Matter of Huff

аppellant, attempt at reasoning by advanced Under the victim was to be by payment by theft where deception, check, long not the statute as as made would violate A check promise did out the check. is a not write victim The fact check credit. that the backed the drawer’s pay, credit negate attempt not steal the is not drawn does too, check. So the fact that the bond was backs the negate attempt to steal not issued does not Edwards’ have insurer which would credit and reputation the bond. backed A.2d Jr., HUFF, a minor.

In the Matter Jelbert HUFF, Appeal of Jelbert Jr. Pennsylvania. Superior Court of Argued 1990. March Filed Nov. 5, 1991. Appeal Granted March Petition for Allowance Heberle, Thomas D. for Corry, appellant. Jones, Erie, Com.,

D. Sherwood Asst. Atty., Dist. participating party. CIRILLO, WIEAND,

Before Judge, President McEWEN, MONTEMURO, BECK, KELLY, JOHNSON, ELLIOTT, HUDOCK and FORD JJ.

HUDOCK, Judge: 26, 1987, April

On the Appellant, years who was then 17 old, was involved in an in automobile accident which the driving vehicle he was struck and seven-year-old killed a 14, boy. On 1987 the May Pennsylvania State Police issued charging Appellant driving1 two citations with reckless 1. 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3714. § held speed2. hearing A was June driving at an unsafe 1987, traffic offenses before a

2, summary on the two Appel- hearing, At the conclusion of the justice. district summary July of both offenses. On guilty was found lant 1987, County Department Probation the Erie Juvenile one charging Appellant with delinquency petition filed a petition The was later by of homicide vehicle3. count allegation aggravated an additional amended include claims that Commonwealth is Appellant assault4. The petition grounds on the on the proceeding prevented estoppel. The trial court double and collateral jeopardy not barred. We affirm. held that the Commonwealth was can before this Court be summarized as issue or collat concepts follows: Whether in Fifth Amеndment estoppel as embodied eral prevent the Commonwealth from United States Constitution court on Appellant proceeding against aggravated assault of homicide vehicle charges traffic his conviction of two viola following prior summary justice.5 tions before a district this Court in panel note the outset that a recent We at Commonwealth, Evers, A.2d 531 v. Pa.Super. protections held “the constitutional dou- felony or implicated clause are not where ble aby conviction before preceded misdemeanor summary guilty plea trial or justice, a district whether its conclusion offense”. That court reached for a Pa. Beatty, Commonwealth on dicta based (1983), later repeated 2. 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3361. §

3. 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3732. §

4. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2702. § estoppel argument Appellant’s is without merit. Collateral collateral requires necessarily estoppel where fact been an ultimate has prosеcution, the issue in a former established in may defendant favor of proceeding against re-litigated any subsequent not be Swenson, 90 S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d defendant. Ashe v. R.R., (1970). also In the Interest See case, Appellant present guilty found A.2d 348 In the of both offenses. Taylor, 547, (1987), stating, 513 Pa. 522 A.2d 37 “The summary prior of a offense a traffic matter to disposition felony present the trial of a misdemeanor or does not of a that government of harassment defendant would type Commonwealth v. In double concerns.” jeopardy offend LaBelle, 179, (1990) (en banc), 579 A.2d 1315 Pa.Super. we found the Evers language court’s reliance on this mis Taylor Beatty involved applica because both placed 110 and the rule compulsory joinder tion of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § Campana, 622, 854, of 455 Pa. 314 A.2d denied, cert. 969, 3172, 41 L.Ed.2d 1139 U.S. IT’). (“Campana (1974) purported Neither case to deal constitutional of the double protections jeopardy with Finding offenses. applicable clause as Beatty misinterpretation was based on this decision LaBelle, Taylor, holding we overruled that decision that clause of the Fifth jeopardy may the “double Amendment indeed of a more serious serve to bar offense summary charge, once a defendant has been convicted on a LaBelle 189, if the met.” at requirements case law are 579 A.2d at 1320.

It is well settled prohibition constitutional against applicable proceed- double to juvenile Jones, ings. Breed v. U.S. 95 S.Ct. R.R., In the Interest In the supra,

L.Ed.2d 346 S., Ill, Interest George Vitale, See also Illinois v.

