Matthews v. BlanosMatthews v. Blanos
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Duckworth
1. A contract under which one of the contracting parties agrees with the other, for a valuable consideration, that he will make a will giving to the other property, either real or personal, is enforceable in equity, but specific performance will not be granted unless strictly equitable and just. Mere inadequacy of price may justify a court in refusing to decree a specific performance, as well as any other fact showing the contract to be unfair, or unjust, or against good conscience, and to authorize the relief sought the terms of the contract must be clear, distinct, and definite.
(a) The petition as amended, seeking specific performance of an alleged oral contract between the petitioner and the defendant administrators’ intestate, whereby in consideration of specified services to be rendered by the petitioner to the intestate the latter promised to make a will leaving to the petitioner all of his property, and setting forth full performance by the petitioner of the agreement and a breach by the intestate, was not subject to the general grounds of the defendants’ demurrer.
(b) The special grounds of demurrer are without merit.
2. The evidence was sufficient to prove, with the degree of certainty required by the law, the alleged parol agreement by the defendant administrators’ intestate that, if the petitioner would render described services to him during his lifetime, he would execute a will leaving all of his property to the petitioner, and that the petitioner fully performed his part of the agreement breached by the intestate.
3. The charge of the court that the petitioner was incompetent to testify in the case was a correct and applicable principle of law, the only issue being as to an alleged contract between him and the intestate and compliance therewith, and was not harmful or confusing to the jury or erroneous for any reason.
(a) The charge of the court that the testimony of an unimpeached witness, where there is no other testimony or evidence in conflict with his, can not arbitrarily be disregarded, stated a correct and applicable principle of law. The rule does not mean that the jury are obliged to believe testimony which under the facts and circumstances they discredit, but means that they are to consider the testimony of every witness who is sworn and not arbitrarily disregard the testimony of any witness. The court was not obliged to charge as to the impeachment of witnesses where no request was made, and if any additional instruction was desired a proper written request should have been made.
(b) The charge of the court that “the fairness of a contract is usually to be determined as of its date, and the happening of subsequent events within the reasonable contemplation of the parties does not afford a defense,” stated a principle of law pertinent and applicable to the facts of the present case.
(c) The refusal to admit in evidence a certain document — purporting to be an original or copy of a written appearance and claim filed in the court of ordinary by two alleged nearest kin of the intestate, through two named attorneys, in the matter of his estate, but being neither sworn
George N. Blanos filed on June 25, 1945, in the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, an equitable petition against H. T. Matthews and John D. Curtis, as administrators of the estate of Peter Yeakes, deceased, the petition as amended alleging the following: (a) Peter Yeakes came to this country more than thirty years ago from Greece and settled at Thomson, Georgia, where he operated a restaurant. He was never married and did not have any family in this country, and so far as the petitioner knows he did not have any relatives in Greece at the time of his death. (b) The petitioner and Yeakes became friends about thirteen years ago; there was a very close personal and affectionate relationship between them; and after Yeakes moved to Augusta, Georgia, in December, 1941, he and the petitioner were constantly together and were very devoted to each other, and Yeakes confided in the petitioner all of his personal and business affairs and sought advice and counsel from him in all matters pertaining to his personal and business affairs. The petitioner is of Greek descent, and the relationship existing between him and Yeakes was in effect that of father and son, and Yeakes referred to the petitioner as his son. (c) This close personal, confidential relationship continued to exist between them, and on or around May 1, 1942, Yeakes agreed with the petitioner that, if the petitioner would continue to render the affectionate and considerate attention to him as he had in the past, in looking after his welfare, comfort and health, and in visiting him and rendering to him the petitioner‘s personal aid and services in and about his private life, to act as a companion, to look after and care for him during any illness, and during his old age, and help him manage his finances, to make investments, help him in running a restaurant business known as “Buddy‘s Place” by buying supplies for the restaurant, to pick up orders and relieve him from duty in the restaurant from time to time, to keep books and to make income, social security and O. P. A. reports, help him in securing labor for the operation of the restaurant business, help with banking, paying bills, and help him in conducting his business affairs
The prayers were: that the defendants be required to specifically perform the contract heretofore entered into between the petitioner and Yeakes, and that the petitioner be declared to be the sole owner of all the property left by Yeakes at the time of his death, subject to the payment of debts and the expenses of his last illness and expenses of administration; that the petitioner have judgment against the defendants for all funds in their hands after payment of the aforesaid items; that the title to all property in their hands be directed to be in the petitioner; and for process.
