delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Thе Appellant, Cynthia Gaustad (Gaustad), appeals from the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Stillwater County, memorandum and order denying her motion for attorney fees. We affirm.
We address the following issue on appeal: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Gаustad’s motion for attorney fees?
Background
On February 19, 1992, an adult at the Columbus Elementary Schoоl allegedly assaulted Gaustad’s minor son. In the course of investigating the alleged аssault, the City of Columbus Police Department interviewed more than a dozen witnessеs. No criminal charges were filed.
On March 26, 1992, Gaustad filed a petition in the Thirteenth Judicial District, Stillwater County, seeking release of information in the City of Columbus’ investigatory file and seeking an award of attorney fees. After an in camera inspection, the District Court allowed Gaustad limited access to the investigatory file, but denied her motion for аttorney fees. She appealed the District Court’s order denying her motion for attorney fees. We remanded the order holding that 1) an award of attorney fees pursuant to § 2-3-221, MCA, is discretionary rather than mandatory; and 2) remand was approрriate because the denial of attorney fees lacked sufficient explanation or rationale and new case law was available regarding the applicable statute. On November 28, 1994, the District Court issued a 13-page *488 memorandum and order denying Gaustad’s motion for attorney fees. Gaustad appeals the District Court’s order denying her motion.
Discussion
Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Gaustad’s motion fоr attorney fees?
Gaustad claims that upon weighing the relevant factors, the District Court abused its discretion because it made a clear error of judgment in its conclusion to deny Gaustad’s motion for attorney fees. We review a trial court’s disсretionary ruling to see if the trial court abused its discretion.
Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
(1990),
Gaustad claims that she is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to § 2-3-221, MCA, which provides in pertinent part:
Costs to plaintiff in certain actions to enforcе constitutional right to know. Aplaintiff who prevails in an action brought in district court to еnforce his rights under Article II, section 9, of the Montana constitution may be awardеd his costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
Gaustad correctly cites § 2-3-221, MCA, as the only authority for an award of attorney fees in cases brought under Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution, the right to know provision. Montana’s Constitution does not provide a right to attorney fees. Additionally, we have held that generally thеre can be no recovery for attorney fees unless authorized by statute оr contract.
Miller v. Titeca
(1981),
As we held in
Matter of Investigative Records
(1994),
In the instant case, the District Court conscientiously balanced the competing rights and interests of the individual’s right to privacy with the public’s right to know. Moreover, in balancing thеse competing rights and interests, the District Court carefully analyzed the controlling сases of
Allstate Insurance Company v. City of Billings
(1989),
Having reviewed the District Court’s thirteen-page memorandum and order analyzing the applicable case law and setting forth its rationale for denying Gаustad’s motion for attorney fees, we conclude that the District Court clearly employed conscientious judgment and did not exceed the bounds of reason in its decision. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award Gaustad her attorney fees under § 2-3-221, MCA.
AFFIRMED.