2:08-cv-13020 | E.D. Mich. | Mar 12, 2009
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TODD MATTOX,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-13020
v. DISTRICT JUDGE BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN
PATRICIA L. CARUSO, DENNIS MAGISTRATE JUDGE VIRGINIA M. MORGAN
STRAUB, J. ARMSTRONG, JAN E
TROMBLEY, THOMAS BIRKET,
LLOYD W. RAPELJE, O.T. WINN,
SUSAN KOHLOFF, AMY S. BEST,
and ZUMMER,
Defendants.
________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
This is a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which the plaintiff, an inmate in the custody
of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleges that the defendants1 deprived
plaintiff of his rights under the United States Constitution through their deliberate indifference to
plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The matter comes before the Court on defendants Caruso,
1
According to plaintiff’s complaint, the individual defendants are all employees or former
employees of the MDOC: MDOC Director Patricia Caruso; MDOC Deputy Director Dennis
Straub; MDOC employee James Armstrong; former Warden at Saginaw Correctional Facility
(SRF) Jan Trombley; former SRF Warden Thomas Birket; SRF Warden Lloyd Rapelje; SRF
Deputy Warden O. T. Winn; SRF Assistant Deputy Warden Susan Kohloff; SRF Assistant
Resident Unit Supervisor (ARUS) Amy Best; and SRF Resident Unit Manager (RUM) Zummer.
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Straub, Armstrong, Rapelje, Winn, Kohloff, Best and Zummer’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(D/E #26) and defendant Birket’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D/E #35).2 For the reasons
discussed below, this Court recommends that defendants Caruso, Straub, Armstrong, Winn,
Kohloff, and Zummer’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D/E #26) be GRANTED and that all of
those defendants be granted summary judgment. With respect to Rapelje and Best, it is
recommended that summary judgment be GRANTED IN PART. This Court also recommends
that defendant Birket’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.
This Court further recommends that defendant Trombley be dismissed sua sponte.
Defendant Trombley has not been served in this matter and is not a party to either motion for
summary judgment. However, the reasoning of this Report and Recommendation applies
equally to her and she would be entitled to dismissal if she was ever served due to her lack of
personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. Where, as here, a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may dismiss a claim at any time if the Court determines
that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff has failed to state claim upon which relief can be granted against
Trombley and, therefore, Trombley should be dismissed sua sponte.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the case continue against only defendants Rapelje
and Best and only as to the claim that plaintiff was not permitted to open doors and windows.
2
This Court would note that DE 35 is incorrectly identified on the docket sheet as being
filed by all the defendants except Trombley.
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II. Background
A. Complaint
On July 14, 2008, plaintiff filed the complaint against defendants in this matter (D/E #1).
In that complaint, plaintiff alleges that plaintiff arrived at the Saginaw Correctional Facility in
Saginaw, Michigan, on October 25, 2007 and that his medical detail provided that plaintiff
required a non-smoking housing unit and a bottom bunk because of plaintiff’s chronic asthma,
bronchitis and gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). (Complaint, ¶¶ 17-18) According to
plaintiff’s complaint, while plaintiff’s housing unit was designated as non-smoking, many
inmates smoked cigarettes there. (Complaint, ¶¶ 18-19) Plaintiff also alleges that he complained
to defendant Best, the Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor for plaintiff’s housing unit, but she
merely told plaintiff that the housing unit does a good job in regulating smoking. (Complaint, ¶¶
21-22) Plaintiff further alleges that the constant smoking in his housing unit caused plaintiff’s
health to deteriorate and that his health problems were exacerbated by defendant Rapelje’s
policy, effective January 1, 2008, requiring all outside windows and doors to be closed from
November 1st through March 15th. (Complaint, ¶¶ 23-27) According to plaintiff’s complaint,
he suffered two asthma attacks because of the constant smoking in the housing unit and his
asthma medication had to be increased. (Complaint, ¶¶ 27-29) Plaintiff also alleges that, after
complaining to everyone he could complain to, he filed a grievance over the smoking in the
housing unit and his grievance was denied, without a proper investigation by defendant Zummer
at Step I, defendant Rapelje at Step II, and defendants Caruso and Armstrong at Step III.
(Complaint, ¶¶ 30-34)
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In the “Claims for Relief” section of his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants Best
and Rapelje’s failure to move plaintiff to a smoke-free housing unit, as well as defendant
Rapelje’s order to keep all windows and doors closed, constituted cruel and usual punishment
and deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (Complaint, ¶ 35) Plaintiff also
alleges that defendants Caruso and Armstrong’s failure to properly resolve plaintiff’s grievance
or supervise their employees constituted cruel and usual punishment and deliberate indifference
to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (Complaint, ¶ 36) Plaintiff further alleges that defendants
Straub, Trombley, Birket, Winn, Kohloff, and Zummer all held supervisory positions within the
MDOC and their failure to move plaintiff to another housing unit, despite their awareness of
plaintiff’s complaint, constituted cruel and usual punishment and deliberate indifference to
plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (Complaint, ¶ 37).
