In the Matter of the DISCIPLINE OF Harlan A. SCHMIDT, as an Attorney at Law.
No. 17525.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Decided Oct. 28, 1992.
Original Proceeding
Argued Feb. 10, 1992.
Arlo D. Sommervold, Sioux Falls, for respondent Schmidt.
HENDERSON, Justice.
Respondent, Harlan A. Schmidt (Schmidt), was admitted to practice law in this state on May 15, 1977. He subsequently established his practice of law in the Spearfish area.
The facts in this case are undisputed. On March 22, 1989, Schmidt prepared an affidavit under
Schmidt did intentionally omit the affidavit, required by
This conduct, in contravention of
Candor Toward the Tribunal
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
....
(d) in an ex parte proceeding, ..., a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
Misconduct
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
....
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; ...
We believe that the present case is on all fours with a prior disciplinary case, Matter of Discipline of Rensch, 333 N.W.2d 713 (S.D. 1983). In Rensch, the subject attorney was publicly censured for a misrepresentation to the trial judge regarding the status of a fee arrangement with a purportedly indigent defendant. In Rensch, as well as the instant case, the attorney committed an intentional misrepresentation before the court.
This Court concludes that Schmidt intentionally omitted a required affidavit concerning prior disciplinary status of a nonresident attorney, in violation of
We note (1) Circuit Judge Steven L. Zinter, appointed as Referee by this Court, entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the latter concluding and recommending public censure (2) Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of South Dakota likewise recommended public censure. For holdings in this Court, all public censure cases, consistent with our sanction of public censure herein, see, Matter of Discipline of Dana, 415 N.W.2d 818 (S.D. 1987); Matter of Discipline of Kirby, 336 N.W.2d 378 (S.D. 1983); Matter of Discipline of Theodosen, 303 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1981); and Matter of Discipline of Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1979).
The ultimate decision for discipline of members of the State Bar rests with the Supreme Court of South Dakota.
We note that Schmidt previously received a private reprimand, which arose as the result of formal proceedings in this Court. Those proceedings were filed on the 6th day of June, 1989. On April 30, 1990, this Court remanded Schmidt‘s previous disciplinary matter, the formal proceedings referred to above, “... to the Disciplinary Board for issuance of a private reprimand in accordance with the recommendation of the Referee and the provisions of
Our sanction for attorney Schmidt‘s conduct herein is a public censure which, in this instance, is in accord with the referee‘s recommendations and the recommendations of the Disciplinary Board.
AMUNDSON, J., concurs.
SABERS, J., concurs specially.
MILLER, C.J. and WUEST, J., concur in part and dissent in part.
SABERS, Justice (concurring specially).
I write specially to point out that, upon the filing of a second disciplinary complaint, a prior disciplinary order which resulted in a private reprimand is subject to public disclosure. After all, the “private reprimand” was by Supreme Court order under
MILLER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I would suspend Schmidt from the practice of law for no less than sixty days.*
Irrespective of that disagreement, one concern, appropriately noted by Justice Henderson, needs to be emphasized. As Justice Henderson notes,
WUEST, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority opinion except as to the discipline—public censure. In my opinion, misrepresentation to the Court is a serious matter. Therefore, I vote for a 60-day suspension.
