Appellants appeal the district court’s denial of their petition to require Charles Shepley, personal representative of the estate of thе decedent Gertrude Shepley, to reserve funds from the estate for the purpose of paying appellants’ attorney fees in a separate specific performance action against the estate.
On November 10, 1979, Charles Shepley, acting as attorney-in-fact for the decedent, agreed to sell certain real property to appellants and signed an earnest money agreement to that effect. The agreement provided for recovery of attorney fees by the prevailing party in any action brought to enforce its terms.
Gertrude Shepley died on December 1, 1979, and Charles Shepley beсame her personal representative. On February 15, 1980, Shepley published a notice to creditors of the estate as required by U.C.A., 1953, 75-3-801. Appellants submitted to Shep-ley, in his capacity as personal representative, a Uniform Real Estate Contract which allegedly provided for conveyance of the real property described in the earnest money agreement signed by Shepley. Shepley refused to accept this contract, claiming that its terms differed from thоse stated in the earnest money agreement. Appellants then brought an action in the Carbon County district court for specific performance of the еarnest money agreement.
In the Carbon County action, counsel for decedent’s estate raised the question of whether, in the event appellants prеvailed in that action, the estate could properly be required to pay appellants’ attorney fees as provided in the earnest money agrеement. Counsel argued that appellants’ right to such attorney fees constituted a “contingent claim” subject to the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 75-3-803. That statute bars “all claims against a decedent’s estate which arose before the death of the decedent, ... absolute or contingent” which have not been presented to the decedent’s personal representative or to the probate court
In an effort to protect themselves against the possibility that the Carbon Cоunty court might deny attorney fees on the basis of the above claims limitation statute, appellants filed a petition in the Salt Lake County district court in which decеdent’s estate was being probated. Appellants’ petition requested that $10,000 be set aside from decedent’s estate for the purpose of paying appellants’ attorney fees in the event they prevailed in the specific performance action. In the alternative, appellants requested аn order extending the time limitation provided in U.C.A., 1953, 75-3-804(2) for contesting the disallowance of claims against the estate.
In arguing their petition to the probate court, аppellants advanced several alternative theories as to why section 75-3-803 should not prevent them from receiving attorney fees in the specific рerformance action. Shepley, in turn, argued several possible grounds for denial of appellants’ petition. However, in denying the petition, the probate court did not specify which, if any, of Shepley’s theories formed the basis of its decision or whether it agreed with any of
Under Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the probate court had no obligation to state its findings of fact in deciding appellants’ motion. The absence of written findings does not alter the duty of this Court to sustain the trial court’s order if we can. do so on any propеr ground.
Section 75-3-803(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
All claims against a decedent’s estate which arose before the death of the decedent, . .. whether due or to become due, absolute оr contingent, liquidated or un-liquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis . .. are barred ... unless presented as follows:
(a) Within three months after the date оf the first publication of notice to creditors ....
Shepley does not argue that this section bars appellants’ specific performance action itself, although that action was filed after the end of the three-month period. On this subject, appellants obtained a ruling from the Carbon County court stating that sectiоn 75-3-803 does not require presentation of a specific performance claim within the three-month period.
In Forsyth v. Pendleton, Utah,
If it is concluded that there wаs no abandonment, then the contract is still in force and the contractual provisions which pertain to attorney’s fees apply.
The above instruction mаkes it clear that this Court did not view the plaintiff’s failure to present a section 75-9-4 claim as an obstacle to his recovery of attorney fees as provided in his contract with the decedent.
Shepley argues that although the time limitations of the former probate code did not apply to claims for attorney fees incident to specific performance actions against a decedent, the enactment in 1975 of the Uniform Probate Code, which includes the current section 75-3-803, changed this rule. However, Shepley cites no specific language in the new probate code which implies any intent on the part of the legislature to make such a change. The current section 75-3-803 makes no reference to any presentation requirement for such attorney fee claims; nor does it contain any general language which might extend the scope of its application to such claims. U.C.A., 1953, 75-1-201(4), which defines the term “claims,” similarly lacks any reference to attorney fees of this nature. This Court can discover no reason to construe the new probate code in such a manner as to subject aрpellants’ claim for attorney fees to a time limitation which does not govern the action
Because section 75-3-803 did not operate to bar an award of attorney fees to appellants in their specific performance action, the trial court properly refused to reserve such fees from the funds being probated оr to extend the time limit for contesting dis-allowance of this claim. Having so concluded, we need not consider the remaining arguments advanced by appellants.
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
Notes
. U.C.A., 1953, 75-3-804 specifies the manner in which such a claim must be presented.
. See Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Co., Utah,
. See also, Forsyth v. Pendleton, Utah,