Matter of County of Orange v. Monroe Bakertown Rd. Realty, Inc.Matter of County of Orange v. Monroe Bakertown Rd. Realty, Inc.
In a condemnation proceeding, Monroe Bakertown Road Realty, Inc., appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Brands, J.), entered April 8, 2013, as, upon a decision of the same court dated January 16, 2013, made after a nonjury trial, is in its favor and against the County of Orange in the principal sum of only $33,000.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the facts, with costs, and thе matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Orange County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
In this partial taking condemnation proceeding, the undeveloped property at issue is locаted in the Village of Kiryas Joel and consisted of 70.70 acres prior to the taking, and 69.23 acres after the taking. Both the claimant, Monroe Bakertown Road Realty, Inc. (hereinafter Monroe Bakertown), and the
The County‘s appraisal was also based on a comparable sales methodology, but it analyzed four recent sales of vаcant land located outside the Village limits. After adjusting sales prices of the comparables based on varying factors, the County appraiser arrived at a value for the entire property, before the taking, at $1,555,400, and a value of the remaining property, after the taking, at $1,522,400, or a difference of $33,000. The County also presented the testimony of a County Department of Health (herеinafter DOH) engineer, which the trial court credited, who testified that the DOH would not have issued a permit allowing Monroe Bakertown‘s asserted 18-unit per acre housing project on the subject property because the Village‘s water supply was inadequate for such a project. In its decision following the nonjury trial, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he lack of adequate water supрly is a predominate factor which cannot be disregarded and leads this court to accept the evaluation placed on the property by the County of Orange.” Based on this conсlusion, the court rejected Monroe Bakertown‘s appraisal, accepted the appraisal by the County, and entered judgment in favor of Monroe Bakertown and against the County in the principal sum of $33,000 as damages for the taking of the parcel. We reverse.
When private property is taken for public use, the condemning authority must “compensate the owner ‘so that he mаy be put in the same relative position, insofar as this is possible, as if the taking had not occurred‘” (Matter of City of New York [Kaiser Woodcraft Corp.], 11 NY3d 353, 359 [2008], quoting City of Buffalo v Clement Co., 28 NY2d 241, 258 [1971]; see
Here, the evidence demonstrated, and the parties agreed, that a high density, multi-family residential development was the highest and best use of the subject property. However, there was disagreement as to whether such use was reasonably possible at the time of the taking or could have been achieved within the reasonably near future. Although the County‘s witness testified that the County would not have permitted a high density residential project on the property due to the lack of available water, proof was adduced that the Village had undertaken efforts to increase its water well supply capacity. Additionally, there was testimony that the Village had secured funding and had begun the approval process to connect its water supply to the New York City Aqueduct reservoir system.
Given this testimony, the record does not support a conclusion that the subject property could never have been developed or that it would have remained vacant land (see generally, Spriggs v State of New York, 54 AD2d 1080 [1976]). More importantly, the crucial issue to be determined in evaluating the subject property is not whether the water issue would be
We further observe that the Supreme Court‘s determination that Monroe Bakertown‘s proposal for the subject property would not have been approved by the County was more akin to a rejection of the size of the residеntial development as too aggressive and, thus, should have only necessitated a reduction of Monroe Bakertown‘s appraised value. However, the court‘s wholesale rejection of such appraisal is, in effect, reflective of an inappropriate highest and best use for the property (see e.g. Matter of Village of Dobbs Ferry v Stanley Ave. Props., Inc., 95 AD3d 1027 [2012]), despite thе fact that the County‘s own appraisal report stated that “the subject [property] is considered to have good development potential.” In other words, although the large scope and high density of Monroe Bakertown‘s suggested residential development was not reasonable in light of the water supply issue in the area at the time of the taking, there was evidence that a smallеr development may have been feasible in the near future. Accordingly, for this additional reason, the Supreme Court should not have simply defaulted to the low valuation put forth by the County (cf., Matter of Metropolitan Transp. Auth. [Longridge Assoc., L.P.], 122 AD3d 856 [2014]).
Therefore, we conclude that the facts adduced at trial do not warrant the determination that the appraised valuation submitted by the County had to be accepted. For similar reasons, in its valuation, the Supreme Court was not bound to accept Monroe Bakertown‘s appraisal. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Orange County, to recalculate the value of the subject property in accordance with this decision and order, and for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment thereafter. Balkin, J.P., Dickerson, Sgroi and Cohen, JJ., concur.
BALKIN, J.P., DICKERSON, SGROI and COHEN, JJ.