ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on an Objection to Proof of Claim by Archibald Bernard (hereinafter “the Debtor”). The Debtor brings this objection in opposition to the bankruptcy claim of World Savings and Loan (hereinafter “World”) and, as such, the matter forms a core proceeding for the Court’s determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (B) & (O). The Court bases its decision upon the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
World Savings and Loan holds a first priority deed to seсure debt on what it now acknowledges to be the Debtor’s residence. The instant controversy turns on the amount which properly should be paid from the Debtor’s estate in satisfaction of World’s claim arising from that debt. Specifically, the Debtor asks the Court to disallow certain attorney’s fees and expenses associated with a foreclosure sale conducted by World after the commencement of the Debtor’s bankruptсy ease. 1 Under the Debtor’s argument, to *1019 the extent that World incurred these expenses in violation of the automatic stay, see 11 U.S.C. 362, it should not recoup them as part of its bankruptcy claim.
Rather than contesting the substance of the Debtor’s objection, World appears to challenge its form and timeliness. To that end, World points out that it filed a proof of claim for $145,094.08, a figure which included the fees and expenses at issue, on January 19, 1993. Furthermore, the creditor nоtes that on February 10, 1993, the Court confirmed the Debtor’s plan of reorganization in an Order which directed any remaining claims objections to be pursued within six months thereafter. As such, contends World, under the doctrine of res judicata, the plan and confirmation Order prohibit the Debtor from presenting this claim objection at a point more than two years subsequent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Section 1327(a) and the Feasibility of Post-Conñrmation Objections to Claim.
With regard to the impact of confirmation, the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[t]he provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a). Fulfilling a need to somehow dispose of reorganizations with finality, this provision closely tracks the operation of the res judicata doctrine.
2
Thus, it is frequently said that the order of confirmation binds both creditor and debtor on any matter which was
or could have been
raised as part of the confirmation process.
See In re Szostek,
Applying the mandate of Code section 1327(a), the Court finds that objections regarding the amount which the plan should pay in satisfaction of a claim, like contests of the plan’s classification of that claim, form just such a matter which could have been raised in the course of the plan-confirming process. To the extent that a debtor may have had the opportunity to object to a specific aspect of a claim before or during the confirmation hearing, his failure to do so, therefore, should cement the presumption of that claim’s validity.
See Fawcett v. United States (In re Fawcett),
II. Reading Section 1327(a) in Conjunction with Related Bankruptcy Code Provisions.
A. The Interplay of Sections 1327(a) and 502(a).
A review of associated Bankruptcy Code sections appears to support, at least to some degree, the extension of section 1327(a)’s res judicata bar to post-confirmation objections. For instance, section 502 provides the following mechanism for the validation or challenge of claims:
(a) A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a general partner in a partnership that is a debtor in a case under chapter 7 of this title, objects.
(b) Except as provided in subsections (e)(2), (f), (g), (h), and (j) of this section, if such objection to claim is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States
* * * * * *
11 U.S.C. § 502(a), (b). Notwithstanding its provision for claim objections by those with an interest in such a challenge, section 502 remains noticeably silent regarding the point at which the objection process must come to an end. Section 502, therefore, offers nothing either in support or in contradictiоn of section 1327(a)’s apparent bar upon post-confirmation objections.
To the extent, however, that section 502 offers no definite statement upon the issue at hand, incorporating its provisions with those of section 1327(a) should present a simple matter of statutory construction: (1) a party in interest may object to any claim of a creditor; (2) absent some prior challenge or reservation, however, at the рoint of confirmation each claim shall be deemed valid and allowed; and (3) the act of confirmation will preclude any subsequent attempt to raise a section 502(a) “objection to claim.”