As relief, plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, compensatory damages, punitive
damages and any other appropriate relief.
B. Pending Motions for Summary Judgment
1. D/E #26
On September 26, 2008, defendants Caruso, Straub, Armstrong, Rapelje, Winn, Kohloff,
Best and Zummer filed a motion for Summary Judgment (D/E #26). In that motion, defendants
argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit against
defendants Armstrong, Winn, and Zummer. Plaintiff also argues that defendants Caruso, Straub,
Rapelje, Armstrong, Zummer and Winn are entitled to summary judgment because they were not
personally involved in the facts giving rise to the complaint. Defendants further argue that
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plaintiff has failed to establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim because
he cannot show that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and that, even
if plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment claim, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
because their conduct was not objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established law.
On October 17, 2008, plaintiff filed a response to that motion for summary judgment
(D/E #32). In that response, plaintiff argues that defendants Armstrong, Winn and Zummer are
not entitled to summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies because Winn was mentioned in the grievance plaintiff filed, Armstrong and Zummer
processed plaintiff’s grievance, and all three were part of the subject matter of the grievance.
Plaintiff also argues that defendants Caruso, Straub, Rapelje, Armstrong, Zummer and Winn are
all liable for failing to correct the unconstitutional actions of their subordinate staff. Plaintiff
further argues that he has demonstrated that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
plaintiff’s medical needs. Plaintiff also argues that defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity because their actions violated clearly established constitutional rights.
On October 24, 2008, defendants Caruso, Straub, Armstrong, Rapelje, Winn, Kohloff,
Best and Zummer filed a reply to plaintiff’s response in which they reiterated their earlier
arguments (D/E #33).
On December 8, 2008, plaintiff filed a motion to amend his response to defendants’
motion for summary judgment (D/E #38) and this Court later granted plaintiff’s motion. In that
amended response, plaintiff makes the same arguments in that amended response that he made
his earlier response.
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2. D/E #35
On November 17, 2008, defendant Birket filed a motion for summary judgment (D/E
#35). In that motion, Birket argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because there is no
liability for respondeat superior under 42 USC §1983 and because plaintiff cannot demonstrate
that Birket was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Birket also argues that he is
entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff was provided with tobacco-free housing and
prison officials enforced smoking violations by issuing misconduct tickets.
On December 12, 2008, plaintiff filed a response to Birket’s motion for summary
judgment (D/E #39). In that response, plaintiff argued that Birket is liable for failing to correct
the unconstitutional actions of his subordinate staff because such a failure constituted deliberate
indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs.
On December 18, 2008, Birket filed a reply to plaintiff’s response (D/E #40) in which he
again argued that he had no personal involvement with the alleged constitutional violations and
that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to
his deliberate indifference claim.
III. Standard of Review
Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(b), which states that “[a] party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move without or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.” Summary
judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
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admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Ltd. et al. v. Zenith Radio Corp., et. al., 475 U.S. 547, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348" date_filed="1986-03-26" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation">106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); see also
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 245 F.3d 587" date_filed="2001-03-29" court="6th Cir." case_name="B.F. Goodrich Company v. United States Filter Corporation">245 F.3d 587, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2001). The moving party
bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once
the moving party has carried his burden, the party opposing the motion “must come forward with
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106
S.Ct. 1348. The opposing party cannot merely rest upon the allegations contained in his
pleadings. Rather, he must submit evidence demonstrating that material issues of fact exist.
Banks v. Wolfe County Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888" date_filed="2003-06-06" court="6th Cir." case_name="Netta Banks v. Wolfe County Board of Education">330 F.3d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348" date_filed="1986-03-26" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation">106 S.Ct. 1348
(quoting First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253" date_filed="1968-05-20" court="SCOTUS" case_name="First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co.">391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575,
1592 (1968)).
IV. Discussion
A. Personal Involvement
To succeed in under § 1983 , a plaintiff must show personal involvement by the
defendant in the constitutional violation. Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476" date_filed="1995-06-13" court="6th Cir." case_name="Clarence Erwin Copeland v. Mark MacHulis James Stephens">57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir.
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1995) (per curiam). A respondeat superior theory of liability, based on the right to control
employees, is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d
629, 649 (6th Cir. 2005); Hays v. Jefferson County, Ky., 668 F.2d 869" date_filed="1982-01-04" court="6th Cir." case_name="Donald L. Hays, Jr., and Michael C. Potter, Cross-Appellants v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, Wilbur Bilyeu and Russell McDaniel Cross-Appellees">668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982).
“Thus, a supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not
actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some
other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least
implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the
offending officers.” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295" date_filed="1999-10-01" court="6th Cir." case_name="Kevin Shehee v. Mark Luttrell">199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit held in Shehee that a denial of an administrative grievance and the
failure to remedy the alleged constitutional violation did not constitute sufficient involvement to
establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Shehee, 199 F.3d 295" date_filed="1999-10-01" court="6th Cir." case_name="Kevin Shehee v. Mark Luttrell">199 F.3d at 300.
