In the Matter of Honorable L. D. CARSTENSEN, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District.
No. 67246.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
March 17, 1982.
316 N.W.2d 889
In Hewitt, this court held that
By contrast, it is apparent that application of rule 179(b) would not be inconsistent with the informality of juvenile court proceedings, because the rule is one which pеrmits omission of a procedural requirement. We therefore hold that rule 179(b) applies to juvenile court termination proceedings, at least insofar as it permits the sufficiency of the evidence to be challenged on appeal when that issue has not been raised below.3
Accordingly, we conclude that R.D. may raise on this appeal the issue of lack оf evidence regarding subsection (b) of section 232.116(5). Because the State rightly concedes error on that question, the juvenile court‘s order of termination must be reversed and the termination petition dismissed without prejudice.
REVERSED; PETITION DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Donald A. Wine of Davis, Hockenberg, Wine, Brown & Koehn, Des Moines, for L. D. Carstensen, Judge.
This is an original proceeding pursuant to application by the Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications to discipline The Honorable L. D. Carstensen, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District, for failure to comply with the provisions of
I. The judicial qualifications functions of the Commission and this court. This is the first time we have had to consider an application by the Commission to discipline a judge. Consequently, it is our first opportunity to review the function of the Commission and its relationship to this court.
The Iowa Constitution provides:
[T]he Supreme Court shall have power to retire judges for disability and to discipline or remove them fоr good cause, upon application by a commission on judicial qualifications. The General Assembly shall provide by law for implementation of this section.
A charge against a judge must be made in writing. After an investigation, the Commission may: (1) dismiss the charge if it is groundless; (2) dispose of the charge by informal conference with or communication to the judge if the charge appears to be substantiated but not of sufficient severity to warrant application to this court; or (3) hold аn evidentiary hearing, which results in dismissal of the charge or application to this court to retire, discipline, or remove the judge.
Upon application to this court, it is our responsibility to review the record as in an appeal of an equity action and render an appropriate decree.
Although the judicial qualifications legislation authorizes the Commission to “make application to the supreme court to retire, discipline, or remove” a judge,
The obvious purpose of the enactment of the judicial qualifications legislation is to maintain the integrity of the judicial branch of government by providing a fair and efficient method for determining whether an ailing judgе should be retired or
Thе Commission has express authority to recommend that a judge be disciplined. A recommendation as to the specific sanctions that should be imposed by this court promotes the overall purposes of the judicial qualifications legislation and is merely incidental to the Commission‘s express power. In several jurisdictions in which this issue has been considered, review boards have been found to possess implied constitutional or statutory authority to recommend specific sanctions when express authority did not exist. E.g., In re Dupont, 322 So.2d 180, 183 (La.1975); In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 682-83, 304 A.2d 587, 600 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974). We likewise conclude that the Commission has such implied authority under article V, section 19 and chapter 605. However, the Commission‘s recommendation is not conclusive. Since our review is de novo, we evaluate the circumstances of the case independently and will substitute our judgment for that of the Commission when appropriate.
II. Failure to comply with rule 200.
A. Origin and nature of the charge. On January 21, 1981, Chief Justice W. W. Reynoldson notified the Commission in writing that the Supreme Court had received numerous complaints that Judge Carstensen was not satisfactorily performing his judicial duties in several specified areas. After a preliminary investigation of these charges, the Cоmmission served Judge Carstensen with notice that charges had been made against him and that it had scheduled a hearing thereon. The charges specified in the notice pertained to only one area of the original complaint—failure, at various times and in various ways, to comply with the requirements of rule 200. At the hearing, which was held on August 26, 1981, the Office of the Attorney General, whiсh has the responsibility of prosecuting charges before the Commission on behalf of the State,
B. Rule 200.
Each senior judge, district judge, district associate judge and judicial magistrate shall report monthly to the supreme court, through the office of the court administrator of the judicial department, all matters taken under advisement in any case for longer than sixty days, together with an explanation of the reasons for the delay and an expected date of decision. If no matters have been taken under advisement over sixty days, the report shall state “none“. Senior judges need only file reports for those months during which they perform judicial duties or have matters under advisement.
Any submission shall be reported when all hearings have been completed and the matter awaits decision without further appearance of the parties or their attorney. A matter shall be deеmed submitted even though briefs or transcripts have been ordered but have not yet been filed.
The report shall be due on the tenth day of each calendar month for the period
ending with the last day of the preceding calendar month. The first report shall be due January 10, 1978. The report shall be signed by the judge or magistrate and submitted on a form prescribed by the court administrator. Thе court administrator shall promptly cause all reports received to be filed in the office of the clerk of the supreme court as records available for public inspection.
This rule was promulgated pursuant to the constitutional and statutory rule-making powers of this court: the Iowa Constitution provides that “the supreme court . . . shall exercise a supervisоry and administrative control over all inferior judicial tribunals throughout the state,”
Rule 200 was designed to provide a system of аccountability, promoting the orderly and expeditious disposition of all matters submitted to a judge or magistrate. With the ever-increasing time demands placed on the trial bench by massive case loads; difficult, new, and complex litigation; and public scrutiny, it is imperative that those responsible for administering the judicial system be apprised of the status of each judge‘s individual cаse load. The reporting system established by rule 200 enables the individuals who make case assignments to afford relief or provide assistance to judges who have fallen behind on their case loads. While some members of the trial bench may look at rule 200 as an attempt to police their activities, most judges use the rule constructively—as a means of self-discipline—to promptly dispose of pending matters.
