Matthews v. WeinbergMatthews v. Weinberg
The sole issue in this case is whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) failed to comply with statutory
Ms. Matthews is a therapist for emotionally disturbed children, and she counsels children in HRS foster care. In the fall of 1991, she began counseling M.C., a six-year-old boy with behavioral and emotional problems, who was in his fourth foster care placement. M.C.‘s caseworker, Zoe Terry, informed Matthews in January 1992 that M.C.‘s foster mother wanted M.C. removed from her home, and that due to his special needs, it was difficult for HRS to find a new foster home for him. Matthews then inquired about becoming licensed as a foster parent to care for M.C.
When Matthews spoke to Ms. Terry about the foster parent application procedures, she informed Terry that she had a roommate, appellant Elaine Kohler, and asked how that would affect the application process. Ms. Kohler is also employed by a mental health care agency, and she counsels foster children through an HRS in-home therapy program. Terry explained that both Matthews and Kohler would have to undergo preliminary background checks and complete a training course, and then HRS would issue Matthews a permanent foster care license. Terry approved of the placement and considered Matthews and Kohler to be ideal caretakers for M.C.
After Matthews and Kohler submitted to the preliminary background checks, M.C. moved into their home on January 31, 1992. HRS employee Arlene Rumac conducted a home study on March 25, 1992, as part of the final requirements for permanent foster care licensing. For the first time, Ms. Rumac asked Matthews and Kohler if they slept in the same bedroom. When they replied that they did, Rumac asked them if they were homosexuals. Matthews and Kohler truthfully responded that they were. Rumac told them, “This could be a problem,” and added, “I don‘t know of any supervisor who would be willing to sign off on you as a gay couple.” On April 15, 1992, HRS removed M.C. from Matthews’ and Kohler‘s home and placed him in another foster home.
In August 1992, Matthews and Kohler filed a complaint for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment which alleged that HRS‘s policies had denied them their rights of privacy, equal protection under the law, and due process guaranteed by the Florida Constitution.
Throughout the proceedings, HRS claimed it had no policy against licensing homosexuals and contended that it removed M.C. from Matthews’ and Kohler‘s home based on its unmarried couple policy. The trial court found that HRS District VI had an unwritten policy against licensing homosexuals as foster parents and that this policy had been applied to Matthews. The trial court also determined, “The Department‘s so called unmarried couple policy is set forth in part [in] Florida Administrative Code Rule 10M-6005(3)(a), and the unwritten policies used by the Department to supplement the written policy.” HRS presented the “unmarried couple rule” as arising from the HRS foster parent guidelines governing family composition. Those guidelines, which were repealed as of May 27, 1992, provided:
(3) Foster Parent Standards. Any exceptions to the following standards shall be for good cause and subject to the written approval of the district program office.
(a) Foster parent applicants shall have had a stabilized, legal marriage of at least one year duration, prior to being licensed.
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(c) Two parent families shall be selected in most cases; however, single parent families shall be selected when they can effectively fulfill the needs of a particular child.
(1) Family Composition.
(a) It is most desirable for the substitute care family to include two parents in order to maximize opportunities for the care and nurturing of children....
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(4) Length of Marriage. If married, substitute care parents should have a stabilized, legal marriage of at least one year prior to being licensed.
HRS is entrusted with giving foster children the “custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by [their] parents.”
The legislature has made it plain that “[r]ulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion. Each agency statement defined as a rule under s. 120.52(16) shall be adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54 as soon as feasible and practicable.”
(16) “Rule” means each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule.
The homosexual and unmarried couple policies are of general applicability. By applying those policies and not following the rulemaking procedures prescribed in section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1991), HRS exceeded its delegated authority. See
HRS contends that the unmarried couple rule is contained in former rule 10M-6.005(3) and current rule 10M-6.025, governing family composition. Former rule 10M-6.005(3)(a) stated, “Foster parent applicants shall have had a stabilized, legal marriage of at least one year duration prior to being licensed.” (Emphasis added.) Here, Matthews alone applied to be a foster parent. Kohler was not an applicant, but Matthews informed HRS that she had a roommate. Former rule 10M-6.005(3)(c) stated, “Two parent families shall be selected in most cases; however, single parent families shall be selected when they can effectively fulfill the needs of a particular child.” HRS has referred us to no other written rule to support or define its unmarried couple policy. Indeed, HRS‘s current provision dealing with family composition does not state an unmarried couple policy either. Rule 10M-6.025 states that “[i]t is most desirable for the substitute care family to include two parents,” but the rule is barren of any notion that the parents must be married.
Because HRS has not followed the rulemaking procedure prescribed in section 120.54 in fashioning homosexual and unmarried couple policies, we reverse and vacate the trial court‘s final judgment. The trial court is instructed to determine an appropriate remedy consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
FRANK, C.J., and PATTERSON and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.