[¶ 1] This is an appeal by the South Dakota Department of Revenue (DOR) from the circuit court’s order determining Barbara Goss-man is entitled to inheritance tax status under SDCL 10-40-21(3), and holding that the phrase “wife of a son” within that statute encompasses the divorced wife of a decedent’s son. We reverse and remand with instruction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶ 2] Nellie Gossman died testate on June 12,1995. She had executed a will on October 14, 1992, leaving property to Barbara Goss-man valued at $64,437.26. At the time Nellie’s will was executed, and at the time of Nellie’s death, Barbara Gossman was divorced from Nellie’s son, Doyle. Nellie was aware of this fact, and referred to Barbara in Article II of the will as “my daughter-in-law ... previously married to my son, Doyle Gossman and now divorced.” All but one of Nellie’s grandchildren and great grandchildren are issue of the marriage of Doyle and Barbara. Following Doyle and Barbara’s divorce, Nellie and Barbara continued to maintain a close and caring relationship.
[¶3] However, Nellie’s estate passed by survivorship and none passed by the terms of her will. Barbara’s share was the result of *104 various joint account certificates of deposit and other accounts established by Nellie pri- or to Doyle and Barbara’s divorce. The estate of Nellie Gossman (Estate) filed its inheritance tax report August 25, 1995. In that report, Barbara was classified by the Estate as a Table 3 beneficiary, 1 pursuant to SDCL 10-40-21(3). Her inheritance tax owed was calculated under Table 3 to be $6,264.61. DOR performed an audit of the report and reclassified Barbara as a Table 5 beneficiary, 2 pursuant to SDCL 10-40-21(5). Her inheritance tax owed was calculated under Table 5 to be $9,451.09. The Department asserted this tax was appropriate as it determined Barbara was a “stranger in blood” under SDCL 10-40-21(5) rather than the “wife of a son” under SDCL 10-40-21(3).
[¶ 4] The matter was brought to a hearing before the circuit court and arguments were presented on the legal status of Barbara Gossman under the inheritance tax statutes. The circuit court determined Barbara was “a wife of a son” of Nellie Gossman and ordered her to pay inheritance tax in the amount of $6,264.61 based on the Table 3 rates. DOR appeals.
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 5] DOR raises two issues which we combine into one that presents a question of first impression for this Court. That is, whether the phrase “wife of a son” within SDCL 10-40-21(3) is to be interpreted as encompassing in its definition a person who, at the time of a decedent’s death, is divorced from a decedent’s son?
[¶ 6] Statutory interpretation involves questions of law for the circuit court and, as such, our review of such matters is de novo.
Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. State,
[¶ 7] With the above in mind, we proceed to an examination of the statute itself. SDCL 10-4-21 provides, in pertinent part:
*105 When property or any beneficial interest in such property passes by a transfer subject to taxation under this chapter and the property exceeds the value of the exemption specified in § 10-4-23 and does not exceed in value fifteen thousand dollars, the tax hereby imposed is:
[[Image here]]
(3) Four percent of the clear value of such interest in such property if the person entitled to any beneficial interest in such property is a brother or sister or a descendant of a brother or sister of the decedent, a wife or widow of a son, or the husband or widower of a daughter of the decedent....;
[[Image here]]
(5) Six percent of the clear value of such interest in such property if the person entitled to any beneficial interest in such property is in any other degree of collateral consanguinity than is herein-before stated, or is a stranger in blood to the decedent, or is a body politic or corporate....[.]
(emphasis added). SDCL 10-44-61 provides that inheritance taxes imposed by our statutes “shall take effect and accrue upon the death of the decedent,” thereby fixing the date we must use in interpreting Barbara’s status for inheritance tax purposes as the date of Nellie’s death. It is undisputed Barbara Gossman was divorced from Nellie’s son, Doyle, at this date.
[¶ 8] In
In re Estate of May,
[¶ 9] In interpreting “wife of a son” in SDCL 10-40-21(3), we also look to the New York cases for guidance as this statute was adopted from what is presently cited at N.Y. Tax Law § 221-a (McKinney 1986). The relevant wording of § 221-a is identical to that of SDCL 10-40-21(3). In 1913, the New York courts were called upon to interpret “wife or widow of a son,” as that term was used in the predecessor statute, and held that a bequest by a testatrix to her son’s wife, who before the death of the testatrix obtained an absolute divorce from the son, was not a bequest to either the “wife” or the “widow” of the son within the state’s tax laws which provided a lower rate of inheritance tax to the wife or widow of a son.
In re Merritt’s Estate,
[¶ 10] Although not bound by the
Merritt
holding, we find it persuasive because it also tracks the plain wording of SDCL 10-40-21(3) and our rules of statutory interpretation. “Wife” is defined by Black’s Law Dic
*106
tionary 1598 (6th ed. 1990) as “[a] woman united to a man by marriage; a woman who has a husband living and undivorced” and by Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2614 (1976) as “a married woman.” We have previously stated that we determine the intent of a statute from what the legislature said, rather than what we think it should have said, and we confine ourselves in making this determination to the language used by the legislature.
M.B. v. Konenkamp,
[¶ 11] Since its enactment in 1915, SDCL 10-40-21 has undergone revision many times, most recently in 1994. We believe the legislature could have easily inserted the word “former” to precede “wife” into the statute if it meant to impose a lesser rate of inheritance tax on divorced wives of decedents’ sons. For us to do so by judicial decree, as urged by Estate, would require that we assume a role the constitution forbids. “In interpreting legislation, this court cannot add language that simply is not there.”
Helmbolt v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co.,
[¶ 12] We note our holding in no way affects a testator’s right to bequeath or devise his or her property to anyone and in any amount he or she sees fit. Our decision today does nothing to disparage the close relationship that Estate claims existed between Barbara and Nellie Gossman or limit the bequest made. Our holding merely determines Barbara’s status as it pertains to the inheritance tax owed on the transferred property.
[¶ 13] We reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand with instruction to hold Barbara Gossman’s tax payable as a “stranger in blood” under SDCL 10-40-21(5) and render judgment accordingly.
Notes
. Table 3 rates are:
[[Image here]]
$500-15,000 4%
$15,000-50,000 10% of that over $15,000 plus $580
$50,000-100,000 16% of that over $50,000 plus $4,080
$100,000 or over 20% of that over $100,000 plus $12,080
. Table 5 rates are:
[[Image here]]
$100-15,000 6%
$15,000-50,000 15% of that over $15,000 plus $894
$50,000-100,000 24% of that over $50,000 plus $6,044
30% of that over $100,000 plus $18,144 $100,000 or over
. The language in SDCL 10-40-21 itself evidences imposition rather than exemption when it provides "the tax hereby imposed is....” The language of SDCL 10^10-25, stating that the exemptions found within SDCL 10-40-23 provide the exclusive exemptions under SDCL Ch. 10-40, also supports the classification of SDCL 10-40-21 as one of imposition rather than exemption. Finally, other courts, having examined issues similar to the one presently before us, have determined that rate provision statutes do not exempt, but impose taxes.
See
People v. Snyder,
. We have noted our accord with the decisions of the New York courts in other cases involving taxation issues.
See
Yadco Inc., v. Yankton Co.,
. We have reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions having addressed the same or similar issues to the one presented to us by this case.
See In re Estate of Edgett,