27 N.E.2d 509 | NY | 1940
Petitioner, a probation officer of the Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York, was removed after a hearing upon charges, including bribery and rendering false reports. This proceeding was brought pursuant to article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to review the determination of respondent. In accordance with the Civil Practice Act the case was removed to the Appellate Division in the first instance. (§ 1296.) That court confirmed the determination *81 of respondent and in its opinion stated that petitioner-appellant was accorded all the rights which he had under sections 16 and 17 of the Domestic Relations Court Act (L. 1933, ch. 482).
Petitioner-appellant, an honorably-discharged veteran, contends that he is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section
The Civil Service Law, section
The Domestic Relations Court Act (§ 17) provides:
"The presiding justice may remove for cause, upon written charges, any officer or employee of the court in the competitive class of the civil service after due notice of such charges and an opportunity of making an explanation.
"The board of justices may remove for cause upon written charges duly sustained after a proper hearing, any officer or employee of the court in the exempt class of the civil service after due notice of such charges.
"In every case of a removal the true cause thereof shall forthwith be entered upon the records of the court and a copy filed with the municipal civil service commission. The presiding justice shall also have power to fine and to suspend from duty, either with or without pay, any employee or officer of the court for a period not to exceed thirty days, and to take such other disciplinary measures as may be appropriate."
By virtue of the provisions of the Domestic Relations Court Act an opportunity of making an explanation is granted to employees who are faced with dismissal. Section *82
A reading of the two statutes does not reveal any irreconcilable conflict. The Domestic Relations Court Act provides certain safeguards in the removal of employees of that court. The provisions of the Civil Service Law, section
In Matter of Eisle v. Woodin (supra) the general principle was followed that in case of removal in the absence of a contrary legislative intent, section 22 should be applied where an honorably-discharged veteran or a volunteer fireman is concerned.
In Matter of Byrnes v. Windels (supra) it was held that an Assistant Corporation Counsel was a "deputy," and that, therefore, section 22, by its own terms, did not apply.
The order appealed from should be reversed and the proceeding remitted to the Appellate Division to review the determination of the respondent as upon certiorari, with costs to abide the event.
LEHMAN, Ch. J., LOUGHRAN, RIPPEY, SEARS, LEWIS and CONWAY, JJ., concur.
Order reversed, etc. *84