Bancroft Cap,
B. The Impact of Section 502(j).
The Court’s anаlysis does not end, however, with the impact of section 502(a) upon the *1021 apparent mandate of section 1327(a). Specifically, having concluded that confirmation carries with it an implicit determination of claim validity governed by the principles of res judicata, the Court next must determine the extent to which that implied decision itself may be reconsidered. On the question of reconsideration, section 502(j) provides the follоwing guidance:
A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause. A reconsidered claim may be allowed or disallowed according to the equities of the case. Reconsideration of a claim under this subsection does not affect the validity of any payment or transfer from the estate made to a holder of an allowed claim on account of such allowed claim that is not reconsidered, but if a reconsidered claim is allowed and is of the same class as such holder’s claim, such holder may not receive any additional payment or transfer from the estate on account of such holder’s allowed claim until the holder of such reconsidered and allowed claim receives payment on account of such claim proportionate in value to that already received by suсh other holder. This subsection does not alter or modify the trustee’s right to recover from a creditor any excess payment or transfer made to such creditor.
11 U.S.C. § 502(j). Certainly, the principal message of this section lends itself to little confusion — once the Court has evaluated a claim’s validity and rendered a decision on the matter, that conclusion may be reconsidered, but only for cause.
The process of section 502(j) appears dirеctly applicable to the question at hand. As previously noted, under section 1327(a), the confirmation hearing marks the point of an implicit determination of claim validity.
See Fawcett,
III. The Debtor’s Objection as a Section 501 (j) Motion.
Treating the Debtor’s “Objection to Claim” as a “Motion to Reconsider” under section 502(j), the Court next must determine whether cause exists to grant such a request. The presence of “cause” under section 502(j) is said to hinge upon the following factors:
(1) whether granting review will prejudice the debtor or other creditors;
(2) the length of the delay and its impact on efficient court administration;
(3) whether the delay wаs beyond the reasonable control of the person whose duty it was to perform;
(4) the presence of good faith;
(5) whether clients should be penalized for their counsel’s mistake or neglect;
(6) whether the claimant has a meritorious claim;
Sentry Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Pitrat (In re Resources Reclamation Corp. of America),
Here, the Debtor filed his “objection to claim” more than 26 months after confirmation. More importantly, as justification for that delay, he submits that he has spent the intervening time pursuing a settlement with World, and that the avenue of compromise only recently proved to be a dead end. Thus, reasons the Debtor, the Court should revisit allowance of World’s claim at a point more than two years subsequent to confirmation.
The Court normally would agree that the pursuit of settlement optiоns constitutes “cause” by which to justify a delay in requesting reconsideration of claims.
See In re Rankin,
Furthermore, the Court notes the degree to which the Debtor has exceeded the provisions of the Confirmation Order itself. As previously pointed out, that Order directed the Debtor to present all challenges to claims within the first six months following confirmation. The Debtor’s failure to observe that internal statute of limitations argues heavily against the presence of “cause” in this ease.
See Bancroft Cap,
In sum, the Debtor simply has waited too long to bring this matter to the Court’s attention. As Judge Walker reasoned when faced with a similar dilemma:
“The court’s broad discretion [regarding section 502(j) ] should not ... encourage parties to avoid the usual rules for finality of contested matters.” Colley v. Natl. Bank of Tex. (In re Colley),814 F.2d 1008 , 1010 (5th Cir.1987). The equitable power of the Court to reconsidеr claims after confirmation must be exercised cautiously, acknowledging the just expectations of all parties that the rights fixed under a plan are final. In the case before the Court, Debtor offers no explanation for its failure to object to [the claim in question]. The entire bankruptcy process depends upon the vigilance of the parties to monitor claims made upon the estate. If the Court were to allow reconsideration of claims merely upon a showing that the debtor was asleep at the switch, there would be no finality to the bankruptcy process. As the court in Colley observed, “[O]ld bankruptcy cases, like old soldiers, never die ...” It appears instead that they haunt the halls of the bankruptcy court until they are laid to rest. If there were no finality to the confirmation and claims allowance process, such restless spirits would likely ovеrwhelm the entire system.
