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Matoush v. Lovingood
177 P.3d 1262
Colo.
2008
Check Treatment

*1 concerning ue for actions real than

applies jurisdiction to the determination of Except in

itself. the limited case of actions

qualifying purposes jurisdic- as local for

tion, venue should not be determined property.

location of real plaintiffs complaint

Because the raises against particular

contract-related claims de-

fendants, jurisdic- personal over whom it has

tion, I would find that the real subject

is the of the contract is not also the action,

subject and therefore venue in County improper by

Chaffee is not rendered 98(a).

C.R.C.P.

I judgment only. therefore concur in the MATOUSH,

Carol S. Petitioner

David H. LOVINGOOD Debra

Lovingood, Respondents.

No. 06SC823. Colorado,

Supreme Court of

En Banc.

March

1264 *2 Morrison,

Howard Springs, Colorado Colo- rado, Attorney for Petitioner.
Felt, Culichia, LLC, Monson & James W. Culichia, Shohet, Springs, David M. Colorado *3 Colorado, Attorneys Respondents. for Justice BENDER Opinion delivered the the Court.

I. Introduction case, possession this adverse we appeals’ review the court of opinion in Ma Lovingood, toush v. (Colo.App.2 159 P.3d 741 006).1 There, appeals the court of conclud ed that applied wrong trial court legal standard to a claim to terminate an by possession.2 adverse The ease ment at right-of-way issue here creates a Respondents across David and Debra Lovin- good’s property for access between Petition property er Carol alley Matoush’s and an adjacent Lovingoods’ property. The Lo vingoods allege adversely pos sessed Matoush’s to use the easement right-of-way by openly preventing access between alley by and the building maintaining and fences perpendicu lar to the easement statutorily- area for the period mandated possess of time for adverse ion.3 Matoush statutorily- that the claims period mandated posses of time for adverse sion of an easement that was ereat- granted time, We following 1. prescription certiorari on the applied issue: ... to servitudes estates, express [non-possessoty "Whether an easement can be extin- such as easements] guished by by possession applied the owner of the while possesso- servient estate adverse and, so, possession ry § adverse if what circum- estates.” Restatement 2.17 cmt. a. prescriptive period.” acknowledge stances commence We this technical distinction. However, clarity consistency, for and we refer to by the claim as termination of an easement ad- 2. nonpossessory proper "An easement creates possession. verse ty right to enter and use land in the obligates possessor another and [of land] not grants 3.The easement in this case Matoush "a to interfere with the uses authorized the ease over, under, perpetual right way and across (Third) Property: ment.” Restatement Servi [Lovingoods’ property] ... for sewer and water 1.2(1) (2000); Lazy Dog tudes see also Ranch v. pipes alley purposes.” and Because the Lovin- Telluray (Colo. Corp,, Ranch goods object only to use of the easement aas 1998). right-of-way across their for access be- Lovingoods’ variously claim is called ter- alley, tween Matoush's their possession, mination of an easement adverse properly partial claim is characterized as a ter- by prescription, termination of an easement ex- possession. mination of an easement adverse tinguishment sion, (“The posses- of an easement See extinguish- Restatement 7.7 cmt. b extinguishment brought of an easement prescription may ment about be com- prescription. distinguishes However, plete partial.”). The Restatement or clarity prescription possession, noting from consistency, Lovingoods' we refer to the claim although permit acquisi- simply "[b]oth doctrines as a claim to terminate an easement property rights through passage tion of of the record of-way 1969. Our review used, since as the easement never such ed but ease, presented no evidence triggered until a need for reveals that there was is not that, no arises, in this regarding trial whether the easement tried to arose until she for the easement between 1901 and need ever used as reasons, in 2003. her For we conclude sell 1969. these Lovingoods’ use of the ease- hold by ad is terminated An easement area was not adverse to Matoush’s ment showing that use of upon a right to the easement as a adverse to easement area was: pur- needed to use it for that until Matoush easement; use of the easement holder’s Hence, reverse the court of pose we (3) continuous, notorious; with open and affirm the trial court’s appeals’ decision statutorily- interruption, for the effective out retains her ruling that Matoush posses period of time for adverse mandated *4 for access the easement as adverse, use of the easement To be sion. alley. We property between her incompatible or irreconcilable area must be appeals to be return this ease to the court right to use the the easement holder’s with entry an returned to the trial court for easement. opinion. judgment consistent with this jurisdic in other Following precedent tions, that whether use of the ease we hold Background II. and Procedural Facts incompatible or area is an irreconcil ment in this case affects disputed The sufficiently trigger able properties long-estab- in a three residential for ad statutorily-mandated period of time city neighborhood Springs, in Colorado lished depends the easement Petitioner Carol Matoush is the Colorado. expressly upon whether the easement was property holder who owns the ben- easement has ever created and whether the easement, by 2108 N. Nevada efited by easement holder. When been used Lovin- Respondents David and Debra Ave.4 but never expressly is created by good properties one of the burdened own used, that use of the easement area we hold easement, E. Elizabeth Jefferson St.5 trigger not the statu is not adverse and will children, Hayes Ronald Martwick and her torily-mandated period of time for Wellensiek, prop- own the other and Bonnie until the easement holder needs easement, 122 E. Jef- erty by the burdened it, to use the demands ferson St.6 right to use it. is denied the along prop- another properties, These case, findings In this the trial court’s 19,000- Matoush, by comprise erty owned fact state that the easement lots, city of four Lots block square-foot by warranty in 1901 and that created deed 18, 19, divided and 20. Lots 19 and 20 were presented at trial re- there was no evidence property in create what is now Matoush’s the easement was used as a garding whether warranty that created the by the deed undisputed It 1901. is of the block right- disputed easement. The rest has never been used as a "); customarily known as the ‘servient estate.' to an easement 4. Most cases and treatises refer l.l(l)(c) (“An by property obligation holder who owns the benefited see also Restatement See, estate owner.” easement as the "dominant land is called a ‘burden’ and that runs with Ranch, (“[T]he e.g., Lazy Dog 965 P.2d at 1234 may be called in land with which it runs interest property by called the benefited the easement is estate.”). To ensure the ‘burdened’ ‘servient’ ”); estate.’ see also Restatement 'dominant simplicity opinion, the Lovin- this we refer to l.l(l)(a) ("A right that runs with land is called holders, goods the servient estate but not as the interest in land with which it a ‘benefit’ and by property burdened rather as the owners may the 'benefited' or ‘dominant’ runs be called estate.”). opinion, we refer to Matoush In this simply as the holder. Martwick, defen- 6.Hayes, and Wellensiek were Lovingoods, along but with the dants at trial burdened an ease- The owner of customarily participate appeal do estate in the below and ment is called “servient did not Ranch, See, e.g., Lazy Dog participate appeal. holder.” in this (“The property burdened the easement is configuration 4,500 Lovingoods’ property square was divided into its current ner. is years following conveyance. adjacent alley. feet in size and is to the block of lots is bounded other residential Hayes’s property is the same size as Lovin- north, to the N. Nevada Ave. to goods’ property and is located between Lo- east, south, E. Jefferson St. to the vingoods’ property prop- and Matoush’s two alley to the west. Matoush’s ten-foot-wide, erties. The easement is located on the block’s northeast corner and ninety-foot-long strip of land that connects 5,000 square feet size. alley. The ease- north, rear, ment burdens the ten property, Matoush’s other feet of which is where Lovingoods’ property the entire width of implicated Matoush resides but which is not 5,000 Hayes’s square property. following is also feet in size schematic and is located on the depicts parties’ block’s southeast cor- properties: *5 acquired wife,