In this case, plaintiff has failed to allege or provide any evidence suggesting that
defendants Caruso, Armstrong, Straub, Trombley, Birket, Winn, Kohloffand or Zummer were
personally involved in any of the alleged constitutional violations and those defendants are
entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Caruso and Armstrong’s failure
to properly resolve plaintiff’s grievance or supervise their employees constituted cruel and usual
punishment and deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs (Complaint, § 36),
and that defendants Straub, Trombley, Birket, Winn, Kohloffand and Zummer all held
supervisory positions within the MDOC and their failure to move plaintiff to another housing
unit, despite their awareness of plaintiff’s complaint, constituted cruel and usual punishment and
deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs (Complaint, ¶ 37). However, as
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discussed above, a respondeat superior theory of liability or a theory of liability based on the
denial of an administrative grievance or the failure to remedy the alleged constitutional violation
is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a plaintiff must show, at the minimum, that the
official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional
conduct of the offending officers. Turner, 412 F.3d at 649; Shehee, 199 F.3d 295" date_filed="1999-10-01" court="6th Cir." case_name="Kevin Shehee v. Mark Luttrell">199 F.3d at 300. Plaintiff
relies solely on such improper theories of liability in his claims against defendants Caruso,
Armstrong, Straub, Trombley, Birket, Winn, Kohloff, and or Zummer and no genuine issue of
material fact exists regarding whether those defendants were personally involved in the alleged
constitutional violations. Consequently, defendants Caruso, Armstrong, Straub, Trombley,
Birket, Winn, Kohloff, and Zummer are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and should be
granted summary judgment.
Defendant Rapelje also argues that he is entitled to summary judgment due to a lack of
personal involvement because plaintiff alleges that Rapelje responded to and rejected a grievance
filed by plaintiff. Plaintiff does alleges that his grievance was denied, without a proper
investigation by defendant Rapelje at Step II, but it does not appear that plaintiff also alleges that
Rapelje’s grievance response constituted cruel and usual punishment and deliberate indifference
to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (Complaint, ¶¶ 30-36)3 To the extent plaintiff makes that
claim, Rapelje is entitled to summary judgment on it because a denial of an administrative
grievance and the failure to remedy the alleged constitutional violation did not constitute
3
Plaintiff does allege that defendants Caruso and Armstrong’s failure to properly resolve
plaintiff’s grievance constituted cruel and usual punishment and deliberate indifference to
plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (Complaint, ¶ 36)
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sufficient involvement to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Shehee, 199 F.3d 295" date_filed="1999-10-01" court="6th Cir." case_name="Kevin Shehee v. Mark Luttrell">199 F.3d at 300.
However, plaintiff also alleges that Rapelje’s order to keep all windows and doors closed,
constituted cruel and usual punishment and deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical
needs. (Complaint, ¶ 35) That claim clearly alleges personal involvement by Rapelje, but
Rapelje never addresses it in the motion for summary judgment. Therefore, Rapelje is only
entitled to partial summary judgment due to a lack of personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional violations.
B. Exhaustion of Administration Remedies
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 110 Stat. 1321-71, as
amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e et seq., “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Accordingly, exhaustion of available administrative
remedies is mandatory in order for prisoners to bring a claim in federal court. Jones v. Bock, __
U.S. __, __, 127 S. Ct. 910" date_filed="2007-01-22" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Jones v. Bock">127 S.Ct. 910, 914, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007); Woodford v. Ngo, __ U.S. __, __, 126
S.Ct. 2378, 2383, 165 L. Ed. 2d 368" date_filed="2006-06-22" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Woodford v. Ngo">165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). Not only must the prisoner exhaust all available
remedies but such exhaustion must be proper, including “compliance with an agency's deadlines
and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford, 126 S.Ct. at 2386 (holding that an inmate's
exhaustion must be in compliance with applicable grievance procedures, specifically deadlines,
because “no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly
structure on the course of its proceedings”). However, § 1997e does not impose a jurisdictional
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bar to federal jurisdiction, Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493" date_filed="2001-04-30" court="6th Cir." case_name="Greg Curry v. David Scott">249 F.3d 493, 501 -503 (6th Cir. 2001), and while the
preferred practice is for inmates to complete the grievance process prior to the filing of an action,
“because the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, district courts have some discretion in
determining compliance with the statute.” Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876" date_filed="1999-10-06" court="6th Cir." case_name="George Wyatt v. Michael Leonard Geri Mangas Mario Marroquin Lt. Pierce Burton L. Cronk B.G. Hummel C/o Walters, Sgt. Hefner">193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999).
