123 N.E. 380 | NY | 1919
Charges preferred against the district attorney of Rockland county were followed by the appointment of a commissioner (Public Officers Law, sec.
We think that the audit and allowance were lawfully rescinded. The appellant concedes that this would be so if the claim were fraudulent or illegal (Smith v. Hedges,
In thus holding, we do not impair the efficacy of the principle that quasi-judicial action, when the statute intends it to be final, may not thereafter be revoked (People ex rel. Chase v.Wemple, supra). The very question to be determined is when action becomes final. That is in every case a question dependent for its answer upon the scheme of the statute by which power is conferred. We are persuaded that the legislature in the enactment of the County Law and like laws that have preceded it, did not mean that audits should be irrevocable as against the better judgment of the auditors. The purpose of an audit is to fix the items that are to enter into the annual appropriation (County Law, sec. 12, subd. 2; sec. 51, subd. 1; Osterhoudt v. Rigney,supra, at p. 234; People ex rel. Francis v. Cahill, supra). Allowance is a means to an end. Finality is not reached, while *246 the life of the board endures, until the end has been attained. This conclusion is consistent with the scheme and purpose of the statute. It is reinforced by a compelling public policy and by long-continued practice. Boards of supervisors must often act hastily and on inadequate information. They ought to have some opportunity to undo and correct an error apparent to themselves. For many years, in the practical interpretation of their powers, they have reserved this opportunity (People v. Stocking,supra; People ex rel. Francis v. Cahill, supra). The practice is wise and lawful. We will not overturn it.
The order should be affirmed with costs.
HISCOCK, Ch. J., CHASE, HOGAN, POUND, McLAUGHLIN and ANDREWS, JJ., concur.
Order affirmed.