Thе instant case arises from a three-car collision. Appellee-defendant Scott Chyatte was driving a vehicle owned by his mother, appellee-defendant Helen Chyatte. Mr. Chyattе drove his mother’s vehicle into the rear of the preceding car. As a result, this second car struck the rear of the vehicle that appellant-plaintiff was driving. Appellant brought the instant suit against appellees, alleging that she had been physically injured as the result of the collision. The case was submitted to a jury and a verdict for appellees was returned. Apрellant’s motion for new trial was denied and she appeals.
1. Appellant enumerates the general grounds. Appellees did not contest the issue of liability for negligence in connection with the causation of the collision itself. They did, however, strongly contest the existence of the requisite causal connection between the collision and the physical injuriеs that appellant alleged she had sustained therein. We have reviewed the record and find that a verdict based upon the evidence supporting appellees’ defensе was not unauthorized. See generally
King v. Loyd,
2. Likewise, the issue of whether appellant had suffered a “serious injury” as the result of the collision was correctly submitted to the jury. See generally
Dabney v. Ammons,
3. The giving оf the following charge is enumerated as error: “[T]he testimony of a party who offers themselves as a witness in their own behalf is to be construed more strongly against that person when it is contradictory, vague or equivocal, and is not entitled to a finding in their favor if that version of their testimony the most unfavorable to them shows the verdict should be against them.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The above-quoted portiоn of the trial court’s charge does state two correct and interrelated abstract principles of law. See generally
Mattison v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
Appellant was not the only witness who testified as to the crucial causation issue. In addition to her own testimony with regard to causation, appellant’s physician was a witness on her behalf. However, appellees contend that the contested charge was nonetheless applicable and properly given in the instant case. According to appellees, the medical testimony that was given by appellant’s рhysician was insufficient to authorize a finding of the requisite causal connection between the collision and appellant’s physicial condition, and the jury was thus, in effect, left with only appellant’s testimony upon which it could base a finding in her favor as to this issue. Appellees further characterize appellant’s testimony in this regard as having been contradictory, vague and equivocal, and they therefore make the assertion that the contested charge was applicable and properly given.
Because it is the underlying premise of appellees’ assertion regarding the applicability of their requested charge, the asserted evidentiary insufficiency of the testimony of appellant’s physician will be the first issue addressed. Thus, “[ajssuming, but not deciding, that the [appellant’s] testimony was such that it should be construed most strongly against [her],” (Fowler v. Glover, supra at 217), we will initially determine whether appellant may nevertheless have beеn “entitled to have a jury decide” the causation issue based solely upon the testimony of her physician, in which event the emphasized portion of the charge was not adjusted to the case. Fowler v. Glover, supra at 218.
In cases that involve “issues of causation which, by the nature of the situation, [can] be resolved solely by expert medical evidence standing alone, . . . the evidence must nаturally be based at least on reasonable probability. ‘It appears to be well settled that medical testimony as to the possibility of a causal relation between a given accident or injury and the subsequent death or impaired physical or
*345
mental condition of the person injured is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish such relation.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis deleted.)
Nat. Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Durham,
This medical testimony, standing alone, would be more than sufficient to demonstrate at least a “reasonable probability” of a causal connection between the collision and appellant’s physical condition and it would consequently authorize a finding for appellant as to this issue. It neсessarily follows that appellant was not the “sole” witness as to the causation issue. Thus, even assuming that appellant’s own testimony was contradictory, vague and equivocal, the emphasized portion of the charge was erroneously given in the instant case.
Appellees lastly contend that giving the erroneous instruction was harmless error. The premise of this contention is that the great weight of the medical evidence, as evidenced by the testimony of appellees’ expert witnesses, was against the existence of a causal connection between the collision and appellant’s asserted injuries. However, the weight and credit to be given expert testimony is for the jury. See
Central Truckaway System v. Harrigan,
4. Error is enumerated as to the giving of the following charge: “[A] verdict cannot be based on mere conjecture, speculation or suspicion. The evidence must establish a cоnnection between the acts charged and the injury alleged as its effect before the plaintiff can be permitted to recover. A possible cause cannot be acсepted by a jury as the operating cause unless the evidence excludes all others or shows something in the way of direct connection with the occurrence.”
In
Womack v. St. Joseph’s Hosp.,
Since the instant case must be reversed for the reason discussed in Division 3, we need not determine whether the contested instruction constitutes an additional ground for reversal. Making such a detеrmination in the instant case would serve no useful purpose. Since Womack recognizes that a determination as to the erroneousness of the instruction must ultimately be based upon a considеration of the entirety of the charge in which it is given, whether the contested instruction would constitute reversible error if given at the retrial of the instant case will depend upon the entirety of the charge that is given at that time. However, since Womack recognizes that the contested instruction is at the very least “subject to attack,” prudence would perhaps dictate that it be avoided at retrial altogether.
Judgment reversed.