101 N.Y. 188 | NY | 1886
At Special Term the petitioner succeeded, but the General Term reversed the decision there made, and he now appeals to this court, alleging two grounds of error: First. "The absence of any ordinance of the common council authorizing the improvement" in question; and Second. "That the work was not done by contract let after public bidding." The questions were before the court in Matter of Walter (
In the case at bar there is no such limitation, and the statute under which the commissioners have acted specifically conferred the power which they have exercised. It authorized the improvement and declared the powers of the commissioners in respect thereto. It not only authorized the laying out of streets, but extended the power of the commissioners so as to include all streets, whether laid out by them, or simply improved under their direction; as to those they were vested with all the powers possessed by them in respect to Central Park, and by the corporation of the city and its several departments over such matters.
A variety of cases are cited by the appellant in support of the objection that the work was not contracted for after advertisement for proposals. They relate to work done under the charter or city ordinances, but imply no limitation to a discretionary power in respect to work ordered by a body whose jurisdiction is derived directly from the legislature.
It is also contended in behalf of the appellant that the act of 1866 was superseded by the act of 1867 (Chap. 696), amended in 1868 (Chap. 288). There are no express words to that effect, and if repealed it is by implication. Such effect cannot be given to the later act, unless its provisions are so inconsistent with, or repugnant to, those of the other, that the two cannot stand together. Nor is the court to strive for such a result. If it is not apparent that the legislature did intend to deal with the very case to which the *194 former statute applied, it should not be disturbed. Here we find no such intention. The existing power of the commissioners is extended, and neither extinguished nor taken away. Their jurisdiction over Manhattan street was specifically conferred by the act of 1866. Its exercise was not forbidden by the act of 1867; nor is it inconsistent with its provisions.
A larger question is also presented. The learned counsel for the appellant insists that the act of 1866 is unconstitutional, saying, "Its title does not express its subject." It is, "An act relative to the powers and duties of the commissioners of Central Park," and a careful scrutiny of its provisions has not enabled us to discover in what respect — having in mind repeated decisions in answer to such objection — the title could be improved. It expresses a general object, and it must now be considered as the settled rule of construction that where such is the case, all matters fairly and reasonably connected with it, and all measures which will or may facilitate its accomplishment, are proper to be incorporated in the act and are germain to the title. (People v. Briggs,
We agree with the General Term in the conclusion that the assessment was well laid. The order appealed from should, therefore, be affirmed.
All concur.
Order affirmed.