Pеtitioner Tatsumi Misaka challenges a decision by the Utah Court of Appeals reversing a trial court decision that admitted to probate a holographic will written by decedent Robert E. Erickson.
In re Estate of Erickson,
Robert Erickson died in June of 1983. A formal will executed in 1955 was admitted to probate, and the court appointed the designated personal representative. In October of 1985, Misаka filed a petition for probate of a holographic will dated August 22, 1973. The instrument Misaka filed consisted of three handwritten note cards, three inches by five inches, lacking page numbers. 1 Mr. Erickson’s name appears only in the exordium clause of the instrument, which states, “Last will & Test I Robert E. Erickson do hereby state that I leave and bequeath to the following persons. ...”
At trial, Misaka presented evidence that the three cards were in Erickson’s handwriting, evidence that was not controverted by the estate. Misaka also submitted evidence that Erickson’s handwritten name on the cards was written in a style that matched the signature he used on certain checks and stock certificates and that the cards were writtеn by the same person who had signed the checks and stocks. The estate submitted evidence that Erickson frequently made notes to himself on file cards similar to the ones on which the instrument was written and that he was sometimes intoxicated when he did so. The estate contended that, at most, the cards contained notes of terms that might be used in some future will that was never prepared.
The trial court found that the instrument was a valid holographic will and admitted it to probate. The сourt of appeals reversed on the ground that Misaka had not met his burden of proving that Erickson intended the handwritten name in the exordium to be his signature. We granted certiorari, and we now affirm.
On the first point, we conclude that the signatory intent issue was adequately preserved and could properly be reached by the court of appeаls. At trial, the estate offered evidence disputing Misaka’s claim that the handwritten name matched Erickson’s signature, and it argued that the location of the name in the instrument did not justify the inference that it was intended to be a signature. This was sufficient to preserve the claim that the note cards did not constitute a valid holographic will because they did not contain the “signature” of the testator, as required by section 75-2-503. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-503 (1978). We therefore proceed to the main issuе: whether the written name in the instrument was intended to be a signature.
Some background is helpful. Testamentary transfers of property are governed by statute.
In re Love’s Estate,
When it comes to holographic wills, the UUPC provisions go even further in an attempt to give priority to testamentary intent by eliminating all but a few technical requirements. The purpose of the holographic will provisions is to allow laypersons to prepare their own wills without the expense or rigorous formalities of attested wills. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-503 (editorial board comment) (1978). As the editorial board of the UUPC stated in its comment to title 75, chapter 2, part 5 of the Code, “The basic intent of these sections is to validate the will whenever possible.” Utah Code Ann. tit. 75, ch. 2, pt. 5 (editorial board comment) (1978).
Section 75-2-503 оf the Code, which is part of the UUPC, establishes the minimum requirements for holographic wills. It states in part, “A will which does not comply with section 75-2-502 [dealing with formal wills] is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and the material provisions arе in the handwriting of the testator.” Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-503 (1978) (emphasis added). Section 68-3-12(2)(r), which contains the rules of statutory construction applicable to the statutes in general, defines “signature” as including “any name, mark, or sign written with the intent to authenticate any instrument or writing.” Utah Code Ann. § 68 — 3—12(2)(r) (Supр.1990) (emphasis added). Taken together, these two sections indicate that a “signature” is essential to a valid holographic will and that a written name is a “signature” only if it is made with “the intent to authenticate” the will.
This requirement of signatory intent raises exactly the same potential for conflict with the decedent’s testamentary intent as does any other formal will requirement.
See
Mechem,
The Rule in Lemayne v. Stanley,
29 Mich.L.Rev. 685, 706-07 (1929). Nevertheless, although the UUPC endeavors to minimize the formal requirements for holographic wills, those requirements that the statute does impose may not be avoided.
See In re Love’s Estate,
In the present case, the trial court implicitly found that the handwritten name in the opening paragraph of what appears to be the first of the cards was written with signatory intent. The court of appeals re
We first canvass the law regarding signatory intent. If the signature appears at the end of an instrument, particularly if it is part of an attestation сlause, signatory intent clearly may be inferred. Annotation,
Place of Signature of Holographic Wills,
A review of the literature and cases dealing with signatory intent in situations where there is not a signature at the end of thе instrument indicates that the kind of evidence to determine signatory intent that is considered by courts generally falls into two broad categories.
See generally
Annotation,
Holographic Wills,
The second source of evidence of signatory intent that is commonly considered is evidence instrinsic to the instrument and includes the completeness of the document as a testamentary instrument.
See
Annotation,
Holographic Wills,
We now turn to the facts of the case at hand. The evidence offered regarding signatory intent consisted of the instrument itself and the extrinsic evidence that the handwritten namе matched Erickson’s signature on checks and other business documents. Assuming that the trial court was correct in finding that the handwriting on the cards matched Erickson’s handwriting, the only other evidence of signatory intent, and the evidence that we consider here, appears on the face of the document itself. This evidence is not in dispute. The appropriate standard of review when evidence is not in dispute is that all issues are questions of law, which we review for correсtness.
3
See In re Love’s Estate,
We first note that the estate argues that the cases requiring “completeness” in the holographic instrument mean that the
Viewing the instrument as a whole, we conclude that the court of appeals was correct in ruling that the instrument does not have sufficient indicia of completeness to support an inference that Erickson intended his name in the exordium to be his signature. Nothing about the instrument indicates that the second and third cards could not be interchanged. More importаntly, the instrument as we have it before us contains nothing to indicate that Erickson had finished his writing. Nothing indicates that the instrument actually ends at the bottom of the third card. There is no attestation clause or final note, as is often present in the documents validated as holographic wills.
See, e.g., Smith v. MacDonald,
Both parties cite Justice Traynor’s dissent in
In re Bloch’s Estate,
We agree that the function of the name in the exordium, to identify Robert E. Erickson as the author of the instrument, is consistent with the functions cited by Justice Traynor as supporting signatory intent.
See id.; see also Smith v. MacDonald,
Notes
. The three cards read as follows, with unreadable portions indicated:
8/22/73 Last Will & Test I Robert E. Erickson do hereby state that I leave and bequeath to the following persons of my family & others on my demise I want to leаve to my wife Dorothy Erickson the home at 1378 Blaine Ave. until she remarries, after which the home shall be sold & ½ go to her & ¼ to REE Jr. & ¼ to Sheryl Ann Erickson
the F.H. Store shall go ¼ to Dorothy ¼ to REE Jr ¼ to Sheryl A [unreadable] the other ¼ is owned by T. Misaka The condominium at Park City is to go To ¼ REE Jr ¼ to Sheryl & ½ T T [Madaka or Masaka] My Interest in Nevada Scratch to Go to Dorothy in total
My Insurance to cover my interest in the Holladay store to go to Dorothy in total — $50,-000 or more. Other stock Interests — Some Zions Utah Bank Croft to go to Sheryl & Bobby Share & Share alike
. We note that some cases hold that even when the instrument appears fairly complete, the courts require independent evidence of signatory intent.
See, e.g., Bamberger v. Barbour,
. If the trial court hears disputed evidence on the question of the decedent’s signatory intent, the reviewing court should defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
See In re Yowell's Estate,