Rule 200 reports are vital to the efficient administration of our judicial system, and, as such, they are a necessary duty, which we expect to be followed and will enforce.
Generally, there are four ways in which rule 200 may be violated: (1) not submitting a repоrt; (2) submitting an untimely report; (3) omitting cases; and (4) reporting cases in an untimely manner. Our de novo review of the facts supports the Commission‘s finding that Judge Carstensen violated the rule in each of these four ways.
C. De novo review of the facts. During the first thirty-seven months that rule 200 reports were required, Judge Carstensen failed to comply with the rule‘s provisions on twenty-eight occasions. He failed to submit five reports and submitted twenty-threе reports late. In 1978 four reports were submitted from fifteen to forty-five days late and reports for November and December were not submitted. In 1979 eight reports were submitted from eight to 115 days late and reports for the months January through March were not sub-
Prompting letters were sent to Judge Carstensen by the supreme court administrator on several occasions, reminding him of his duty to submit repоrts. On October 22, 1979, Chief Justice Reynoldson wrote Judge Carstensen directing him to comply with rule 200. On January 7, 1980, the Chief Justice and the supreme court administrator traveled to the Seventh Judicial District and discussed Judge Carstensen‘s noncompliance with rule 200 with him and the chief judge of the district. On that date Judge Carstensen submitted the monthly report that was due on January 10. The balance of the reports due in 1980 were submitted late, however. From February through June the reports were one to seven days late, and reports for the months July through December were ten to forty-three days late.
Judge Carstensen also failed to comply with rule 200 by completely omitting eight cases from required reports and by reporting seven cases that should have been listed on previous reports. Judge Cаrstensen maintains that these incidents do not show any intent to avoid his responsibility to report cases or his duty to make timely rulings on matters pending before him. He points out that fifteen of the twenty-seven cases listed on his reports were reported correctly. He alleges that of the remainder, five cases were reported late only because no report was submitted for the appropriate month, and these five cases were reported subsequently when reports were submitted. He also notes that of the eight cases that were omitted, three were motions that were decided before he realized that motions had to be included in rule 200 reports and two were dissolution of marriage proceedings in which decrees wеre filed in seventy and ninety-five days. He admits that the three remaining cases were overlooked and that one of them had been pending for seven months.
In addition, Judge Carstensen failed to include in his January 10, 1978, report four cases decided on January 9 and 10. These cases were pending on January 1 and therefore should have been included in the report. The first investigative reрort prepared by the attorney general‘s office stated that Judge Carstensen was attempting to “beat the deadline.” In response, Judge Carstensen stated that his action showed agreement and cooperation with the spirit of the rule.
Our independent review of the facts leads us to the conclusion that Judge Carstensen blatantly, flagrantly, and persistently disregarded thе requirements of rule 200. He failed to submit five reports and has given no reasonable explanation for these omissions. He consistently submitted reports late, completely omitted some matters required to be reported, and reported other matters on reports subsequent to the ones they should have originally been reported on. Furthermore, he paid little or no heed to the letters reminding him of his responsibilities under rule 200 and ignored the admonitions of the Chief Justice. The gravity of Judge Carstensen‘s noncompliance with the requirements of rule 200 warrants disciplinary action by this court.
III. Discipline. As already noted, the discipline recommended by the Commission is suspension from office for a period of thirty days without pay. Judge Carstensen maintains that this sanction is far tоo severe, and that mitigating factors, such as his good faith and the prevailing practices of other judges, should be considered.
First, he contends that although
Judge Carstensen also asserts that we should consider the number of cases listed by other judges on their rule 200 reports. As the Commission determined, however, this factor is irrelevant to the charges against Judge Carstensen. The issue here is not the number of cases listed on his rule 200 reports, but his noncompliance with the requirements of the rule in listing and failing to list those cases.
Although Judge Carstensen has cited us cases from other jurisdictions in which censure and reprimand, rather than suspension, were imposed for noncompliаnce with financial reporting requirements, we believe the nature and frequency of the rule infractions in this case warrant a more severe sanction. We have carefully considered the sanction recommended by the Commission and find it appropriate with slight modification. It is therefore ordered that, effective April 23, 1982, Judge L. D. Carstensen is suspended from office without pay until May 21, 1982. This opinion shall not be construed to prevent an arrangement by Judge Carstensen to keep in force his health and life insurance coverage at his own expense during the period of suspension.
APPLICATION GRANTED AND DISCIPLINE ORDERED.
All justices concur except ALLBEE, J., who concurs in part and dissents in part, and LeGRAND and HARRIS, JJ., who take no part.
ALLBEE, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
While I am satisfied that Judgе Carstensen knowingly and persistently disregarded the requirements of rule 200 and that his conduct is deserving of censure by this court, I believe that the penalty exacted is greater than warranted under the circumstances. A penalty that deprives one of eight and one-third percent of his gross annual judicial compensation is a high price to pay under any set of circumstances, and, it seems to me, is out of proportion to the defalcation here. Certainly a censure would constitute punishment in the form of a rebuke by this court; a censure would indelibly blemish the judge‘s record of service; a censure without doubt would be the cause of chagrin and ignominy to the judge. A censure, in addition, would serve as notice to others that such inattention to judicial duties does not go unnoticed and will not go unpunished. Thus, I concur in the court‘s findings but dissent from the sanction imposed.