The defendants demurred generally to the petition as amended on the following renewed and additional grounds: 1. The petition does not set forth any cause of action legal or equitable against the defendants. 2. The petition does not set forth any cause of action because the allegations of the petition as a whole fail to set forth any grounds in law or equity on which the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for. 3. The petition does not set forth a cause of action in law or equity because the contract relied upon is not set forth so clearly and satisfactorily as to leave no reasonable doubt as to what the contract was. 4. The petition does not set forth a cause of action in law or equity in that it fails to allege the date of the alleged contract, the value of the services rendered by the petitioner to the deceased, or the value of the property the petitioner was to receive under the agreement, so as to enable the court to determine the adequacy of the consideration therefor or the justness or fairness of the contract. 5. The petition does not set forth any cause of action because it appears from the petition that at the time of his death on May 11, 1944, the deceased was a resident of McDuffie County, Georgia, and the defendants qualified as administrators in the court of ordinary of that county; and that the contract sought to be enforced, as it appears from the petition, was entered into by the deceased and the petitioner on or around May
The court overruled the demurrers, and the defendants filed exceptions pendente lite duly certified.
Thereafter the case came on for trial and evidence was introduced substantially as follows: Jim Gorgwitch testified: While he came from Jugoslavia many years ago, he spoke Greek, had been associated with Greeks most of the time in this country, and was
Dr. William J. Cranston testified: He was called to administer to Yeakes at his restaurant on May 11, 1944. Yeakes had recently suffered an acute attack of a coronary disease and was in great pain, critically ill, and died within five minutes after being placed in a room at a hospital. The witness knew Jim Gorgwitch. He saw him at the restaurant and he and Yeakes were talking in a tongue unknown to the witness. Yeakes pointed to the cash register and various objects in the cafe. This took place while they were waiting for the ambulance to take Yeakes to the hospital. The witness had treated Yeakes on previous occasions. Blanos would generally bring him to the office and would make arrangements for Yeakes to come and see the witness, though Yeakes would occasionally come by himself.
W. A. Ansley testified that he knew Yeakes from the time Yeakes went to Thomson until his death. Yeakes used to think quite a lot of the witness’ two little girls who are now grown and one of whom is married. Yeakes was a very popular fellow in Thomson. After he had had a serious illness in an Augusta hospital in December, 1943, and had returned to his place of business, the witness had a conversation with him there and said: “Pete, my daughter was thinking about you the other day when you were so sick, and wondered if you had made any different plans.” Yeakes used to tell the children, who purchased hot-dogs or hamburgers at his place
Dr. R. Lee Olive testified: That he saw a great deal of Yeakes after Yeakes moved to Augusta. He heard Yeakes express his high regard for Blanos and his confidence in Blanos, and on one occasion Yeakes told him he was figuring on going in business and that Blanos was his lawyer, but the witness did not recall anything definite in the way of remarks about Blanos, to whom he usually referred as “my boy.”
J. G. McManus testified: That he saw Yeakes at his place of business on the afternoon when Yeakes was taken to the hospital and died, and described his condition at that time. He had had conversations with Yeakes and Yeakes repeatedly said, that Blanos was his boy and he was going to look after him, a mighty fine boy. Blanos was bookkeeper at the lunchroom, the witness imagined, looked after all Yeakes’ business as far as the witness could see, paid the bills, and made all returns. Yeakes told the witness that Blanos attended to all his business. Blanos was in the place of business sometimes one or two times a day, sometimes more. He bought the stuff, odds and ends, that went in the restaurant.