(1981). 100 S.Ct. (1980). 65 L.Ed.2d 228 deciding In whether clause present would bar an in the adjudication case, guided we ‍‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‍are the recent decision of the United — Corbin, U.S.-, States Court case, 110 S.Ct. 109 L.Ed.2d 548 two defendant; one charging traffic citations were issued to the driving charging failing while intoxicated and the other keep right. days Three later an assistant district prosecu- for a homicide attorney began gathering evidеnce investigation tion but failed to inform the town court of that appear or ascertain when defendant was scheduled to trial on offenses. defendant later the two traffic offenses. When a pled guilty grand jury indictment months later the brought charging back an two manslaughter, degree defendant with reckless second vehic homicide, and the criminally negligent ular manslaughter, a sought prohibition barring prosecution defendant writ claiming all the indictment jeopardy on counts of double claim, his upholding the the Su prosecution. barred in determining held that whether or not subse preme Court is barred the court quent prosecution jeopardy, double must first the traditional test first enunciated apply 299, 180, 76 States, 284 U.S. 52 S.Ct. Blockburger v. United “If test (1932). application L.Ed. 306 of the reveals that the elements or that one is a statutory offenses have identical other, then must inquiry lesser included offense cease, subsequent and is prosecution Grady barred”. 2090, at-, Ohio, 110 at Brown v. citing 53 The test for 97 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 187 an determining offense is a lesser included offense whether every and element of the lesser offense is is whether each necessarily greater an element offense. Common Thomas, 376 546 A.2d Pa.Super. app. wealth v. (1988); 520 Pa. den.

Pemberth, (1985); A.2d Pa.Super. Com Williams, 278, 445 A.2d 753 monwealth v. (1982). The found that this is not the Grady also determining standard for whether violations only exist. clause clause double “[T]he in which the any subsequent prosecution government, bars charged essential element of an offense to establish an will that constitutes prosecution, prove conduct prose has already offense defendant been at-, at 2093. “The critical cuted”. 110 S.Ct. Grady not what prove, is conduct the state will inquiry what use that conduct”. Id. prove evidence the state will analysis employed Applying case, must first determine present Court we parame- would violate the intended whether The offense in Bloсkburger, supra. ters announced of the Motor in Section driving is defined reckless drives a vehicle person who “Any as follows: Vehicle Code or persons property safety for the disregard in careless offense.” driving, of reckless guilty speed provi- at safe driving 3714. vehicle Pa.C.S.A. § alia: provides, sion inter than is speed greater at a shall drive a vehicle person

No having under the conditions prudent reasonable existing, hazards then potential actual and regard to the to bring the driver greater permit than will speed nor at clear distance the assured stop his vehicle to a within ahead. A of the ele- comparison technical

75 Pa.C.S.A. § offenses these two necessary prove ments to to demon- aggravated assault fails the elements with prosecute to attempting is strate that the Commonwealth for a lesser included offense under Blockbur- Appellant assault, alleged thе Com- Aggravated by as supra. ger, case; person that a requires proof in the instant monwealth another, or to “attempts bodily injury to cause serious or knowingly recklessly injury intentionally, causes such indifference to extreme manifesting under circumstances life.” 18 2702. While both the value of human Pa.C.S.A. § speed driving require at an unsafe driving reckless vehicle, aggravated Appellant driving proof that requires assault Additionally, aggravated does not. assault bodily inflict serious attempted to Appellant that proof a court should limit some confusion as to whether 6. There has been alleged, or should inquiry statutory of the offenses elements its determining if two circumstances of the case consider the factual Blockburger, supra. See Harris under are the “same offense” offenses 2912, (1977); Oklahoma, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 v. However, Vitale, holding in supra. view of the recent v. Illinois Corbin, provides an examination of supra, which for v. dеtermining the same for alleged if two offenses are conduct Blockburger, we find purposes application of after the comparison only to a appropriate limit our discussion it to generally v. statutory crimes. See Commonwealth elements of the LaBelle, supra. occurred; an element of bodily injury serious or that injury summary charges either of the here proof required not assault and the two aggravated Since involved. the other proof an element of require each charges not the same offense. not, clearly are they does requires the Commonwealth Homicide vehicle in a manner that (1) Appellant drove prove Code, (2) the knew or Appellant Motor Vehicle violated (3) that his conduct violated the law and known should have of the Motor Code result Vehicle probable the death was Uhrinek, violation. Commonwealth 518 Pa. Hyduke, also In thе Interest See (1988); A.2d 947 (1988). Since of a 538 A.2d 66 evidence Pa.Super. always necessary prove charge is not speed violation vehicle, 3361 is not a 75 Pa.C.S.A. lesser homicide § R.R., supra. In the Interest offense. included however, driving prop reckless appears It homicide by included offense of a lesser erly considered reckless necessary to establish only proof vehicle. in careless drove a vehicle Appellant is that driving of others. Common safety property for the disregard Glassman, wealth v. A.2d 865 Pa.Super. den. 515 Pa. app. (1987). The mens rea disregard”, implies “careless driving, reckless more conduct ... ... than willful or wanton “less [but] mere of care under or the absence ordinary negligence than circumstances____” Podrasky, Likewise, in order A.2d 450 vehicle, prove must the Commonwealth by homicide prove Heck, v. negligence, Commonwealth ordinary more than (1987), proof must be and there Pa. negligеnt” or “criminally the defendant’s conduct Heck, supra; v. Common- “reckless”.7 Commonwealth Spurgeon, panel in Commonwealth that a of this 7. We note prior determined that a A.2d 189 prosecuting defen- driving preclude the acquittal would not of reckless argument rejecting by the charge vehicle. on a of homicide dant vehicle, by necessary driving element of homicide is a that reckless showing "(s]ection require a 3732 does not court held that the 517 Pa. 537 A.2d v. Scheuing, wealth i.e., driving, of reckless the actus reus elements Since both disregard, of careless a vehicle and mens rea driving by in a for homicide necessarily proven prosecution will vehicle, reckless is a lesser includ- driving we conclude that Thus, by excep- homicide vehicle.8 absent ed offense of clause, of the double applicability tion to the charge homicide would be by of the vehicle supra. under Blockburger, barred failure Although we concluded earlier that neither driving nor reckless were lesser speed to drive at a safe assault, offenses of our does aggravated inquiry included not As instructed Court stop.

