83 P. 218 | Wyo. | 1905
Lead Opinion
This action was instituted in the District Court of Uinta County by the defendants in error, plaintiffs below, for the appointment of a suitable person to distribute between the parties to this action the water from a certain irrigating ditch in said county known as the Mau canal. The court in its decree found that the parties to the suit were joint ■owners of the canal and made the appointment as prayed for in the petition. From this order the cause was appealed to this court. Counsel for defendants in error contend that an appeal will not lie from the judgment of the Distinct Court in this case, and that this court is without jurisdiction in the premises. This action was brought under the provisions of Sections 908 to 914, inclusive, Revised Statutes, 1899. Section 910 provides: “The hearing provided for under this chapter may be held either before the court, the judge thereof sitting in chambers, or the District Court Commissioner of said county, and shall be had upon the day fixed in the summons for making answer to the petition filed, or as soon thereafter as possible, and the decision of •the court, judge or commissioner shall be final.” This section was amended by Chapter 93, Session Laws, 1903, to
Since the Legislature has declared that the judgment of the District Court shall be final in cases brought under the provisions of the statute under consideration, it becomes important to determine whether under the constitution of this state the right of appeal is guaranteed in all cases. The constitution in defining the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court provides: “The Supreme Court shall have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in both civil and criminal causes, and shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law.” (Const., Sec. 2, Art. 5.) Section 18 of the same article provides: “Writs of error and appeals may be allowed from decisions of the District Courts to the Supreme Court under such regulations as may be' prescribed by law.” And again in the same article Section 23 provides: “Appeals shall lie from the final decisions of justices of the peace and police magistrates in such cases and pursuant to such regulations as may be prescribed by law.” Section 2 merely defines and limits the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without attempting to define the manner of appeal or the class of cases in which appeals may be taken. It provides that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend throughout the state both in civil and criminal cases without attempting-to define how it may be exercised. We think the expression “under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law” refers to and limits all the powers conferred by the section — in other words, prescribes how the exercise of these powers may be regulated and limited. The construction of Section 2 is materially affected by the provisions of Sections 18 and 23, which refer particularly to judgments, of the District Courts and justices of the peace and police
It is not necessary, however, in this case for us to express an opinion as to whether there is a constitutional' right of appeal or review in cases which proceed according to the course of the common law. The statute under consideration provides for a special or summary proceeding unknown to the common law, created by the Legislature for the purpose of affording temporary relief only and to meet immediate emergencies that may arise under it. The Legislature clearly had the power in such a proceeding to declare that the decision of the District Court should be final and deny the right of appeal therefrom. We, therefore, hold that the Legislature in this proceeding had the right to declare the judgment of the District Court final, and that it has done so by the statute under consideration. It is unnecessary to consider the errors assigned in the record. The appeal is dismissed.
Rehearing
ON PETITION EOR REHEARING.
This cause was decided at the present term of this court. Within time counsel for plaintiff in error filed a petition for rehearing. It is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error that the clause, “the decision so rendered shall be final,” as used in Chapter 93,"Session Laws of 1903, merely defines the judgment of the District Court as a final order, and distinguishes it from an interlocutory order, as the same are defined and distinguished by the statutes of the state, allowing appeals from final orders only. It is, therefore, claimed that the order or judgment complained of, being so ex