L. E. Markwalter testified that he knew Yeakes. The witness operated Buddy‘s Place on Board Street in 1944, and Yeakes had a lunchroom in there. The witness called the ambulance that took Yeakes to the hospital on the afternoon of his death. He observed Yeakes and Jim Gorgwitch in conversation in the restaurant, Yeakes appearing to be pointing to the cash register. The witness saw Blanos around but not every day. He was there pretty frequently, and the witness thought that he kept the books for Yeakes, paid his income tax, and helped around the place. He was
George Bennett testified that he was present in the restaurant and observed the condition of Yeakes before being taken to the hospital where he died, and that Jim Gorgwitch came in and he and Yeakes held a conversation in a foreign language which the witness could not understand. The witness saw Blanos quite often. Blanos would come to the restaurant, and he and Yeakes would visit with each other. The witness understood that Blanos was taking care of the business.
Sylvester Murray testified that he was present when Yeakes was taken sick, and Yeakes requested him to get Blanos. The witness was unable to locate him, but Blanos came in after a few minutes. The witness saw Blanos in the restaurant three or four times a day, practically every morning. Blanos kept the books and looked after the business. Yeakes said that Blanos had the business in charge and looked after him and this business.
John D. Curtis testified that he formerly lived in Thomson and knew Yeakes there, but did not have any knowledge of a contract between Yeakes and George Blanos.
H. T. Matthews testified that he knew Yeakes well, and that Yeakes discussed his business affairs with him and talked to him the day before his death, but did not mention any contract with Blanos.
The following colloquy took place before the court charged the jury: Mr. Harris: “Your Honor, one thing I would like to call the court‘s attention to before your charge. In these kind of cases the plaintiff, as the court understands, is not a competent witness to testify to any transactions or communications with the deceased, the man whose estate is involved here, and we think in this kind of situation it is fair to charge that to the jury, so they will understand why the plaintiff does not testify, because under the law he is not permitted to testify.” Mr. Bussey: “That is correct, but I don‘t think the court should charge anything on it. It is just like any other incompetent witness.” Mr. Harris: “In these peculiar situations the jury does not always know that, and they might not know why.” The Court: “Well, I will charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that he is not a competent witness, and that he is not allowed to testify.”
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants filed a motion for new trial on the usual general grounds, and by amendment added the following special grounds: The first special ground complains of the charge of the court: “Well, I will charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that he [Blanos] is not a competent witness, and that he is not allowed to testify;” it being contended that it was erroneous and injurious because, (a) it was confusing to the jury, in that Blanos was not incompetent to testify as to transactions or communications, not in his own favor, by the deceased Yeakes with him or any other person, and the charge as given gave the jury the impression that Blanos was not a competent witness in any manner; (b) it was misleading to the jury for the same reason; (c) it was not sound as an abstract principle of law.
The second special ground complains of the charge of the court: “I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that where a witness is unimpeached, and there is no other testimony or evidence given in conflict with his, the witness’ testimony can not in any case be arbitrarily disregarded, and it is the jury‘s duty to consider and decide the issue in accordance therewith.” It is contended that the excerpt referred to the testimony of Jim Gorgwitch, as he was the only one who testified in reference to the purported contract between Yeakes and Blanos, and it was erroneous and injurious to the defendants because, (a) it was misleading to the jury in that it practically charged them that the testimony of Jim Gorgwitch was to be believed by them; (b) it gave the jury the impression that his testimony was unimpeached, whereas the jury had the right to consider the manner in which he testified and discrepancies in his testimony, and because it appeared that his testimony was equivocal, in that he testified: “I heard a conversation between George and Peter. It was this: He asked George, if he find a girl to get married, he buy him a home, buy him furniture, buy him everything he wants. As to any agreement he had, really I never seen the writing or anything, but I heard it right between them two. I heard them talking, George and Peter. Pete Yeakes said, `If George need anything he wants, he give it to him, and if he finds a wife to get married, he buy him home or buy him furniture, buy him everything.’ On the same time I told him, I said,
The third special ground complains of the charge of the court, as follows: “I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the fairness of a contract is usually to be determined as of its date, and the happening of subsequent events within the reasonable contemplation of the parties does not afford a defense.” It is contended that the charge was erroneous and injurious to the movants because, (a) it was misleading and prejudicial to them because it was an expression of opinion by the court that the contract had been established, and that the time thereof was established by the evidence, because the court said, “The fairness of a contract is usually to be determined as of its date,” when as a matter of fact the contract had not been established, nor had its date been established. The only witness testifying as to the terms of the alleged contract was James Gorgwitch, who affirmatively swore as follows: “This contract was made before that — before 1942 — I really don‘t know whether it was made before 1941;” (b) the charge was not sound as an abstract principle of law.
