Matter of Peters v Dugan
Appellate Division, Third Department
July 7, 2016
2016 NY Slip Op 05402 | 141 AD3d 751
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected through Wednesday, August 31, 2016
In the Matter of Leonette A. Peters, Appellant, v Roberta Dugan et al., Respondents, et al., Respondent. (And Another Related Proceeding.)
Linda Richardson, Glens Falls, for appellant.
Michelle I. Rosien, Philmont, for Roberta Dugan and another, respondents.
D. Alan Wrigley Jr., Cambridge, attorney for the child.
Lahtinen, J.P. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Essex County (Meyer, J.), entered February 27, 2014, which, among other things, partially dismissed petitioner‘s application, in a proceeding pursuant to
Petitioner (hereinafter the mother) is the mother of two daughters, one born in 2001 whose father is Jonathan D. Koerner, and another born in 2004 whose father is respondent Hollis Olden Jr. Neither child had resided with the mother since 2008 or earlier. At the time these proceedings were commenced in July 2013, both children lived with their maternal grandfather, respondent James Dugan (hereinafter the grandfather) and maternal step grandmother, respondent Roberta Dugan. Pursuant to consent orders, the Dugans (hereinafter collectively referred to as the grandparents) had legal and physical custody of the older child, and they had joint legal custody with Olden and primary physical custody of the younger child. The mother sought to modify the prior orders to grant her sole legal and physical custody of the children. Following a hearing, Family Court rendered a written decision and order in February 2014 finding that the grandparents had demonstrated extraordinary circumstances. Upon considering the best interests of the children, the court
“It is well settled that a parent has a claim of custody of his or her child that is superior to that of all others, absent surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness, disruption of custody over a prolonged period of time or the existence of other extraordinary circumstances” (Matter of Sweeney v Sweeney, 127 AD3d 1259, 1260 [2015] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Renee TT. v Britney UU., 133 AD3d 1101, 1102 [2015]). “The burden of showing that such extraordinary circumstances exist rests with the nonparent challenging the parent‘s custody, and it is only when this threshold demonstration has been achieved that a court may then turn to the question of what custodial arrangement is in the best interests of the child” (Matter of Battisti v Battisti, 121 AD3d 1196, 1197 [2014] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Yandon v Boisvert, 130 AD3d 1257, 1258 [2015]). “The extraordinary circumstances analysis must consider the cumulative effect of all issues present in a given case, including, among others, the length of time the child has lived with the nonparent, the quality of that relationship and the length of time the parent allowed such custody to continue without trying to assume the primary parental role” (Matter of Brown v Comer, 136 AD3d 1173, 1174 [2016] [internal quotation marks, citations and ellipsis omitted]; see Matter of Elizabeth SS. v Gracealee SS., 135 AD3d 995, 996 [2016]).
At the time of the hearing, neither child had resided with the mother for many years. The younger child had been with the grandparents continuously for over five years (see
Next, we consider the mother‘s argument that Family Court‘s custody determination was not in the older child‘s best interests. Relevant factors include “maintaining stability in the child‘s
Egan Jr., Lynch, Devine and Mulvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