Corbin, must next look to determine whether the supra, we Commonwealth, petition, is supporting delinquency attempting to conduct which formed the bases for reprove convictions on the offenses. Appellant’s prevented using is not any While Commonwealth in the first or presented prosecution, the evidence evidence, may evidence be introduced presenting new no constituting conduct an offense prove which would had been convicted. From Appellant previously which the court, trial it that the Common opinion appears of the it on the sum rely Appellant’s wealth concedes that would delinquency. mary proving allegations convictions dispute does not this fact. Notably, us, Thus, appear that based on the record before it would “same proceeding petition on the would violate Grady’s assertion how conduct” test. It is the Commonwealth’s ever, exception that a to the double jurisdictional part negligent culpability on the defendant’s in order to reckless or liability without re- sustain a conviction and creates strict criminal however, gard any element.” This decision was overruled scienter silentio, Heck, supra.

sub in Commonwealth v. case, driving included In this our conclusion that reckless lesser supported by vehicle is further the Common- offense of homicide concession, fully infra, rely that it intends to wealth's discussed more offenses, including presumably on the convictions conviction, driving to meet its burden in the reckless proceeding. 584 court had single juris- since no recognized

clause should be the delinquency offenses and summary both the diction over proceeding. Ashe Brennan, concurring opinion in his

Justice Swenson, 397 U.S. 7, 1189, 7, v. 436, n. 90 1199 n. 457 (1970), exceptions three recognized 469 25 L.Ed.2d clause, excep the being jurisdictional one stated, has over single jurisdiction if no court Simply tion. crimes, to the double alleged exception the all States, 223 U.S. exist. See Diaz v. United clause would 250, (1912) cannot (Jeopardy 56 L.Ed. 500 32 S.Ct. of the court in the beyond jurisdiction extend to an offense Warden, v. State Cor Daniel tried); accused is which the Pa., Huntington, at rectional Institution 794 F.2d neither Supreme Court has the United States While com exception, the we find accepted rejected nor explicitly recognition of such an express the pelling justifying reasons pre are juvenile adjudications in instances where exception a offenses before district disposition a ceded justice.9 for separate legal system has created a legislature

Our Act, 42 The Juvenile offenders. adjudication the seq., et (the Act), grants jurisdiction Pa.C.S.A. §§ a child is over proceedings court Id. at 6303. Un- delinquent dependent. or alleged to be § Act, designat- ‍‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‍act” is defined as “an act “delinquent der the ... the law of this Commonwealth ed a crime under [but] adopted jurisdictional exception in State We note that New Mexico Goodson, (1950) held where the court N.M. 217 P.2d 262 battery justice in the appellant’s on assault and conviction justice rape prosecution for because the bar a later court did not charge. felony rape jurisdiction peace have to hear did not position in State v. Supreme Court reaffirmed its New Mexico The Manzanares, (1983) Fugate nom. P.2d 100 N.M. aff’d sub Mexico, L.Ed.2d 777 105 S.Ct. New jurisdiction magistrate have reasoning did not that because exception applicable felony charge, magistrate several after conviction of by vehicle before a homicide jurisdictional exception which we traffic offenses. misdemeanor justice necessary the district nor adopt because neither matters, unlike New Mexico where jurisdiction over both had charge. felony jurisdiction magistrate over the only lacked offenses____” (ii) Pa.C. shall not include: ... 42 Pa.C.S.A. justices, 6302. As for district S.A. § § general prescribed by as otherwise provides “[ejxcept that of (relating reassignment to 503 to adopted pursuant rule § shall, matters), procedure prescribed under district justices rule, following have of all of the general jurisdiction offenses____” (i) Finally, Motor Summary matters: of 16 “[a]ny person age that over provides Vehicle Code of this any provisions with the violation of years charged shall have all the constituting summary title a offense provi- under the rights may prosecuted of an adult and be in the same manner as an adult.” 75 sions of this title Pa.C.S.A. § court, then, is without to jurisdiction

