to calculate future in- applied its discretion when it the 35% mar- taxes; come and that the lowest combined ginal income tax rate in valuing those federal and state income tax rate that plans, we reverse the court of appeals. apply to Maurer’s retirement assets Reversed. is 35%. The record further reflects the 35% rate is based on the following: income; projected Maurer’s 1997 his LANCASTER, (concurring). Justice income; assumption that Maurer’s I concur with by the result reached fluctuate; 1999 income would not and the majority. I separately emphasize write assumption that Maurer’s other income that the decision upon is based the facts of and deduction items would remain consis- case, this represent and does not depar- tent. ture from general rule that tax conse- argues Galvin because the 35% tax quences may not be taken into account using anticipa- rate was calculated mere when to do so speculative. would be Aar- assumptions, specula- tions and the rate is (Minn. on v. Ultimately, argument goes tive. 1979); Miller v. question of whether the trial court had O’Brien, O’Brien v. supportable “reasonable and basis for (Minn.1984). Restricting making an judgment informed as to [the] consideration of tax consequences Alexander, probable liability.” 742 P.2d at events that are to occur within a 64. Specifically, question we must now short time of the dissolution a safeguard answer is whether the 35% rate used against speculation. unfair I Although am in calculating the value of Maurer’s retire- *6 not convinced the consideration of future ment assets caused the trial court’s valua- in this case resulted tion to fall outside a range “reasonable equitable assets, distribution of I con- Minn, figures.” at cur the result because the record is 44. Based on the record before lacking in evidentiary support applica-

us, we conclude that it did not. The testi- rate, tion of lower tax which may well be mony provided by expert, Hin- appropriate in many retirement situations. nenkamp, provides support in the record marginal for the 35% tax rate. There is BLATZ, Chief Justice (concurring). suggesting evidence the record some lower rate would be appropri- more join I in the concurrence of Justice Joan Indeed, parties ate. made no effort to Ericksen Lancaster.

have the trial court consider a lower rate. While it be that evidence could have ANDERSON, produced RUSSELL A. supporting application

been of a Justice (concurring). lower no such evidence

was offered at trial. Because the trial join I in the concurrence of Justice Joan court’s valuation did not fall outside a “rea- Ericksen Lancaster. figures,” sonable hold trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Because we hold that the trial court’s

consideration of future income tax conse- valuing Maurer’s deferred com-

pensation and was not speculative

rendered in that a taxable

event was not required by

Case Details

Case Name: Maurer v. Maurer
Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date Published: Mar 22, 2001
Citation: 623 N.W.2d 604
Docket Number: C7-99-1319
Court Abbreviation: Minn.
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