Appellant Darryl Mattis claims that his conviction for assaulting, resisting, or interfering with a police officer (“APO”), in violation of D.C.Code § 22-405(b) (2009 Supp.), must be reversed because an off-duty officer is not protected by the statute when engaged in оutside employment. We disagree and affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On the evening of March 27, 2009, Officer Lloyd Murphy, a member of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”), was working part-time as a “uniformed officer” at a TGIFridays in the District of Columbiа. Someone told Officer Murphy that “there was a guy and a lady arguing at the bar.” As he approached the bar, Officer Murphy could “hear [appellant’s] loud voice.” Mr. Mattis was “cursing out the young lady” while “standing directly over top of her back ... as she was sitting at the bar.” 1
Officer Murphy tapped appellant on the shoulder and asked him to lower his voice and stop cursing. In response, appellant asked Officer Murphy, “who the fuck [are you]?” and lunged forwаrd, pushing the officer in the chest with both hands, so that he stumbled backwards a few feet. Officer Murphy then asked if he could see Mr. Mattis outside. Appellant refused, put his fists up, and told the officer to “mind [his] fucking business.” At that point, Officer Murphy attempted to handcuff Mr. Mattis, but appellant slipped, grabbed the officer on the way down, and they both fell to the floor. They “scuffle[d]” and eventually Officer Herbert Newman, who was also working at TGI-Fridays, helped handcuff appellant.
Appellant testified on his own behalf and explained that, while waiting for his check, he started talking with the patron beside him. He jokingly asked her whether she had stolen his money — a comment that he sometimes uses as “an icebreaker....” He claimed that she misconstrued his remark and began “cussing [him] out,” and the two started arguing. Shortly thereafter, “an officer [in an unadorned blue rain jacket or overcoat] came out of nowhere .... ” According to appellant, thе man “didn’t appear to be an officer.... He didn’t announce himself as an officer. He didn’t act as an officer. I just [peripherally saw] somebody approaching me.” Mr. Mattis denied pushing anyone and denied being handcuffed while in the restaurant. In fact, Mr. Mattis suggested that he did not realize Officer Murphy was a police officer until he “was sitting in jail trying to figure out ... why [he] was
Judge Christian found the testimony of Officer Murphy and the female patron “credible beyond a reasonable doubt.” By contrast, appellant was “much less credible.” The court found that Officer Murphy “approached the defendant in a reasonable manner” but “the defendant pushed him with such force that he stepped back, he was pushed back away....” Although appellant testified he did not recognize that Murphy was an officer, the trial court rejected that assertion as a matter of fact. 2
II. Legal Analysis
Appellant argues that because Officer Murphy “was in an off-duty status, [ ] he was not a party protected by the APO statute.” We are not persuaded and hold that the APO statute prоtected Officer Murphy even though he was off duty and working for a private employer at the time of the assault.
Under the District’s APO statute, “[w]hoever without justifiable and excusable cause, assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with a law enforcement officer on account of, or while that law enforcement officer is engaged in the performance of his or her official duties,” is guilty of a misdemeanor. D.C.Code § 22^05(b) (2009 Supp.). 3 Notably, thе statutory language does not focus on whether an officer is on or off duty but, rather, on whether he is engaged in the performance of official duties. Id.
There is no question that when Mr. Mat-tis pushed Officer Murphy he assaulted him.
See Dunn v. United States,
The APO statute does not define “official duties.”
See
D.C.Code § 22-405 (2009 Supp.). This court has recognized, however, that MPD members are “held to be always on duty” when they are in the District of Columbia, and “the fact that they may be technically off duty shall not be held as relieving them from the respon
The same holds true for a member of the MPD engaged in “police-related outside employment ... when the member’s police powеrs are in effect....” 6A DCMR § 303.5 (2009). The officer must continue to comply “with all applicable provisions of the D.C.Code and ... [Title 6A of the Code of Municipal Regulations] pertaining to the performance of duties, the law of arrest, and the use of firearms and other weapons.” Id. Consequently, irrespective of an officer’s duty status, “when in the District of Columbia, [he is] required to respond to felonies in progress and crimes against persons.” 6A DCMR § 303.11(b) (2009). 5
It is not necessary to decide whether a crime had already been committed when Officer Murphy approached to investigate the disturbance. He properly was determining whether a crime was being committed and attempting to defuse the situation.
6
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that, when Officer Murphy intervened in the argument and made requests of Mr. Mattis, he was acting “as an officer trying to resolve a situation....”
See Bauldock,
“[A] principal rationale of the APO statute ... is to ‘de-escalate the po
III. Conclusion
We reject appellant’s claim that Officer Murphy’s encounter with him was not part of the officer’s “official duties.” The judgment of the Superior Court is hereby
Affirmed.
Notes
. Mr. Mattis had consumed at least one beer and two Long Island iced teas while at the restaurаnt and, when Officer Murphy approached, he observed that Mr. Mattis was "truly intoxicated.”
. Officer Murphy wore a full police uniform, which included traditional police garb, badge, name plate, insignia, and a blue MPD jacket with police department patches on it.
. "A person who violates subsection (b)” of the APO statute and either "causes significant bodily injury” or “commits a violent act that creates a grave risk of causing significant bodily injury” to an officer is guilty of а felony. D.C.Code § 22-405(c) (2009 Supp.).
. Judge Christian specifically found "beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer did not use excessive force.”
See Speed v. United States,
. The general rule that officers are held to be always on duty doеs not apply when the officer is outside his or her jurisdiction, where he or she lacks police powers.
See Rife v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters’ Retirement & Relief Bd.,
.
See Speed,
.Mr. Mattis asserts that the rule of lenity requires us to read the statute narrowly, as applying only to officers who are technically on duty. Yet, we have explained that the rule of lenity "can tip the balance in favor of
. Finally, appellаnt claims that, because he was "simply exercising his free speech when he was yelling at [the female patron],” Officer Murphy "could not have been performing any official duties when he interfered with [him].”
See
D.C.Code § 5-333.04 (2008 repl. vol.) ("The MPD shall сonduct all investigations and preliminary inquiries involving First Amendment activities for a legitimate law enforcement objective and, in so doing, shall safeguard the constitutional rights and liberties of all persons.”). We will assume, without deciding, that apрellant had a First Amendment right to be loud and obnoxious in a bar. Even so, he had no right to use violence against a police officer.
See Dolson,