The juvenile The for this division in hear offenses.10 basis achieved divergent goals sought lies in the jurisdiction court In the juvenile systems. Cf., thе criminal and Leonardo, 436 A.2d 685 Pa.Super. 291 Interest of (1981) purposes While at least one of the (plurality). punish is to individuals who fail justice system criminal law, on the proceedings, of obey purpose juvenile hand, treatment, reformation and rehabili other is to “seek Moreover, tation, 436 A.2d at 687. punish.” and not to Id. process to courts the adversarial employ while criminal defendant, provision there is no secure a conviction of the See, of a “crime”. “convicting” juvenile an adjudicated Wilson, Pa.Super. 532 A.2d the Interest Commonwealth, 520 (1987), Petition allocatur denied 598, 552 520 Pa. app. Pa. den. (1988). system simply “adjudi A.2d 252 consequences eliminating many of juvenile, cates” the holding authority court has is 10. We note that there where, hearing at a de novo jurisdiction to hear offenses pleas, seeks to have his case common the child before the court of grounds § that 75 Pa.C.S.A. court on the transferred and, age bаsed on this applicable because of his was not to him section, him. Commonwealth v. jurisdiction the court had no Kirk, expressing While no A.2d decision, present propriety we note that in the opinion as to the of this case, Appellant clearly applicable and received is 75 Pa.C.S.A. § rights statute. his as an adult under which would result from normally a criminal conviction. The Act specifically addresses the effect of an adjudication “An delinquency. order of disposition of other adjudica- tion under no t a conviction proceeding chapter crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting a conviction or to operate to disqualify the child in civil any application service or appointment.” 42 6354(a) added). Pa.C.S.A. (Emphasis By design, the two § systems are separate are clearly intended to serve different functions.

Recognizing jurisdictional exception to the double jeop- ardy clause will each system to operate allow without detriment to the functioning of the other. Under the present architecture of the judicial system, since the juris- diction of the district justice is not co-extensive with court, the juvenile and neither the justice district nor juve- nile court can adjudicate both summary and more serious offenses arising incident11, out of the same the Common- wealth would necessarily be forced forego one of the prosecutions. Clearly, our legislature did not intend to place prosecutors in type this of dilemma when it sought to provide an alternative to the treatment of juvenile offenders as criminals.

Recognition of this exception does not run afoul of the rule in announced Grady because the Grady specifi cally reaffirmed its recognition that application of its tradi tional double jeopardy analysis is not without exception. Grady at-, 7, 110 n. S.Ct. at n. quoting, Brown 11. By juvenile virtue of 75 Pa.C.S.A. charged a § with a summa- ry Thus, rights vehicle offense juvenile has all the of an adult. required cannot be informality submit to the Moreover, hearing. charges there is no indication that all could have brought been "[e]xcept in provides, criminal court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § provided as (relating in 75 rights Pa.C.S.A. 6303 § to the minors), appears liabilities of if it proceeding to a court in a criminal murder, child, other than that the defendant is a the court shall halt and, proceedings further case to appropriate, criminal where transfer judge assigned the division or a of the court to conduct then, hearings----” Clearly jurisdiction juve- exclusive charged niles with offenses other than murder or vehicle Zoller, offenses lies with the 345 court. See Commonwealth v. n. n. 97 S.Ct. at Ohio, 432 U.S. at supra v. first acknowl- omitted.) Although exception (Citations on the of facts premised absence Brown was edged charge, serious wе believe to sustain the more necessary by this case com- presented circumstances unique that the application recognition exception of an equal pel on the analysis based jeopardy of the traditional double courts involved. by the two jurisdiction of co-extensive want spirit with the of Brown comports exception fully Such the double clause protections which and the and, criminally yet, accused to afford envisioned was unable to the fact that Commonwealth sensitive the trial delinquency petition both go forward with single proceeding. a Code violations on the Vehicle accord with our recent decision is full Additionally, this LaBelle, interpreting supra, decision Commonwealth ad- Corbin, Grady Neither LaBelle nor supra. nor exception, jurisdictional of a applicability dressed the since of those exception necessary both such an would of- greater where the lesser and involved situations cases single thereby enabling joined, could have been fenses prosecution. exception, we

Having adopted jurisdictional does not bar clause hold that the double delinquency peti with proceeding guilty was found tion, Appellant the fact that the despite held before prior code offenses in a proceeding vehicle justice. district for the case is remanded is affirmed and

The order relinquished. is Jurisdiction proceedings. further MONTEMURO, J., statement. concurring files a WIEAND, J., BECK, J., opinion, dissenting files a joins. statement:

MONTEMURO, concurring Judge, of resolution ultimate agree Majority’s I with the While my belief claim, separately express I write appellant’s singular focus of this case on the that because of criminal in relation juvenile and courts interaction between prior only cases which those involve jeopardy, to double LaBelle, v. Cоmmonwealth viz., 397 Pa. system, criminal banc); (1990) (en 579 A.2d Super. Evers, A.2d 531 are fact Act factually and irrelevant. As the makes

jurisdictionally clear, offenses. specifically excludes Therefore, the situation obtain unlike Pa.C.S.A. § cases, to be an joinder in the cited was understood ing impossibility.