The maxim “vigilantibus non dormienti-bus aequitas subvenit,” or equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights, has particular application in such a ease. Debtor has failed to demonstrate that the equities of the case in favor of allowing reconsideration of [the creditor’s] claim outweigh the necessity for finality in both the claims allowance process and the rights of the parties as established by the confirmed plan. The Court will not exercise its discretion to reconsider [allowance of the claim]
*]? íjí íjí í[í jjí
Clark,
CONCLUSION
Confirmation as well as the Court’s own time reservation for post-confirmation objections having come and gone, the Court finds Arсhibald Bernard’s “Objection to Proof of Claim” of World Savings and Loan to be improperly presented. Specifically, in light of the Debtor’s inaction, the confirmation event implicitly has determined the issue of claim allowance as a matter of res judicata. Additionally, treating the Debtor’s Motion as a request to reconsider allowance of World’s claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(j), the Court finds that no cause exists to grant such review. It, thereforе, is ORDERED that the Debtor’s “Objection to Proof of Claim” hereby is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Acting upon an existing default in its loan and believing the property to be owned by a third party, World previously had scheduled a foreclosure for November 3, 1995. Although the Debtor filed his Chapter 13 petition on November 2, 1995, World nonetheless proceeded to *1019 foreclose upon the mortgage, presumably because a title report failed to disclose the recon-veyаnce of the property back to the Debtor only a few days earlier. Upon realizing the Debtor's status as owner of the property, World filed a proof of claim in his bankruptcy case. As part of that claim, World included the attorney’s fees and expenses which it had incurred in mistakenly foreclosing on its loan.
. Res Judicata, or claim preclusion, serves to bar re-litigation of those matters which were or could have been litigated as part of an earlier case. Courts, therefore, evaluate the doctrine’s applicability by reference to the following four inquiries:
(1) Whether the prior judgment was validly rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the requirements of due process.
(2) Whether the prior judgment was final and on the merits.
(3) Whether there exists an identity of both parties or their privies.
(4) Whether the later proceeding involves the same “cause of action” as its predecessor.
See Windsor v. McVeigh,
. Given that the confirmation Order lies at the root of section 1327(a)'s res judicata bar, that same Order presents the first logical candidate for an exception. Indeed, where the Order, or the reorganization plan which it confirmed, includes a reservation by the debtor of a right to bring future claim objections, res judicata should cement terms of that reservation just as it would the rest of the Order and allow the reservation to create its own statute of limitations for future objections.
In re Bancroft Cap Co.,
Here, while the confirmation Order made expressed provision for post-confirmation objections, that reservation came subject to a six month time limitation. As such, the text of that Order cannot be read to provide license for the presentment of new claim objections at a point more than two years after confirmation.
Bancroft,
. Admittedly, there exists a subtle tension between the finality conferred by section 1327(a) and the court's power to reconsider allowance under section 502(j).
International Yacht & Tennis, Inc. v. Wasserman (In re International Yacht & Tennis, Inc.),
First, a conclusion that res judicata bars reconsideration of allowance after confirmation would require one substantially to read section 502(j) out of the books.
Fryer,
. Where possible, courts must give effect to all relevant sections of the Code, reading them in a collective fashion.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
. Aside from following the mandаte that all Code sections shall be given effect, the Court believes that interpreting section 502(j) as the only means by which to avoid section 1327(a)’s bar serves to satisfy all policy concerns in play. Giving section 1327(a) the effect of an absolute bar upon post-confirmation claim challenges certainly would seem both imprudent and, on occasion, inequitable. L. King, 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3007.03 (15th ed. 1993) (suggesting that confirmation should not be read as an absolutе bar). At the same time, however, the Court’s own interests, as well as those of the parties, demand at least some sense of finality to the objection process.
In re Earley,
Furthermore, the Court notes that the presence of section 502(j) makes it unnecessary for members of the bench to engage in judicial gymnastics at the behest of pragmatics and policy. In particular, in the presence of this statutory exception, courts need not, and should not, make strained and somewhat arbitrary efforts to limit section 1327(a) case law to its facts.
See, e.g., In re Kula,
. The Court need not speculate upon the specific time at which settlement cеased to be a valid option justifying the Debtor’s continued failure to file an objection or motion to reconsider. Suffice it to say that, on these facts, the Debtor has offered the Court no reason to believe that such protracted negotiations could be characterized as productive and justifying continued delay on his part. Thus, while the Court normally would provide those seeking settlement a great degree of latitude in delaying further action, here the Debtor crossed far beyond the parameters of good faith diligence in pursuing that option.