In this case, plaintiff filed a grievance regarding his claims that he was not being housed
in a smoke-free environment that could accommodate his medical needs. (Grievance SRF-08-
02-128-03c; attached as Exhibit B to D/E #26). Plaintiff also stated in that grievance that “[t]his
grievance is properly filed in compliance with USCA title 42 §1997e(a); [PLRA], and Jones vs.
Bock, #05-7058 (U.S. Supreme Court) for the purpose of Federal Exhaustion” and that it was
being filed against defendants Straub, Caruso, Trombley, Birket, Best, Rapelje and Kohloff, as
well as MDOC Region #1 Administrator James McKeenen.4
Defendants Armstrong, Winn and Zummer were not named in that grievance and they
argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies against them prior to filing the lawsuit. While, as discussed above,
those defendants are entitled to summary judgment due to lack of personal involvement, they
should not be granted summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Plaintiff did fail to specifically identify Armstrong, Winn and Zummer
in the grievance and MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 does state that the names of all those
involved in the issue being grieved are to be included in the grievance (PD 03.02.130, ¶ T;
attached as Exhibit C to D/E #26). However, despite the fact that plaintiff failed to name those
4
McKeenen is not a defendant in this case.
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three defendants in the Step I grievance, he should still be deemed to have properly exhausted
his administrative remedies. “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the
grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s
requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 127
S.Ct. at 923. As evidenced by the fact that plaintiff’s grievance regarding his claims in this case
were decided on the merits at all three separate steps of the MDOC grievance process, MDOC
itself was satisfied that plaintiff properly filed his grievance.5 To the extent Armstrong, Winn
and Zummer argue that the grievance procedure failed to provide them with notice of plaintiff’s
claim, the Sixth Circuit has noted that, while the grievance procedure may promote early notice
to those who might later be sued, that has not been thought to be one of the leading purposes of
the exhaustion requirement. Jones, 127 S. Ct. 910" date_filed="2007-01-22" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Jones v. Bock">127 S.Ct. at 923, citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503" date_filed="2004-09-08" court="5th Cir." case_name="Roderick Keith Johnson v. Gary Johnson">385 F.3d 503,
522 (5th Cir. 2006) (“We are mindful that the primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison
officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued;
the grievance is not a summons and complaint that initiates adversarial litigation”). The Sixth
Circuit has identified the benefits of exhaustion to include “allowing a prison to address
complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to
the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation that does occur by
leading to the preparation of a useful record.” Jones, 127 S. Ct. 910" date_filed="2007-01-22" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Jones v. Bock">127 S.Ct. at 923. Those goals have been
met in this case and, therefore, plaintiff should be deemed to have exhausted his administrative
remedies against Armstrong, Winn and Zummer prior to filing suit.
5
Grievance SRF-08-02-128-03c; attached as Exhibit B to D/E #26.
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C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to
plaintiff’s claim that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Qualified
immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194" date_filed="2001-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="SAUCIER v. KATZ Et Al.">533 U.S. 194, 200; 121 S.Ct. 2151; 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) overruled in part by Pearson
v. Callahan, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 808" date_filed="2009-01-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Pearson v. Callahan">129 S.Ct. 808, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2009), (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511" date_filed="1985-06-19" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Mitchell v. Forsyth">472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). The privilege is an immunity from
suit and not a mere defense to liability. Saucier, 533 U.S. 194" date_filed="2001-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="SAUCIER v. KATZ Et Al.">533 U.S. at 200. As a result, courts have
“repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible
stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224" date_filed="1991-12-16" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Hunter v. Bryant">502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)
(per curiam).
“A court should not grant summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity if there
exists a genuine issue of material fact, ‘involving an issue on which the question of immunity
turns, such that it cannot be determined before trial whether the defendant did acts that violate
clearly established rights.’” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, 270 F.3d 340" date_filed="2001-10-26" court="6th Cir." case_name="Edward Flint v. Kentucky Department of Corrections Jack Lewis">270 F.3d 340,
346-347 (6th Cir. 2001) quoting Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418" date_filed="1988-07-28" court="6th Cir." case_name="Patsy Carolyn POE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donnie HAYDON, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants">853 F.2d 418, 425-426 (6th Cir. 1988). A court
required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider whether the facts alleged show
the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right and whether that constitutional right was
clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. 194" date_filed="2001-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="SAUCIER v. KATZ Et Al.">533 U.S. at 201. In making those inquiries, courts are “permitted to
exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”
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Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 808" date_filed="2009-01-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Pearson v. Callahan">129 S.Ct. at 818. “This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition; and it too serves to advance
understanding of the law and to allow officers to avoid the burden of trial if qualified immunity
is applicable.” Saucier, 533 U.S. 194" date_filed="2001-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="SAUCIER v. KATZ Et Al.">533 U.S. at 201.