BECK, dissenting: Judge, Huff, Jr., 2, 1987, 17 year appellant June old Jelbert On driving driving reckless stood trial and was convicted of that, Today court concludes be- speed. at an unsafe limitations on the courts in perceived statutory cause ‍‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‍tried, tried once appellant he was and will be can be view, my majority’s for offense. again the same funda- holding appellant’s is an unwarranted violation I respectfully guarantee against jeopardy. mental double dissent. guarantee respecting

The constitutional a second protections: protects against three “It embodies It pro- after acquittal. for the same offense prosecution for the same offense against tects a second protects multiple punish- And it against after conviction. Pearce, North Carolina ments the same offense.” 23 L.Ed.2d 656 89 S.Ct. with are concerned particularly In the instant case we to that respect interests. With protected second these emphasized: Court has protection, prohibition against jeopardy” The constitutional “double being subject- designed protect individual more conviction possible ed hazards trial offense____ alleged underlying once than for an Anglo- idea, one in at least the deeply ingrained that is with American that the State system jurisprudence, should not power all its resources and be allowed make repeated attempts alleged to convict an individual an offense, embarrassment, him to ex- thereby subjecting and and him to in a pense compelling ordeal live continu- ing insecurity, enhanсing state of as well as anxiety though may that even innocent he found possibility guilty. States, 184, 187-188,

Green v. United S.Ct. 223-24, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 — term, Corbin, U.S.-,

Last v. Grady 2084, 2093, 109 L.Ed.2d the Supreme Court that, explained Jeopardy any “the Double Clause bars sub- sequent prosecution government, establish charged an essential element of the offense in that prosecu- tion, prove will conduct that constitutes an offense for prosecuted.” which the defendant has been already Corbin, in Grady pattern a fact similar to the instant case, pled the defendant to traffic guilty charges driving while failing keep right intoxicated and of the median. charges arose from a fatal automobile accident. Two entered, months after the had been the defen- guilty pleas dant charges Corbin was indicted on of vehicular man- slaughter, negligent reckless assault and homicide. The New York held Appeals Court that double prosecution barred the second because the State intended to rely prior prove on the traffic offenses to the homicide and charges. assault The United States Court af- firmed, stressing the successive barred because the conduct the state would prove concededly indisput- the second trial was ably prosecuted. conduct for which Corbin had been already As such it constituted the “same offense” for purposes double jeopardy analysis.

The majority correctly recognizes Corbin and, would govern applied, result this case once would bar reprosecution appellant had been adult at the time the offenses were committed. See also Common- LaBelle, (1990) wealth v. However, (en banc). impact the avoids the of majority to this defendant the full and denies v. Corbin out a protection by carving whol- jeopardy extent of double exception” operation to the- ly “jurisdictional unwarranted guarantee. jeopardy of the double is, at this conclusion what in my The arrives majority unnecessarily technical of view, reading a strained and the of provisions governing adjudication statutory various petitions of in delinquency offenses and if I However, agreed majority’s with the con- court. even “no court had over both the single jurisdiction clusion that I proceeding”, offenses and the find Double prosecution nevertheless would barred. multiple for the protection against trials same jeopardy statutory creating device of offense cannot be eroded the a jurisdiction single sovereignty. courts of limited within the acknowledges, “jurisdictional excep- the majority As tion,” jeopardy which it bases its denial of double upon defendant, never protection expressly to this has been artic- the the context adopted by ulated or Court outside stated, “jurisdictional the sovereignty.” Simply “dual had, in instances, some constituted an which exception” to double exception general application the has is that if a defendant been convicted of a principles jurisdiction in inferior which had no lesser offense an relies, exception” upon majority "jurisdictional 1. Unlike the which the sovereignty persists exception as the doctrine prohibition against dual jeopardy. If the two entities which seek double successively prosecute separate sovereigns, are defendant underlying principle upon reprosecution. The jeopardy will not bar sovereigns right sovereignty separate have dual rests is that against is their laws. A of law an offense enforce own violation sovereign sovereign "peace dignity” and each and individual authority. right its See vindicate the breach of United retains 377, 142, Lanza, 382, 141, 43 S.Ct. 67 L.Ed. 314 States v. (1922). U.S. concept sovereignty in the The heart of the of dual lies sourсe authority power whose name under 82, Alabama, 89-90, taken. See Heath v. 437-38, 474 U.S. S.Ct. Thus, (1986). applies to L.Ed.2d the doctrine federal prosecutions, prosecutions, successive individual state and state clearly applicability prosecutions. no for federal and tribal It has single sovereign. prosecutions within See successive Waller Florida, 397 U.S. 90 S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 435 offense, greater that defendant tried may be greater offense and double will not bar the subsequent prosecution. Whatever brief life the “jurisdic- exception” enjoyed tional in the Pennsylvania guise of Evers, 381 Pa.Super. Commonwealth v.

