Matthews v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
61 S.E. 192
N.C.
1908
Check Treatment
WalKER, J.

There was evidence in the case sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, provided there is no error in the rulings of the court to which the defendant excepted. The policy provides as follows: “Premiums are payable at the home office in the city of New Yоrk, but at the pleasure of the company suitable persons mаy be authorized to receive such payments at other places, but only on the production of the company’s ‍​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‍receipt, signed by the president or secretary and countersigned by the person receiving the payments.” Counsel argue from this provision that no receipt for a premium was admissible as evidence оf its payment unless it strictly conformed to this requirement of the contrаct of insurance. "We do not think so. It must not be understood, though, that we consider the provision an invalid or immaterial one. Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S., 425. The jury have fоund upon competent evidence and under proper instructions that the premium due 8 August, 1906, was paid to the agent of the defendаnt, who ‍​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‍was authorized to collect it, and that the money was remitted to the defendant and received by it. The stipulation in the poliсy as to the mode of *342 payment and tbe form of the receiрt for the premium can have no application where thе money is actually received and appropriated -by the company, knowing that ‍​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‍it was intended as a payment of the prеmium, as the provision was intended only to protect it against unauthorized payments to local agents or collectors. Bishop v. Life Insurance Co., 85 Mo. App., 302. It cannot be either morally or legally right for the company to insist on kеeping the money paid for the premium and then deny the authority of the agent to receive it because a receipt was not given in literal compliance with the requirement of the pоlicy. It was the agent’s fault that the “official” receipt was not delivered to the insured, and his wrong should not be imputed to the plaintiff so as to deprive her of the insurance. By receiving and retaining the money the defendant clearly waived ‍​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‍the benefit of the stipulation as to the form of the receipt. Vance, in his work on insurance, at pp. 201, 202, says: “Usually the premium is required to be paid at the home office or to the agent in possession of a propеrly executed receipt. Such a stipulation must be strictly comрlied with, but the payment of a premium to an agent not authorized to receive it will be sufficient if the premium money actually comеs to the hands of the insurer.” See, also, Joyce on Insurance, sec. 1167; Mauck v. Insurance Co., 54 Atl. Rep., 952.

The New York statute was introduced by the plaintiff and admitted by the сourt for the purpose of showing that notice of the maturity of premiums should have been given. But ‍​​​​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‍the court afterwards ruled that the law was not applicable to policies issued in this State, so that thе objection to the admission of this evidence was thus eliminated.

Thе testimony of J. S. ITall and Charles Matthews was competent as cоrroborating Mrs. Matthews, who had testified as to the payment of the рremiums. What she formerly said to them was clearly admissible for this purpose, and the court *343 restricted the evidence within proper limits under Rule 27 of this Court. 140 N. C., 662.

We have carefully examined the case and find no error in the rulings at the trial.

No Error.