Matter of Estate of Schield
In this аppeal Inez Schield challenges the district court’s order requiring completion of the sale of a farm from the estate of Hattie Schield to Lawrenсe Schield. We affirm.
This appeal is one of several that have arisen out of the estate of Hattie Schield. Hattie died testate in 1972. Her children, and benеficiaries under her 1963 will, are Lawrence, Inez and Melda Irene Schield.
The will granted an option to Lawrence and Inez to purchase a 160-acre farm fоr $52,000, substantially below market value. According to the will, for the first seven months after it was admitted to probate Lawrence and Inez were to be offered the farm as joint purchasers. The will was admitted to probate on July 14, 1977, and on August 1,1977, Inez filed her election to exercise the option. Lawrence, however, elected on February 10, 1978, to decline to purchase the farm jointly with Inez. Under the will, if Lawrence and Inez failed to purchase the farm jointly, it then was to be offered to Lawrеnce alone. On February 21, 1978, Lawrence exercised this second option to purchase the farm by himself by depositing a check for $52,000 with the executor. Howеver, the property was not immediately conveyed to him.
On February 24,1978, Inez filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that the will was ambiguous because it did not cover the situation where Inez elects to exercise the option to purchase the farm jointly with Lawrence but Lawrence refuses. In response to Lawrence’s application for adjudication of law points, the district court ruled on August 20,1979, that the will was unambiguous. The court decided that since Inez and Lawrence did not jointly exercise the first option, Lawrence had the option to purchase the farm alone, which he did.
After this favorable ruling, Lawrence applied оn October 22, 1979, for a court order to complete the sale of the farm to him. Inez resisted because she had filed a notice of appeal to this court from the final order after the adjudication of law points. That appeal was dismissed because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.
While Lawrence’s request to complete the sale was pending, Inez filed a suit for damages against the executor, as executor for the estate and individually, claiming that a dead tree limb on the farm fell and broke her leg. The incident occurred on April 29, 1979, and the petition was filed on January 11, 1980.
After hearing, the court on Jаnuary 31, 1980, ordered completion of the sale of the farm to Lawrence. Inez claims that this was error and has appealed to us.
The following questions are presented for our consideration:
(1) Did the trial court err in ordering completion of the sale of real estate after an adjudication of law pоints where the losing party’s motion to render final judgment was still pending?
(2) Where a personal injury action is pending against the executor, as executor and individually, for injuriеs suffered on estate property, did the court err in ordering the sale of land to an optionee at below market value?
I. Pendency of declaratory judgment action. Inez claims that the district court’s оrder to complete the sale of the farm to Lawrence was improper because her declaratory judgment action was still pending.
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Whether Lawrence had properly exercised a valid option to purchase the farm by himself did not involve any disputed issues of fact. Therefore, the declaratory judgment action could be disposed of by the ruling on the application for adjudication of law points.
Woodburn v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
Where a ruling on an application to adjudicate law points under Iowa R.Civ.P. 105 disposes of the entire case, it is an appealable final order.
Andersen Construction Co. v. National Bank,
After losing the adjudication of law points in her declaratory judgment action and having the appeal from that final order dismissed, Inez now claims that the court order of January 31,1980, requiring the sale to be completed was premаture because her declaratory judgment action was still pending. Specifically, she had filed a motion to render final judgment. We conclude that such a motiоn was unnecessary. Where a court’s adjudication of law points disposes of the case and the appeal from that final order is dismissed, there is no room to assert that the action is still pending.
See Weik v. Ace Rents, Inc.,
Inеz’ declaratory judgment action was not pending and therefore the trial court order to complete the sale of the real estate was not prеmature.
II. Inez’ tort claim. Inez also claims that the court order to complete the sale of the farm to Lawrence was error because she has filed a tort suit against the executor as executor and individually. She says that the land, or proceeds representing its fair market value, should remain in the estate to satisfy any judgment shе might recover. We find no error in the order to complete the sale to Lawrence.
Inez assumes that if the executor is liable to her, she may reach thе estate’s assets to satisfy her judgment. The weight of authority in Iowa and other jurisdictions indicates that the estate would not be liable for the negligent acts of the executor toward a third person in the course of administering the estate.
Herd v. Herd,
After upholding the validity of the exercise оf the option, the trial court concluded that even if Inez recovered in her tort suit and even if the estate could be held liable, the $52,000 proceeds arе “the extent to which said real estate could be reached to satisfy any subsequent judgment.” We agree with the court that under these circumstances, the $52,000 stood in place of the real estate.
In this case, the injury to Inez occurred after Lawrence had exercised his option to buy the farm for $52,000 in 1978. Although litigation prevented completion of the sale, Lawrence had deposited the $52,000 with the executor. If Lawrence had a valid option contract to buy this land from anоther individual, and he exercised it in the manner intended by the parties, he could have petitioned a court in equity to decree specific performance.
See Lyon v. Willie,
Finally, we cannot conclude that the district court has erroneously prejudiced any claim Inez may have against the estate. We have stated before that asserted liability against a decedent for torts committed by thе decedent is a claim against the estate.
Wolder v. Rahm,
We have considered all contentions of Inez, whether specifically addressed, and find them without merit. We therefore affirm the trial court order to complete the sale of the real estate to Lawrence.
AFFIRMED.