91 Minn. 434 | Minn. | 1904
Action to recover upon a benefit certificate issued to plaintiff’s intestate by the Modern Samaritans, in which, on trial below, the court directed a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appealed from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
The facts are as follows: Defendant is a fraternal beneficiary society organized under the laws of this state for the purpose of insuring the lives of its members, and other purposes stated in its articles of association. Rules were adopted for the purpose of regulating the membership of the order, persons engaged in certain occupations being expressly prohibited from.joining; among such, manufacturers of intoxicating liquors and bartenders. One Lackey was the agent of defendant as a deputy organizer, with authority to solicit persons to become members of the order, receive their applications, and collect from them assessments and dues. In October, 1892, this agent called upon plaintiff’s intestate, who was a bartender in the saloon of one Goldman in the city of St. Paul, and urged him to become a member of the society. After some talk and negotiations, deceased concluded to join, and a preliminary, application was made out by the agent and signed by deceased at the saloon. Subsequently a formal application was made and signed, presented to the society, and in due course of events deceased was admitted as a member of the order. He died in December following, and his widow brought this action to recover upon the beneficiary certificate issued to him. The court below directed a verdict for plaintiff, and the propriety of this direction is presented for our decision.
We are of opinion that the court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff. There are many cases holding that the knowledge .possessed by an insurance solicitor — one 'clothed with power and authority similar to that of the agent Lackey in the case at bar — is the knowledge of the principal, which he cannot repudiate for the purpose of annulling a contract of insurance formally entered into by the agent. But an examination of those cases will show, though involving false or untrue answers to questions in applications for insurance, that the insured truthfully stated all the facts pertinent to the questions embraced in the ■ application, but that false answers were
While it does not appear that the insured knew that bartenders were ineligible to membership in the society, and consequently did not know the effect the disclosure of the truth would have had, this is immaterial, and not decisive against the society. The society was entitled to have truthful statements made in the application for membership, and, if deceased knew they were false, whether he knew their materiality or not is immaterial. 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2d Ed.) 033. That the questions here under consideration were material there can be no doubt. The test in determining the materiality of such questions is whether the knowledge or ignorance of the fact sought to be elicited would materially influence the action of the insurer in entering into the contract.
The case of Otte v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 88 Minn. 423, 93 N. W. 608, is distinguishable, for in that case the insured not only truthfully answered all questions in the application, but he had no knowledge that the agent had inserted false answers therein. Other cases cited by respondent are distinguishable for the same reason.
Order reversed.