(1989), fully put has now been to rest in this court’s en banc LaBelle, decision Commonwealth v. supra. majori- acknowledges this the first section of its ty opinion. The “jurisdictional exception” has fared no better else fact, upon where. case which the relies for majority “jurisdictional its bald assertion of a i.e. exception”, Diаz v. States, United 56 L.Ed. 500 much, longer thought can no to have if any, in the face of vitality jeopardy jurisprudence double developed has since Diaz was decided. See v. Waller Florida, 387, 1184, (1970) 397 U.S. 90 S.Ct. 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (a municipal place court and a state court cannot defendant on the despite argu trial twice for same criminal conduct they ment that constitute distinct sovereignties); Brown v. Ohio, 161, 2221, (1977); 432 U.S. 97 53 L.Ed.2d 187 Vitale, 410, 2260, v. 447 Illinois U.S. 100 S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d (1980); Corbin, 228 v. The of the supra. rejection “jurisdictional exception” by states and federal many Waller, etc., courts2 in recent years the wake of is based sound, on the indeed compelling, rationale that the double jeopardy guarantee is not so as to fragile dependent be upon the jurisdictional limitations states may choose impose within multifaceted judicial system.3 See, 1219, e.g., (5th Wainwright, Culberson v. 453 F.2d 1220 Cir. 1972); 369, (D.N.M.1989) (and Tansy, F.Supp. v. 730 371 cases Salaz therein); Neil, (E.D.Tenn.1973); F.Supp. cited Robinson v. 366 924 Norman, 82, 816, 820, Mass.App. v. Commonwealth 27 N.E.2d (1989); State, affirmed, May 406 Mass. 545 N.E.2d 1155 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). S.W.2d 577 n. 7 notes, majоrity apparently clings "jurisdic- 3. As the New Mexico exception” seemingly jeopardy protection, tional to double alone its Fugate, resolve to do so. See State v. 101 N.M. 678 P.2d 686 , (1984) nom., sub L.Ed.2d 105 S.Ct. aff’d (1985) (affirmed Court). by equally an divided I do not read equally prece- this affirmance definitive or divided court as a event, adoption "jurisdictional exception”. any dential of the reasoning I find the court’s persuasive 816, 820, 82, 534 Norman, Mass.App. aff'd, N.E.2d (1989): N.E.2d 1155 Mass. of the land succes- the constitutional law If ... forb[ids] act, for the same criminal that doctrine prosecutions sive courts of limited to be subverted because ought not the same sov- been established within jurisdiction ha[ve] obliged gauntlet to run the defendant ereign. For once, painful would not be less than the ordeal more he had courts was haled before the several because jurisdiction. discrete the deteriorated so-called attempts

The revive majority drawing the instant case “jurisdictional exception” distinctions, persuades deprive neither me two First, protection. of his double appellant that, its interpretation due to emphasizes majority limits district court and jurisdictional justice have come court, charges in the instant case could not Therefore, prose- in order that the ‍‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‍single before a tribunal. either offense forego not forced to cution adjudication, appellant’s or rights may through impo- be sacrificed Putting trials for the same offense. sition of successive statutory too narrow majority’s aside for a moment here, my limits involved jurisdictional on the interpretation of this position simple. courts response to unified, system, judicial are of a state part opinion majority in noted in his Mr. Justice Brennan former — 2, 2, Corbin, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2087 n. 109 L.Ed.2d U.S. at-n. facing jeopardy the in Corbin the issue Court at 557 n. that double Fugate left but had been unresolved. been raisеd before in had open Supreme issue after the Court resolved the that remained Corbin subsequent Fugate. It that double clause barred found the if, greater general jurisdiction in a court of prosecution for a offense offense, prosecu- the an essential element of that in order establish already prove for the had been would conduct which defendant .tion (as Fugate well as the case at in court. Both Corbin and tried traffic bar) charges arising attempted prosecutions successive involved previously in which the defendant from a fatal automobile accident offense. Corbin disal- been tried in traffic court on traffic had and, consequently, Fugate, type at issue lowed exception. jurisdictional impliedly rejected New Mexico’s the jurisdictional limits of are single set by a sover- eign through legislative Downs, action. Commonwealth v. 334 483 A.2d Both the justice district court and court derive their power and from authority the same source. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution I, and Article Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee citizens, alike, to our adults and juveniles they will prosecutions be free successive for the same legislature offense. Our escape cannot this constitutional mandate creating courts by with mutually juris- exclusive diction greater and lesser criminal offenses. The integrity jurisdictional by scheme created the legisla- ture surely precedence cannot take over the fundamental rights constitutional embodied in the double jeopardy I clause. with the agree court Salaz v. Tansy, F.Supp. at which stated: “When the state controls prosecutions its judicial system, multilevel the double is a jeopardy clause defendant’s only protection.” Defen- dants cannot stripped protection of this by manipulating the jurisdiction of the through courts which they must suffer their multiple trials.

Further, I agree cannot with that its majority denial of double jeopardy protection to this appellant justified because of divergent “the goals sought to be achieved by the criminal I systems”. Nor can conclude because the system “simply ‘adjudi- juvenile” cates’ the that therefore he is entitled only diluted form protection. of double jeopardy These asser- tions majority fly the face of the realities of the juvenile court process, and more contravene importantly, the long-standing guarantees constitutional fashioned by the Supreme Court.