The fourth special ground complains that the court erred in excluding a certain document, uncertified and not sworn to, tendered by the defendants, and consisting of a written appearance and claim filed in the Court of Ordinary of McDuffie County, Georgia, by John George Yeakes, as brother of Peter Yeakes, and George Kastanis, as nephew of Peter Yeakes, through two named attorneys, in the matter of the estate of Peter Yeakes, in which they alleged that they were the two closest of kin and heirs at law of the said Peter Yeakes, that they were citizens and residents of the country of Greece, and claimed the entire estate as such closest and nearest of kin and heirs at law of Peter Yeakes. It is contended that the exclusion of such document was illegal because it would have benefited the movants, and its exclusion was harmful and prejudicial to them in that it tended to show that Peter Yeakes did have close relatives who would inherit his estate, and that the case was not simply a question whether the jury would give the entire estate of $25,000 to George Blanos, or let it escheat to the State as provided by law.
The court overruled the motion for new trial, and error is assigned on such judgment and on the exceptions pendente lite to the judgment overruling the defendants’ demurrers. 1. “Contracts under which one of the contracting parties agrees with the other, for a valuable consideration, that he will make a will giving to the other property, either real or personal, have been sustained and enforced in America from the earliest times, and the validity of such contracts seems now to be beyond all doubt.” Banks v. Howard, 117 Ga. 94, 96 (43 S.E. 438). However, “specific performance is not a remedy which either party can demand as a matter of absolute right, and will not in any given case be granted unless strictly equitable and just. Mere inadequacy of price may justify a court in refusing to decree a specific performance of a contract of bargain and sale; so also may any other fact showing the contract to be unfair, or unjust, or against good conscience. And in order to authorize specific performance of a contract, its terms must be clear, distinct, and definite.” Shropshire v. Rainey, 150 Ga. 566 (2) (104 S.E. 414); Huggins v. Meriweather, 177 Ga. 461 (1) (170 S.E. 483); Whitehead v. Dillard, 178 Ga. 714, 717 (174 S.E. 244); Johns v. Nix, 196 Ga. 417 (26 S.E.2d 526). The petition must allege the value of the services to be rendered and the value of the property, so as to show that the contract sought to be enforced is one not unfair or unjust or against good conscience. Potts v. Mathis, 149 Ga. 367 (100 S.E. 110); Brogdon v. Hogan, 189 Ga. 244, 249 (5 S.E.2d 657). There must be a sufficient specification of the items of service, or else the petition is demurrable. Lansdell v. Lansdell, 144 Ga. 571 (87 S.E. 782). “The fairness of a contract is usually to be determined as of its date, and the happening of subsequent events within the reasonable contemplation of the parties does not afford a defense.” Whitehead v. Dillard, 178 Ga. 714, 717 (174 S.E. 244).
Tested by the above-stated principles of law, the petition as amended set forth a cause of action for specific performance. It alleged historically that the petitioner and the deceased were close
All grounds of special demurrer are without merit.