1. Constitutional Violation
Here, defendants first argue that there was no constitutional violation. As discussed
above, in the “Claims for Relief” section of his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants Best
and Rapelje’s failure to move plaintiff to a smoke-free housing unit, as well as defendant
Rapelje’s order to keep all windows and doors closed, constituted cruel and usual punishment
and deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (Complaint, § 35)
Elementary principles concerning the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and
unusual punishment establish the government's obligation to provide medical care for those
whom it is punishing by incarceration. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97" date_filed="1976-11-30" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Estelle v. Gamble">429 U.S. 97, 102-103, 97 S. Ct. 285" date_filed="1976-11-30" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Estelle v. Gamble">97 S.Ct. 285,
50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). A prisoner’s claim that his constitutional right to medical treatment was
violated is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. 97" date_filed="1976-11-30" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Estelle v. Gamble">429 U.S. at 103-104. To state a
§ 1983 claim for a violation of a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights due to inadequate medical
care, the prisoner must allege facts evidencing a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294" date_filed="1991-06-17" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Wilson v. Seiter">501 U.S. 294, 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).
To succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference, plaintiff must satisfy two elements, an
objective one and a subjective one. Wilson, 501 U.S. 294" date_filed="1991-06-17" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Wilson v. Seiter">501 U.S. at 300. The objective element is satisfied
by a showing that plaintiff had a serious medical need. Wilson, 501 U.S. 294" date_filed="1991-06-17" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Wilson v. Seiter">501 U.S. at 297. “‘Where the
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seriousness of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person,’ this
obviousness is itself sufficient to satisfy the objective component of the adequate medical care
test.” Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868" date_filed="2005-02-25" court="6th Cir." case_name="Johnson v. Karnes">398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005), quoting Blackmore v. Kalamazoo
County, 390 F.3d 890" date_filed="2004-12-07" court="6th Cir." case_name="Tjymas Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County">390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). However if the need involves minor needs or
non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care, the plaintiff “‘must place verifying
medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical
treatment.’” Johnson, 398 F.3d 868" date_filed="2005-02-25" court="6th Cir." case_name="Johnson v. Karnes">398 F.3d at 874, quoting Napier v. Madison County, Kentucky, 238 F.3d
739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001). To satisfy the subjective component of the adequate medical care test,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “subjectively perceived a risk of harm and then
disregarded it.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693" date_filed="2001-12-12" court="6th Cir." case_name="Carolyn Comstock v. Norris McCrary v. S. Thyagarajan and David Howell">273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001).
Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or
good faith error. Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851" date_filed="1992-07-30" court="6th Cir." case_name="Betty Gibson v. Dale Foltz John Jabe John Gauldin Lewis Herr Beverly Williams George Drake James Roth Joyce Rinehold Ozzie Bryant Larry Kuras Bill Mcfarlan Brad Brager John Doe Deputy Grinage Inspector Moats">963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1992). Moreover, where the
prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the
treatment, courts are reluctant to second guess medical judgments, Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d
857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976), and deliberate indifference does not include negligence in
diagnosing a medical condition. Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151" date_filed="1995-09-15" court="6th Cir." case_name="Brenda Sanderfer v. John Nichols">62 F.3d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted). However, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to “show that the official acted
‘for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.’” Comstock, 273
F.3d at 703, quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Put simply, “deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that
risk.” Comstock, 273 F.3d 693" date_filed="2001-12-12" court="6th Cir." case_name="Carolyn Comstock v. Norris McCrary v. S. Thyagarajan and David Howell">273 F.3d at 703, quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
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a. Objective Component
Defendants argue that the law does not require that plaintiff be completely free from
exposure to ETS and that plaintiff must show that he is being exposed to unreasonably high
levels of ETS in order to satisfy the objective component of a deliberate indifference claim. In
support of their argument, defendants cite to Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25" date_filed="1993-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Helling v. McKinney">509 U.S. 25, 113 S.Ct. 2475,
125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993). In Helling, the plaintiff William McKinney alleged that he was
incarcerated in a Nevada prison with a cell mate who smoked five packs a day and the Supreme
Court found that a prisoner stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent by exposing him to ETS that posed “an unreasonable risk
of serious damage to his future health.” Helling, 509 U.S. 25" date_filed="1993-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Helling v. McKinney">509 U.S. at 35. With respect to the objective
component of the plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme Court stated that on remand the plaintiff was
required to “show that he himself is being exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS.”
Helling, 509 U.S. 25" date_filed="1993-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Helling v. McKinney">509 U.S. at 35. The Supreme Court further explained:
Also with respect to the objective factor, determining whether
McKinney’s conditions of confinement violate the Eighth
Amendment requires more than a scientific and statistical inquiry
into the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that
such injury to health will actually be caused by exposure to ETS.
It also requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk
that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates
contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly
to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk
of which he complains is not one that today’s society chooses to
tolerate. [Helling, 509 U.S. 25" date_filed="1993-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Helling v. McKinney">509 U.S. at 35-36.]