The arguments posited are majority precisely those rejected by Court when it first applied protection proceed- to juvenile delinquency ings. Jones, Breed v. U.S. (1975). There,

L.Ed.2d too, argued state that since and justice benign were system purposes the policies the underlying the punitive, not intended to be not implicated. were The Court protection double jeopardy Pointing to suggested approach. emphatically rejected had extended various recent decisions which the Court the Supreme to Court guarantees juveniles,4 constitutional that, recognition were motivated the they noted that benign of originally conception a the gap “there is between and its realities”. Breed [juvenile justice] system the Moreover, at 1785. the Jones, 421 at 95 S.Ct. U.S. jeopardy guarantee was emphasized that double Court criminal protect against multiple to only punish- not meant ordeal spare It and is intended to citizens the ments. to involved in respect trials. With the “trials” multiple case, distinguish is little to said: that Court “[T]here in this case from a hearing such as was held adjudicatory reason, For prosecution. engen- criminal that it traditional and ‘anxiety insecurity’ juvenile, elements of and a ders 530, 95 at imposes ‘heavy personal strain’.” U.S. that, being concluded at 1786. Breed Court twice S.Ct. burden, being put to that task subjected twice charges brought by the state defending against the same being personal strain” of experiencing “heavy twice offense, the double plight exactly tried for same at U.S. guarantee against. assures rejected Finally, at 1787. Court S.Ct. embraces, i.e. here majority apparently which the argument jeopardy guarantee the double extending flexibility diminish the somehow proceedings would It concluded informality juvenile justice system. ap- envisions instead that: burdens [the “[T]he state] nor sufficient qualitatively quantitatively to us neither pear in this context from the fundamental justify departure 537, at against jeopardy.” double U.S. prohibition Therefore, Breed, on a denial the basis S.Ct. at sup- protection to this cannot be (1967); Gault, 4. In re In re L.Ed.2d 527 387 U.S. 87 S.Ct. Winship, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 ported by the distinction juvenile between a proceeding adult criminal trial. that

Finally, extent the majority’s today conclusion reading is dictated its jurisdictional statutory here, scheme at work I suggest that it is erroneous. As the points out, various majority jurisdictional provisions operate in to define which and under procedural courts what circum- summary stances offenses and delinquency petitions may In adjudicated. particular, charges could form Only vehicle. these by and homicide of and its attendant finding delinquency of a the basis the proceeding, juve- the same during Yet consequences. summary to hear the power not without nile court is juvenile Nothing inherent the nature charges. summary power adjudicate it the to deprives court of charges. to has held juvenile the court been plain

This is because (without a offense alone summary jurisdiction have offense summary if the petition) of a filing the delinquency 6322 after to court under section is transferred pleas of common has taken the court de novo been appeal Thus, summary from conviction. Commonwealth a (1981),a 12 year D., Pa.Super. Alan of criminal conviction a juvenile appealed old of taken to the Court de novo appeal mischief. His judge The transfer- County. of Berks trial Pleas Common The court. 6322 to the juvenile red case under section the a beyond guilty then found defendant court imposed a summary charges reasonable doubt of hand, the juve- On the other fine ordered restitution. committed had not since the defendant nile court found that statute, he could meaning delinquent a act within court affirmed delinquent a child. This adjudged not be Accord, of the courts below. actions A.2d Given J., Kirk can J., majority I to see how fail Alan D. and Kirk court, then, conclude that is without “juvenile jurisdiction hear offenses.” this is Clearly, not the case.

I interpret applicable decline to statutes to at arrive here, the anomalous result the mаjority whereby achieves adjudicate summary charges court could when jur- is through provisions isdiction obtained the transfer power section 6322 to adjudicate but without the same charges when they accompany petition for 6303(a)(1). under section proceeding No rational purpose would be served such a result and the majority offers no explanation illogical anomaly.5 for the majority attempts escape force of this argu- ment by suggesting that the result it reaches is necessitat- ed the operation of section 6303 of the Motor Vehicle That Code. section provides juveniles between 16 and years of age charged who are with summary vehicle offenses all rights “have of an adult and may be prosecuted provisions under the this title in the same manner anas adult.” 75 (Purdon Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1977). The majority then cites the language the Juvenile Act regarding transfer criminal proceеdings to juvenile appears when it the defendant is a child. 42 (Purdon Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Supp.1990). pertinent § part, section 6322 provides:

