138 N.E. 743 | NY | 1923
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *80
The board of education of the city of Buffalo is a corporation. (Matter of Fleischmann v. Graves,
In January, 1922, the board of education transmitted to the defendant an estimate of the amounts which would be required for the payment of salaries of the superintendent, teachers, supervising staff and other employees of the department of education of the city of Buffalo for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1922. The total amount so estimated was $8,276,906.32. It was made up of 166 different items, among which was one for $10,000, the salary of the superintendent of schools. The total estimate was reduced by the city council to $7,214,219.88, and among other reductions was the *81 estimated salary of the superintendent of schools from $10,000 to $7,000.
On the 1st of July, 1922, there was placed to the credit of the board of education for educational purposes for the fiscal year beginning at that time, the amount allowed by the council, $7,214,219.88, of which $6,148,627.50 was for the salary of superintendent, teachers and other employees of the department of education, so that there was, at the time the warrant here in question was drawn and presented to the appellant for his signature, sufficient funds to the credit of the board to meet the amount represented by the warrant. Notwithstanding that fact, he refused to countersign the same, upon the ground that the council, in the exercise of its discretion, had determined not only the gross amount to be raised and used for educational purposes, but also that of such amount only $7,000 could be used for the payment of the superintendent's salary and for that reason he had no authority to countersign a warrant for the first half of the month of July based upon a salary of $10,000.
The board of education of the city of Buffalo, as before stated, is a separate and independent corporation. It is not tied to or connected with the city council. It is charged by law with certain definite and well-defined duties. It is given very broad powers in the administration of the public educational system of the city and these powers are exclusive and in no way controlled by the city council, except as to the total amount that shall be expended for educational purposes. The board not only fixes the salaries of the superintendent and teachers (where they are not otherwise fixed by law) but it also fixes the amount to be paid other employees. (Matter of Emerson v. Buck, supra.) The funds which the board has under its control, and which it is held responsible for disbursing, are derived largely from: (a) An amount annually appropriated by the legislature for the support *82 of common schools and apportioned by the commissioner of education. The amount so appropriated is required to be used exclusively for the payment of teachers' salaries (Education Law [Cons. Laws, ch. 16], sec. 490.); (b) appropriations by the city council, raised by taxation as a part of the city budget (Education Law, sec. 877, subd. 6, as amended by Laws of 1917, chap. 786); and (c) proceeds derived from the sale of textbooks, tuition of pupils, and other small items.
The intent of the legislature in enacting the Education Law is clear. It imposes upon boards of education, as separate corporate bodies representing the state, the responsibility of furnishing an efficient system of public education (People ex rel. Wells Newton Co. v. Craig,
Section 880, subdivision 3, of the Education Law, as amended by chapter 786, Laws of 1917, requires that the commissioner of finance and accounts shall countersign warrants drawn by the board, and in addition to this the board is required to classify its funds and furnish the necessary data for that purpose. This is to enable the financial officer of the city to keep an account of its disbursements and insure compliance with statutory requirements as to the use of such funds for educational purposes, and also the genuineness of the signature of the board on the warrants.
The fact being undisputed that there were sufficient funds to the credit of the board, moneys appropriated for the payment of superintendent's and teachers' salaries, the appellant had no power, and he was not authorized to determine the legality of the charge. That being so, he was not justified in refusing to countersign the warrant in question. The salary of the superintendent had been fixed by the board. It had a right to fix it. It also had a right to determine how and when it should be paid. The warrant in question was drawn strictly in accordance with its direction and for that reason the superintendent was entitled to be paid the amount called for. *84
The order of the Appellate Division should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.
HISCOCK, Ch. J., POUND, CRANE and ANDREWS, JJ., concur; CARDOZO, J., concurs in result; HOGAN, J., dissents.
Order affirmed.