However, defendants’ argument that, pursuant to Helling, plaintiff must show that he was
exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS in order to satisfy the objective component of his
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claim misconstrues the basis of plaintiff’s claim. Unlike the plaintiff in Helling, plaintiff does
not argue that exposure him to ETS poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future
health. Rather, plaintiff alleges that (1) he suffers from chronic asthma, bronchitis and
gastroesophageal reflux disease, (2) that his medical detail provides that plaintiff required a non-
smoking housing unit and a bottom bunk, and (3) that defendants failure to ensure that the
medical detail was followed cause plaintiff’s health to worsen and constituted a deliberate
indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Given those allegations, plaintiff is clearly not
alleging danger to his future health and defendants’ argument they are entitled to summary
judgment because of a lack of scientific or statistical evidence demonstrating that plaintiff has
been exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS is without merit.
The Sixth Circuit has addressed the type of case presented here, where the plaintiff
alleges that exposure to smoke is causing current medical problems. In Talal v. White, 403 F.3d
423 (6th Cir. 2005), the plaintiff was allergic to tobacco smoke and, while he was confined in the
no-smoking housing unit at the Turney Center Industrial Prison; he was “subjected to excessive
levels of smoke at the hands of both staff and other inmates” in a facility that had a ventilation
system that would merely re-circulate smoky air. In addition, the staff permitted smoking in the
non-smoking areas. In that case, the Sixth Circuit explained:
To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must show that his
medical needs are “sufficiently serious.” Hunt v. Reynolds, 974
F.2d 734, 735 (6th Cir. 1992). The exposure to smoke must cause
more than “mere discomfort or inconvenience.” Id. at 735.
Additionally, the prisoner must demonstrate that the risk is one
which society deems “so grave that it violates contemporary
standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.”
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Helling, 509 U.S. 25" date_filed="1993-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Helling v. McKinney">509 U.S. at 36. To satisfy the subjective component, a
prisoner must show that prison authorities knew of, and manifested
deliberate indifference to, his serious medical needs. Id., at 32.
[Talal, 403 F.3d at 426.]
In Talal, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff met the objective test by demonstrating that his
illness was sufficiently serious:
Here, Talal alleges that he has been subjected to excessive levels
of smoke at the hands of both staff and other inmates and that
TCIP’s ventilation system merely re-circulates smoke-filled air.
Additionally, he has substantiated that he suffers from ETS allergy.
The record contains medical documentation evidencing this fact
and establishing that smoke causes Talal sinus problems and
dizziness. On several occasions, medical staff recommended that
Talal have a non-smoking cell partner. On at least one occasion,
medical staff recommended that he be placed in a non-smoking
unit. Based upon these facts, we conclude that Talal has alleged
that he has a medical condition which is sufficiently serious to
satisfy the objective component of the Helling test. [Talal, 403
F.3d at 427.]
In this case, plaintiff submitted evidence demonstrating that he was transferred to SRF
due to medical reasons and that a Special Accommodation Medical Detail provided that plaintiff
was to be housed in a non-smoking housing unit because of plaintiff’s asthma. (Medical
Transfer and Special Accommodation Notice, attached as part of Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s
Response to D/E #26) Plaintiff also submitted medical records demonstrating that he suffered an
asthma attack on January 5, 2008 before being transferred to the Covenant Care Emergency Care
Center and being diagnosed with Bronchitis Asthmatic, and that plaintiff suffered another asthma
attack on January 28, 2008. (Medical Records, attached as part of Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s
Response to D/E #26) Viewing that evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of
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plaintiff, as the Court must, plaintiff has come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial with respect to whether plaintiff had a serious medical need that satisfies
the objective component of his deliberate indifference claim. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.6
b. Subjective Component
The Sixth Circuit also found in Talal that the plaintiff met the subjective component by
showing that the prison officials were aware of his condition but continued to violate the
no-smoking policy in the smoke-free hosing unit. Talal, 403 F.3d at 427-428. In doing so, the
Sixth Circuit distinguished the case from Scott v. Dist. of Columbia, 139 F.3d 940" date_filed="1998-04-03" court="D.C. Cir." case_name="Scott v. District of Columbia">139 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir.
1998), where “prison officials made good-faith efforts to enforce the prison’s no-smoking
policy.” Talal, 403 F.3d at 428. The Sixth Circuit also concluded that “the mere existence of
non-smoking pods does not insulate a penal institution from Eighth Amendment liability where,
as [in Talal], a prisoner alleges and demonstrates deliberate indifference to his current medical
needs and future health.” Talal, 403 F.3d at 428. See also Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648" date_filed="2001-09-28" court="7th Cir." case_name="Chad J. Alvarado v. Jon E. Litscher, Secretary, Jane Gamble, B. McCreedy">267 F.3d 648
(7th Cir. 2001) (an Eighth Amendment claim arises when officials deliberately fail to enforce
rules regulating smoking); Warren v. Keane, 196 F.3d 330" date_filed="1999-11-16" court="2d Cir." case_name="Vince Warren v. John Keane">196 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999) (under-enforcement of
inadequate smoking rules, overcrowding, and poor ventilation resulting in a prison environment
permeated with smoke amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
6
This Court would also note that, in Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734" date_filed="1992-09-10" court="6th Cir." case_name="Eanos Earl Hunt and Raymond Roger Jones v. Jeff Reynolds">974 F.2d 734, 736 (6th Cir. 1992),
the Sixth Circuit held “that the Eighth Amendment’s objective component is violated by forcing
a prisoner with a serious medical need for a smoke-free environment to share his cell with an
inmate who smokes.” Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit from his cellmate Donald Rhodus in
which Rhodus asserts that Rhodus smokes. (Affidavit of Donald Rhodus, attached as Exhibit B
to Plaintiff’s Response to #26).