Except as in provided (relating Pa.C.S. § rights minors), of liabilities or the event the child is My research has revealed one decision which has addressed the adjudication by juvenile summary charges court of which were filed delinquency proceeding in a alleged in which a child was also to have delinquent Leonardo, a committed act. In re panel A.2d 685 In case that a lone member of the concluded summary charges adjudicated could not be in this a fashion juvenile sitting delinquency proceeding. court for a The two addition- panel only al members concurred in the result. I find Leonardo First, unpersuasive. holding reasoning its only reflects the of one Second, judge. although just Leonardo was filed a few weeks after D., attempt Alan it makes no it distinguish reference to nor it does to view, I, my it. both Alan D. and Kirk are inconsistent with the underlying panel opinion rationale the one member’s in Leonardo. upon Leonardo has never juvenile been relied for the conclusion that power adjudicate summary charges court is they without to when are charged along proceeding alleging delinquent with a acts. today, Until this court so has never held. in a guilty murder or has been found

charged with if the court in a crimi- appears it to proceeding, criminal child, chapter that the defendant is a proceeding, nal the court shall immediately applicable, become shall proceedings, further criminal and where forthwith halt or judge transfer the case to the division a appropriate, to assigned juvenile hearings____ conduct the court excluding section as foregoing The reads majority juvenile jurisdiction offenses summary in criminal it as courts involved permitting court. I read motor summary rеtain ve- jurisdiction to proceedings 16 and 18 the offender is between hicle offenses where vehicle code such, section 6303 the motor years old. As mandate of section general as an to operates exception criminal Act which seeks to have 6322 of the Juvenile court. adjudicated juvenile children proceedings against precludes 6322 either However, agree I not that section do or, important- more court juvenile transfer of such cases if over such offenses jurisdiction court ly, juvenile denies The part delinquency proceeding. as of a are filed they code, using language, pro- clearly permissive motor vehicle may prosecuted 16 and 18 juveniles vides that between It provide offenses. does not summary as for adults provi- motor vehicle as such. The prosecuted shall be they authority not, view, court strip juvenile in my sion does delinquency proceeding charges are filed at to act if such pursuant to proceeding from criminal or are transferred section 6322. underlying Section policy the legislative

It is clear that treat juveniles Code of the Motor Vehicle cases of ordinary adults of 16 and as ages between the qualities special offenses. summary adjudication required not system were However, legislature I not that the can believe offenses. of jurisdiction court deprive intended had jurisdiction offenses where there is policy the matter. As a matter generally which make nothing summary offenses about court Nor inappropriate ‍‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‍an forum. is there about anything functioning court as a system whole that makes inappropriate forum.

Permitting joint adjudication both the motor charges allegations vehicle a single proceeding before the court would have question avoided at issue here and jurisdictional would not contravene imposed limits stat- Moreover, ute. I see no inherent policy considerations argue against However, a proceeding. would such I wish to re-iterate legislature that even had intended if the mutually jurisdiction create exclusive majori- that the finds here ty and even the Commonwealth would there- if fore to forego have one or the other prosecution, my re- sponse Appellant cannot, would be the same. consistent with prohibition the constitutional against double jeopardy, be forced submit to prosecutions successive same offense. No of jurisdictional amount juggling deprive can him of guarantee. this fundamental

WIEAND, J., joins dissenting opinion. A.2d GILMORE, Shani a Minor Her Parents Natural Guardi Gilmore, ans Marvin GILMORE and Sheila and Marvin Gil Gilmore, Right, Appellants, more and Sheila in Their Own DONDERO, Appellee. K. Victoria Superior Pennsylvania. Court of

Argued June 1990.

Filed Nov. be notes majority (Purdon 1981) Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. gives jus- district § jurisdiсtion summary Moreover, tices over offenses. Motor provides Vehicle Code juveniles between the ages of and 18 are charged who summary with motor rights vehicle offenses have the of “may an adult and be prosecuted under the provisions of this title the same manner as an (Purdon adult.” 75 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1977). addition, In juvenile court jurisdiction, which is Act, defined the Juvenile to “proceedings extends a child alleged which is to be delinquent or dependent” and to “transfers under (relating section 6322 to transfer criminal proceedings)”. 6303(a)(1) Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § (2) (Purdon 1982). The final statutory provision which applies today’s to inquiry the definitional portion of the Juvenile Act which states that a “delinquent act” does not include “summary offenses.” 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § (Purdon 1982). very guide it, With little law case that, majority concludes based on reading its of these together, statutes justice “neither the district nor juvenile court can adjudicate summary both and more of- serious fenses arising out of disagree. the same incident.” I I would hold that the statutory above-described scheme preclude does not bringing single proceeding within a be- fore juvenile court, both the delinquency petition alleg- ing a delinquent act I and the arrive summary offenses. at conclusion by straightforward reading the statu- tory addition, language. unless the statutes are so interpreted senseless anomalies arise from the case law jurisdiction and transfer original discusses which offenses. court use precludes Act While the Juvenile of delinquency, as for an adjudication offenses the basis deprives jurisdiction in the act court nothing part are filed as summary charges which adjudicate delinquent. alleged a child is proceeding over such gives jurisdiction Act specifically case, example, the delin- In the instant proceedings. aggravated with assault charged appellant petition quency

Case Details

Case Name: Matter of Huff

Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Mar 5, 1991

Citation: 582 A.2d 1093

Docket Number: 00195

Court Abbreviation: Pa.