110 N.E. 614 | NY | 1915
The claimant was employed in connection with the general repair and maintenance of the tracks of the employer, the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company. While tamping ties he was struck in the right eye by a stone which came up from the ground. The workmen's compensation commission awarded him compensation at the rate of $6.54 weekly for two weeks. The claimant's employer at the time of the accident was engaged in interstate commerce. The appellant contends that because the claimant when injured was employed by a railroad company which was then engaged in interstate commerce, the Federal Employers' Liability Act alone measures the claimant's right to recover, and as there can be no recovery under that act, because the injury to the claimant was not the result of negligence, the claimant is remediless. This appeal makes it necessary for us to determine whether this contention is correct. The question presented has not as yet been determined by any decision of *287
the Supreme Court of the United States or of this court. In the absence of controlling precedent we must endeavor to reach a conclusion which shall be in accord with the established principles which underlie our dual system of government. The Federal Constitution in express terms grants to Congress jurisdiction over interstate commerce. The exercise by Congress of a power granted to it by express terms supersedes all legislation on the same subject by the states. In the exercise of the power so conferred Congress has prescribed the liability of carriers, for injuries resulting from negligence, to their employees while engaged in interstate commerce. (35 U.S. Stat. 65.) The Federal Employers' Liability Act is, therefore, in so far as it attempts to prescribe the rules of liability for injuries resulting from negligence, paramount and exclusive and must so continue until Congress shall see fit to remit the subject to the reserved police powers of the state. These general principles have been so often enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States that they are now no longer open to dispute. (Second Employers' Liability Cases,
The state in the Workmen's Compensation Law has assumed to deal with all industrial accidents whether they be the result of negligence or not. The suggestion is made that in so doing the state has required employers to contribute to an insurance fund upon the assurance that such contribution relieves them of all further liability and yet so far as accidents resulting from negligence occur to those engaged in interstate commerce, the employer may still be subject to a liability under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. This apparent difficulty disappears when we distinguish between the different spheres in which the Federal and state statutes operate. So far as accidents result to those engaged in interstate commerce, the whole subject is, when Congress assumes to deal with it, excluded from the operation of state regulation. As to accidents to those engaged in interstate commerce resulting from negligence, which are within the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Congress has
assumed to deal with the subject, and, therefore, all state regulations within that sphere must be inoperative. In so far as the separate and distinct field of compulsory insurance against accidents, not the result of negligence by the employers, is concerned, Congress has not assumed to act upon the subject, and until such time as Congress does enter this distinct and separate field, it is open to occupancy by the state, provided only that in occupying it the state does not go beyond the necessities of the case, or unreasonably burden the exercise of the privileges secured by the Constitution of the United States. While it is true that our state statute in terms is broad enough to cover accidental injuries caused by negligence, and those that are not caused by negligence, that portion of it which affects accidental injuries caused by negligence resulting to *294
those engaged in interstate commerce, which are within the Federal Employers' Liability Act, is as ineffective and inoperative as if it had not been enacted. The legislature intended that injuries resulting from negligence to those engaged in interstate commerce, which are within the Federal statute, should not be affected by the provisions of the state statute. This is evident from the provisions of section
"Interstate Commerce. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to employers and employees engaged in intrastate, and also in interstate or foreign commerce, for whom a rule of liability or method of compensation has been or may be established by the Congress of the United States, only to the extent that their mutual connection with intrastate work may and shall be clearly separable and distinguishable from interstate or foreign commerce, except that such employer and his employees working only in this state may, subject to the approval and in the manner provided by the commission and so far as not forbidden by any act of Congress, accept and become bound by the provisions of this chapter in like manner and with the same effect in all respects as provided herein for other employers and their employees."
In Matter of Jensen (supra) this court pointed out that literally construed, section 114 "makes the statute apply only to intrastate work, either done by itself or in connection with, but clearly separable and distinguishable from, interstate and foreign commerce." The court then remarked that "though the section is awkwardly phrased, it is manifest that a broader application was intended." (p. 521.) Thus viewing the matter, we held in that case that the provisions of the state statute applied to accidental injuries received in interstate as well as intrastate work except those injuries received while engaged in interstate or foreign commerce for which "a rule of liability *295 or method of compensation has been or shall be established by the Congress of the United States." Writing for the court in that case Judge MILLER, referring to the statute, said: "In other words, the legislature said that it did not intend to enter any field from which it had been or should be excluded by the action of the Congress of the United States. But it is said that Congress may at any time regulate employments in interstate or foreign commerce, and that the case is one in which a rule `may be established,' etc. Again, the spirit, not the letter, must control. If it had been intended to confine the application of the act to intrastate work, the legislature would doubtless have said so in a sentence. The words `may be' should be construed in the sense of `shall be.'" (p. 522.) Moreover in the last sentence of section 114 it is made clear that the act applies to employers and employees working only in the state, "subject to the approval and in the manner provided by the commission and so far as notforbidden by any act of Congress." In so far as employers and employees working in this state are engaged in interstate commerce and injuries result to the employees which are not the result of negligence and are not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or another or result from his intoxication while on duty, Congress not having legislated upon the subject, the state statute is operative. The insurance fund created by the state statute is not for the benefit of those who are within the Federal statute. Nor does the state statute assume to release employers who contribute to the insurance fund from liability imposed by the Federal statute. In all such cases the state statute imposes no liability and does not relieve from liability for such accidents. All accidents of that character are governed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In regard to such accidents it is not within the jurisdiction of the state either to create a liability or to relieve from it. The contribution which the employer *296 makes to the insurance fund under the state statute relieves him of liability to his employees in cases which are not within the Federal statute. But accidents, resulting from negligence to those engaged in interstate commerce, which are within the Federal statute, are now exclusively within the sphere of Federal jurisdiction and as to them the state cannot create or take away liability. It is also urged that the state statute imposes inevitable liability upon the employer and sanctions in some cases a two-fold recovery. If a claim is made under the state statute against an employer and the employer pleads that the employee was injured in interstate commerce as a result of the employer's negligence the question will be presented whether the employer shall be permitted to urge his negligence to defeat the claim of his employee. That question is not now presented and we think discussion of it should be reserved until it arises. This much, however, without impropriety may be said, if the claim of the employer that the injury was the result of his negligence should be upheld, and the case should be within the Federal statute, the employer would not be subjected to a double recovery, because in this event there could be no recovery under the state statute. If the injury was not the result of negligence an award under the state statute could be made, but in such cases there could be no recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and hence the employer could not be subjected to a double recovery.
The other questions urged upon us by the appellant have already been discussed in Matter of Jensen (supra) and do not require further discussion by us.
It follows that the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
CHASE, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN and CARDOZO, JJ., concur; HISCOCK, J., not voting; WILLARD BARTLETT, Ch. J., absent.
Order affirmed. *297