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Here, defendants note the existence of the MDOC’s non-smoking policy, arguing that the
prison officials’ alleged good faith efforts to enforce the policy prevent plaintiff from proving the
subjective component of a claim of deliberate indifference. The Supreme Court has held that the
adoption of a nonsmoking policy will “bear heavily on the inquiry into deliberate indifference.”
Helling, 509 U.S. 25" date_filed="1993-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Helling v. McKinney">509 U.S. at 36 (noting that the realities of prison administration would appropriately be
considered in evaluating this factor). However, the Sixth Circuit has also concluded that “the
mere existence of non-smoking pods does not insulate a penal institution from Eighth
Amendment liability where, as [in Talal], a prisoner alleges and demonstrates deliberate
indifference to his current medical needs and future health.” Talal, 403 F.3d at 428. Moreover,
in the context of defendants’ specific knowledge of plaintiff’s medical conditions, a policy alone
may not be enough. See Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F. Supp. 2d 762" date_filed="2001-06-22" court="E.D. Mich." case_name="Reilly v. Grayson">157 F.Supp.2d 762, 771 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (stating
“whereas a generalized risk of future harm may reasonably and perhaps only be addressed by
implementation of an antismoking policy, existing serious medical needs are susceptible to and
may reasonably require more specific action” and “[a] prison official presented with a doctor’s
note indisputably diagnosing an inmate with a heart condition and recommending that he be
provided with a nonsmoking cellmate could not reasonably ignore the recommendation in
reliance on an anti-smoking policy.” ); Fisher v. Caruso, No. 03-71804, 2006 WL 2711807, *12
(E.D. Mich. September 21, 2006) (Cleland, J.) (denying summary judgment on the basis of a
non-smoking policy where a reasonable fact finder could conclude that housing plaintiff in a
facility where the non-smoking policy is consistently and strictly enforced would be the sole
efficacious means to prevent a further serious risk of harm to plaintiff).
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Defendants also cite to an unpublished Sixth Circuit case, Green v. Martin, 18 F. App’x
298, 300 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Scott v. District of Columbia, 139 F.3d 940" date_filed="1998-04-03" court="D.C. Cir." case_name="Scott v. District of Columbia">139 F.3d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir.
1998)), for the proposition that “[i]mperfect enforcement of [a non-smoking] policy by
defendants does not equate to deliberate indifference on their part.” (D/E #26 at 15) The Sixth
Circuit has quoted Scott in a series of unpublished cases subsequent to Green. See, e.g., Wilson
v. Hofbauer, 113 F. App’x 651" date_filed="2004-09-20" court="6th Cir." case_name="Wilson v. Hofbauer">113 F. App’x 651, 653 (6th Cir. 2004); Taylor v. Boot, 58 F. App’x 125" date_filed="2003-02-05" court="6th Cir." case_name="Taylor v. Boot">58 F. App’x 125, 127 (6th
Cir. 2003); Henderson v. Martin,73 Fed.App’x. 115, 118-119 (6th Cir. 2003).
However, this case is distinguishable from Scott, where the D.C. Circuit cited a number
of steps taken by the defendant prison officials to demonstrate that the non-smoking policy was
adhered to. The Scott court stated:
Here prison officials testified to their good-faith attempts to
enforce the prison’s nonsmoking policy to the best of their
abilities. A fire protection specialist found the prison in substantial
compliance with nonsmoking rules during unannounced
inspections. Guards and prisoners caught ignoring or violating the
nonsmoking policy were disciplined. Steps were taken to improve
ventilation in problem areas about which the prisoners complained.
Grievances and requests from inmates and prison physicians
regarding exposure to tobacco smoke were answered and acted
upon. And again, actual measurements of the amount of smoke in
the prison revealed that prison officials were doing a good job
keeping the environment reasonably smoke-free. [Scott, 139 F.3d
at 944.]
