Matter of Tiffiny Sims - Decision on Motion for Relief from Stay

Jun 2, 2026
25-30727

DECISION ON MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY

On June 2, 2026

In this chapter 13 case, The Bank of New York, which has judgment of foreclosure as to the debtor‘s residence, has filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(d)(4). 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4). That provision of the Bankruptcy Code is addressed to a species of bad faith associated with the filing of multiple cases affecting real property. While “bad faith” has long been a recognized as “cause” for relief from the stay, see e.g., In re Grieshop, 63 B.R. 657 (N.D. Ind. 1986), § 362(d)(4) has a twist. As to a creditor with a lien upon real estate, it not only allows for relief from stay in the case itself but, where the petition is part of “a scheme to hinder, delay or defraud creditors that involved . . . . multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real property,” it also has a mechanism to operate in future cases involving the same property that might be filed during the next two years. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4)(B). See also, In re Wallace, 676 B.R. 298, 308 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2026).

As with all stay motions, the party opposing relief – here the debtor – has the burden of proof on all issues except the issue of equity in property. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g). Nonetheless, the movant is first expected to give the court some reason to believe its complaints are justified before the party opposing relief is required to prove that those fears are unfounded. See, In re White, 409 B.R. 491, 494 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2009). In this instance, that means the bank must come forward with evidence suggesting that the present petition is part of multiple filings designed to hinder or delay its effort to foreclose; having done that it then becomes the debtor‘s ultimate burden to prove otherwise. In re Lovato, 2021 WL 3410462 *5 (Bankr. D. N.M. Aug. 4, 2021). Generally, the movant‘s initial responsibility under §362(d)(4) is relatively straight-forward. It introduces evidence of multiple bankruptcy filings and shows how those filings correlate with efforts to enforce its lien. This can be done using the state court docket which may show events in a judicial proceeding, notices of sale or other evidence that would show what was happening around the time the debtor filed. That did not happen here.1 Although the bank proved multiple filings by the debtor and her husband, there is a paucity of evidence to suggest those filings were timed to frustrate the bank‘s efforts to foreclose.

The only documents from the foreclosure litigation itself that show the timing of the bank‘s efforts are the judgment of foreclosure entered on May 31, 2013 (Exhibit 1) and orders from January 2025 that a foreclosure sale could proceed. (Exhibits 27 & 29). Instead of relying on the docket from the state court foreclosure litigation to show other efforts or events in the collection process, the creditor has chosen to rely on allegations contained in various pleadings the debtors filed in other state and federal litigation between them. So, for example, in a complaint filed in District Court, the debtors alleged that a Sheriff‘s sale was scheduled for January 2, 2015 (Exhibit 10, ¶ 11) and a counterclaim filed in state court litigation references a Sheriff‘s sale set for July 28, 2022 (Exhibit 25, ¶ 29).2 While there has been much aggressive and vexatious litigation between the Sims and the bank there is no evidence that that litigation by itself operated to stay the bank‘s efforts to foreclose. To the contrary, the state court of appeals denied a request to stay in December 2024. (Exhibit 30).3

The evidence presented at trial established the following timeline for the Sims’ various bankruptcies and the bank‘s foreclosure litigation:

  • May 31, 2013 – Decree of foreclosure
  • January 8, 2015 – sheriff‘s sale to be held. The record does not disclose why this sale did not proceed.
  • July 10, 2018 – Mario Sims files chapter 13, case no. 18-31237. A plan was confirmed and, although the bank was relieved of the automatic stay on January 24, 2020, a decision which was affirmed on appeal by both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit, and a motion for stay pending appeal denied by this court on March 3, 2020, the debtor completed the plan and received a discharge.
  • July 28, 2022 – sheriff‘s sale to be held. The record does not reveal why this sale did not proceed.
  • September 6, 2022 – Marios Sims files a second chapter 13 which was voluntarily dismissed on October 6, 2022.
  • February 1, 2023 – Tiffiny Sims files a chapter 13 which was voluntarily dismissed on February 28, 2023.
  • June 7, 2023 Tiffiny Sims files a second chapter 13 which was voluntarily dismissed on November 9, 2023.
  • January 7 and 16, 2025 – State court orders allowing foreclosure to proceed to sale.
  • May 13, 2025 – Tiffiny Sims files the present case.

There is no indication that Mario Sims’ 2018 bankruptcy stayed any action of the bank, since there is no evidence of any activity in the state court litigation around that time. The same is true of his second bankruptcy filed in September 2022. While Tiffiny Sims filed two cases in 2023, there is no evidence of anything happening in the state court litigation that those filings disrupted or delayed. The only bankruptcy case that is associated with activity in the state court litigation is the present one, which was filed in May 2025 after the state court‘s orders in January allowing a sheriff‘s sale to proceed. When that sale was to be held does not appear in the record.

Multiple filings alone are not enough to justify relief under § 362(d)(4). Lovato, 2021 WL 3410462 *6; In re Danley, 540 B.R. 468, 476 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2015). See also, In re Darlington, 2009 WL 6498171 *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2009) (multiple bankruptcies without more not sufficient). If they were, the statutory reference to “a scheme to hinder, delay or defraud creditors” would serve no purpose; it would add nothing to the substance of the text concerning multiple bankruptcies. Instead, the evidence should demonstrate that those filings somehow hindered or delayed the creditor‘s efforts to foreclose. In re Jackson, 672 B.R. 693, 712 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2025); Matter of House, 2018 WL 1505572 *5 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc. March 26, 2018) (“Were the debtor‘s prior cases ‘strategically timed’ vis-a-vis potentially adverse state court action?“); In re Worden, 2023 WL 4480358 *13 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y July 11, 2020) (referring to the timing and sequencing of bankruptcy filings as indicative of the purpose to hinder or delay the creditor‘s efforts); In re Walker, 676 B.R. 298, 308 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2026) (repeated filings “on the eve of successive foreclosure attempts” constitute evidence of intent to delay and hinder).

While the bank has demonstrated multiple filings by both the debtor and her husband, based on the evidence presented at trial, only one of them – the present case – seems to have been timed to coincide with any activity in the foreclosure litigation. That is not enough to suggest the cases were part of a scheme to hinder or delay the creditor. Since the bank has failed to carry its initial burden of coming forward with evidence suggesting the multiple bankruptcies were designed to hinder or delay its efforts to foreclose, the court need not address the debtor‘s efforts to prove otherwise. The motion will be DENIED.

/s/ Robert E. Grant

Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court

Notes

1
The bank argues that “The plain language of the statute does not require proof of a correlation between the filing of multiple bankruptcies and the movant‘s efforts to enforce a lien upon real estate.” Creditor‘s Memorandum, filed Apr. 21, 2026, pg.2 (ECF No. 118). But that is not so. The creditor must be doing something to enforce its lien before those efforts can be hindered or delayed by a bankruptcy filing. Without them there would be nothing to hinder or delay.
2
The court would note that allegations of events made in pleadings from other litigation are not evidence that those events actually occurred, as opposed to evidence that the pleadings say those things. They may, in some circumstances, constitute some sort of admission by the pleader. Whether or not that is so is a question for another day.
3
While the nature or tenor of non-bankruptcy litigation between the parties might be a factor in deciding whether a debtor carries its ultimate burden of proof under § 362(d)(4), in evaluating the creditor‘s initial burden under that provision the question is whether multiple bankruptcies hindered or delayed the creditor‘s efforts, not whether other litigation might have done so.