OPINION OF THE COURT
The issue here is whether Family Court appropriately applied the statutory presumption that a person who “rides in or otherwise uses a vеhicle * * * without the consent of the owner is presumed to know that he does not have such consent” (Penal Law § 165.05 [1]). We conclude that the prеsumption was correctly applied, and we affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
Appellant, 14 years old, was charged with committing an act, which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree. At a fact-finding hearing on December 1, 1999, the presentment agency called two witnesses. The first was the owner of the vehicle, who testified that he worked for the New York City Police Dеpartment in traffic enforcement, that he had parked his minivan near his home on July 28, 1999 and that he next saw the vehicle three days later, on July 31, 1999, at a police precinct. The owner testified that he had not given appellant or anyone else permission to use the van. When shown a picture, the owner identified a placard in the front windshield issued by the Police Department.
The second witness was the arresting officer who tеstified that around 12:20 a.m. on July 31, 1999, he and his partner were driving on East 4th Street and Avenue A in Manhattan when they noticed a green van with a defective taillight. After a computer check revealed that the plates had been suspended, the officers pulled over the van. The driver did not produсe a valid registration and could not explain why the plates registered to the vehicle and the plates on the van did not match. The driver stated that the van belonged to a friend. On cross-examination, the officer testified that the driver was an adult, and that nothing in the appearance of the van indicated *95 that it was stolen. Appellant was seated in the middle of the rear seat of the van. Although the petition stated that there were two other passengers in the van, the officer did not refer to them in his testimony.
Appellant did not present any witnesses on her behalf аnd did not testify. After summations, Family Court, applying the presumption in Penal Law § 165.05 (1), found appellant “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charge of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree,” adjudged her a juvenile delinquent and placed her on probation for 12 months.
A divided Appellate Division affirmed. The majority held that Family Court properly invoked the Penal Law presumption, rejecting the dissenters’ arguments that the presentment agency had failed to offer sufficient evidence to give rise to the presumption and that the presumption was rebutted by the officer’s tеstimony that there was no indication the car was stolen. We now affirm.
Penal Law § 165.05 (1) provides that
“[a] person is guilty of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree when:
“1. Knowing thаt he does not have the consent of the owner, he takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses a vehicle. A person who engages in any such conduct without the consent of the owner is presumed to know that he does not have such consеnt.”
The presumption in Penal Law § 165.05 (1), like all other statutory presumptions in New York, is permissive
(People v McKenzie,
A permissive presumption is unconstitutional only when it “undermine[s] the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on the evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt”
(Allen,
Here, the presentment agency established that appellаnt was in the van without the permission of the owner. These two facts alone permitted the presumption that she knew that the owner had not cоnsented to its use
(Leyva,
On the record here, it was not irrational for Family Court to crеdit the presumption and find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Late at night, appellant was a passenger in a car with a police plаcard on the windshield. The vehicle had been recently stolen not far from where appellant lived. As evidenced by the Appellate Division decision, reasonable people can disagree on whether appellant actually knew that the owner had not given permission
(see Leyva,
Contrary to the Appellate Division dissent, imposing on the appellant the burden of offering to explain her innocent pres
*97
ence in the car does not infringe on the constitutional right to remain silent. This Court and the Supreme Court have rejected the argument that a permissive presumption infringes on the right to remain silent
(Barnes v United States,
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Levine, Ciparick, Wesley, Rosenblatt and Graffeo concur.
Order affirmed, without costs.
Notes
Appellant argues Family Court erred by treating the statutory presumption as mandatory rather than permissive. However, there is no reason to infer from the court’s ruling that it did not understand the permissive nature of the presumption. That the court chose not to articulate its reasons for accepting the presumed fact does not establish that the court treated the presumption as mandatory.