2. In making proof of an alleged contract under which specific performance is sought, the petitioner has the burden of showing the precise contract, not by a mere preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt. Printup v. Mitchell, 17 Ga. 558 (63 Am. D. 258); Scott v. Williams, 167 Ga. 386 (145 S.E. 651);
Certain contentions of the defendant will now be noticed. Jim Gorgwitch testified that Yeakes said that Blanos was “my boy” and that he liked him and was going to do everything he could for him, and the witness heard Yeakes tell Blanos that, if he should marry, he would buy him a home, furniture, and everything he wanted; that at that time the witness reminded Yeakes that Blanos had a mother and a father, and Yeakes replied, “I like the boy and I do everything I can for him as long as I like him.” On another occasion, according to the same witness, Yeakes told him twice in the presence of Blanos that “he ain‘t got nobody or a home and he ain‘t got nobody in this world, and he might as well leave it to George as anybody he knows,” and Yeakes further said, “Everything I got I am going to leave it to George.” From such portion of the testimony of Jim Gorgwitch it is contended by the defendant that there was a conflict on the main issue in the case, and that the most that can be said is that the evidence, properly construed, does not show a contract but only the expression of gratitude by Yeakes for services rendered; and that, as ruled in Barnett v. Henry, 200 Ga. 365 (37 S.E.2d 340), the wishes and desires of the intestate can not be substituted for a contract such as would authorize
It is also contended that the evidence shows that the services rendered by the petitioner in and about the restaurant were on behalf of the partnership and not to Yeakes individually. The contract is shown to have been entered into in 1942 before Gorgwitch became a partner with Yeakes in that year. As then made it contemplated services to Yeakes in his business, but the fact that Gorgwitch became a partner in the operation of the restaurant, and Blanos’ services were rendered to that business, does not fail to show a performance of the agreement. Yeakes‘s business appears mainly to have been the operation of the restaurant, but though he did not own the entire interest therein, in serving the partnership Blanos was serving Yeakes because he was vitally interested in its success.
It is further argued that, whereas the petition alleged that the services of Blanos in advising and helping Yeakes in his business matters were worth at least $2000 per year, the testimony of Jim
The further contention that the evidence shows that Blanos was in fact paid for his services to the restaurant is not borne out by the record. The testimony of Gorgwitch on this point is that Blanos was paid no salary, and while occasionally Gorgwitch gave him $10 or other small sum from the business, it was only a gratuity and he never knew Yeakes to give or pay him anything.
3. The special ground of the motion for new trial complaining of the charge of the court as to the incompetency of the petitioner to testify in the case is without merit. The charge stated a correct and applicable principle of law, and was not harmful or confusing to the jury in any respect. The issue was whether or not the deceased had in his lifetime made a contract with the petitioner as contended by him, and obviously the petitioner was incompetent to testify as to any transaction or communication with the deceased respecting this issue. Whether or not he could, as argued by the plaintiff in error, have testified to transactions or communications not in his own favor, is merely to present an academic question entirely foreign to the real issue or required testimony here. Certainly no harm resulted to the defendant by reason of this charge.
The charge of the court, that the testimony of an unimpeached witness, where there is no other testimony or evidence in conflict with his, can not arbitrarily be disregarded, stated an applicable and sound principle of law. Of course, the stated rule does not mean that the jury are obliged to believe testimony which under
The charge of the court complained of in the third special ground of the motion, that “the fairness of a contract is usually to be determined as of its date, and the happening of subsequent events within the reasonable contemplation of the parties does not afford a defense,” stated a principle of law which was pertinent and applicable in the present case, and was not error for any reason assigned.
The refusal to admit in evidence a certain document, as complained of in the fourth special ground of the motion, was not error for any reason assigned. It purported to be only a copy or original of a written appearance and claim filed in the Court of Ordinary of McDuffie County, Georgia, by two alleged closest kin of Peter Yeakes, through two named attorneys, in the matter of the estate of Yeakes, but it was neither sworn to nor certified, and clearly was not admissible as evidence for any purpose.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Atkinsonand Head, JJ., who diss