In this case, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that defendants failed to take steps
comparable to those reported in Scott, aside from disciplining violators of the nonsmoking policy
in some cases, and a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether defendants
were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Unlike the circumstances of
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Scott, there is no evidence in the record of this case suggesting that defendants performed
unannounced inspections, that they properly responded to complaints or grievances regarding
smoking, or that actual measurements of the amount of smoke in the prison revealed that prison
officials were doing a good job keeping the environment reasonably smoke-free. Defendants did
submit an affidavit from defendant Best asserting that the non-smoking policy is being enforced
and over thirty misconduct tickets written from June 2, 2008 to August 20, 2008. (Affidavit of
Amy Best, ¶¶ 5-6, unsigned copy attached as Exhibit G to D/E #26, signed copy entered as D/E
#27; Misconduct Reports, attached as part of Exhibit G to D/E #26)7 However, “[w]hile the
records of violations support a conclusion that MDOC officials were working to enforce the
non-smoking policy, a reasonable fact finder could also interpret the evidence as supporting
Plaintiff's allegations of widespread smoking in many of the facilities housing Plaintiff since this
litigation commenced.” Fisher v. Caruso, No. 03-71804, 2006 WL 2711807, *11-12 (E.D.
Mich. September 21, 2006) (Cleland, J.). Therefore, viewing the evidence and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, as the Court must, the record taken as whole could
lead a rational trier of fact to find for plaintiff, there is a genuine issue for trial, and defendants
are not entitled to summary judgment with respect to the subjective component of plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claim.
2. Clearly Established Right
7
Those misconduct tickets were issued after plaintiff filed his complaint, but, according to
Best’s affidavit, smoking misconduct reports are not kept past sixty days. (Affidavit of Amy
Best, ¶ 4; unsigned copy attached as Exhibit G to D/E #26, signed copy entered as D/E #27)
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Defendants also argue that, even if there was a constitutional violation, the relevant
constitutional right was not clearly established. “When considering a claim of qualified
immunity, ‘[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly
established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted.’” King v. Ambs, 519 F.3d 607" date_filed="2008-03-21" court="6th Cir." case_name="King v. Ambs">519 F.3d 607, 612 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Saucier,
533 U.S. 194" date_filed="2001-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="SAUCIER v. KATZ Et Al.">533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151.). Moreover, as discussed above, “[t]his inquiry, it is vital to
note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition; and it too serves to advance understanding of the law and to allow officers to avoid
the burden of trial if qualified immunity is applicable.” Saucier, 533 U.S. 194" date_filed="2001-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="SAUCIER v. KATZ Et Al.">533 U.S. at 201.
Here, defendants argue that, once medical staff proscribed tobacco-free housing for
plaintiff, prison staff transferred him to a tobacco free housing unit upon his arrival at SRF and
defendants subsequently took strides to ensure that the tobacco-free unit remained smoke free by
enforcing MDOC policy. However, as discussed above, a genuine issue of material fact exists
with respect to whether defendants’ efforts were sufficient in light of Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 113 S. Ct. 2475" date_filed="1993-06-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Helling v. McKinney">113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) and Talal v. White, 403 F.3d 423" date_filed="2005-03-31" court="6th Cir." case_name="Lutfi Shaqf Talal v. Quenton White">403 F.3d 423 (6th Cir.
2005), and defendants do not dispute that the meaning of those cases, and the duties they impose,
are clear.
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V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court recommends that defendants motion for
summary judgment (D/E 26) be GRANTED as to Caruso, Straub, Armstrong, Winn, Kohloff,
and Zummer and that all of those defendants be granted summary judgment. With respect to
Rapelje and Best, it is recommended that the motion be GRANTED IN PART. This Court also
recommends that defendant Birket’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. This Court
further recommends that defendant Trombley be DISMISSED sua sponte due to a clear lack of
personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations.
The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and
Recommendation, but are required to act within ten (10) days of service of a copy hereof as
provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific
objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140" date_filed="1986-01-27" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Thomas v. Arn">474 U.S. 140
(1985); Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505" date_filed="1991-05-06" court="6th Cir." case_name="Eloise HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee">932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947" date_filed="1981-01-20" court="6th Cir." case_name="United States v. W. R. Walters, United States of America v. Two Hundred Sixty-Two Firearms">638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981). The filing of objections which raise some issues,
but fail to raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party might have to
this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390" date_filed="1991-04-30" court="6th Cir." case_name="Dorothy Willis v. Louis Sullivan">931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir.
1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370" date_filed="1987-09-29" court="6th Cir." case_name="Ernest Smith Sam Eliowitz Albert Rosen Robert Sheldon Jan Sklenar Joseph Soltesz Cecelia Stoll v. Detroit Federation of Teachers">829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this
magistrate judge.
Within ten (10) days of service of any objecting party's timely filed objections, the
opposing party may file a response. The response shall be no more than 20 pages in length
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unless, by motion and order, the page limit is extended by the court. The response shall address
each issue contained within the objections specifically and in the same order raised.
s/Virginia M. Morgan
Virginia M. Morgan
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: March 12, 2009
PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and plaintiff via
the Court’s ECF System and/or U. S. Mail on March 12, 2009.
s/Jane Johnson
Case Manager to
Magistrate Judge Virginia M. Morgan
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