Matoush title property to the in Lovingood, Debra in 2003. Neither of Lovingoods’ the block’s northeast in the through corner deeds nor the of deed their predecessor a warranty immediate in title specifically deed referenced referenced the easement, although prior at least one easement across deed through the surface and the chain of title Hayes did.8 Elizabeth ac- Lovingoods’ the property subsurface of and quired title to property through her in 1969 Hayes’s a property, reserving perpetual “a warranty specifically deed that over, referenced way under, and across the 1993, Hayes conveyed the easement.9 In the North 10 feet of the West 90 feet of Lot 20 property children, to herself and her Ronald ... for sewer and pipes alley water and Wellensiek, Martwick and through Bonnie a purposes.” language This was included quit claim specifically deed that did not refer- eight each of the deeds in the chain of title to ence the easement. property, Matoush’s which dates back to 1901.7 Lovingood acquired David title to his Hayes acquired property When title to her property through in 2001 warranty a deed being the easement was used for conveyed and property the pipes himself and his grease trap. Although sewer and a originally sewer, 7. The easement was created in a alley, war- West 45 feet of said Lot 20 for and ranty perpetual deed in 1901 that "a reserved purposes.” water right way over under and across the North ten (10) ninety feet of the West feet of said lot warranty conveyed property 9.The deed that twenty pipes alley for sewer and water and Hayes property in 1969 described the as "[t]he purposes.” 17, 18, East 45 feet of the West 90 feet of Lots except right way and 20 ... a over the North property conveyed In through was sewer, water, alley pur- 10 feet thereof for specifically right way deed that referenced “a poses.” over, under and across the North 10 feet removed, driveway Matoush’s is a on the There since been trap has grease from N. Nevada underground provides vehicle access running between pipes sewer alley prop- are still in Matoush’s garage and the to a located on Ave. Matoush’s proposed removing that the easement erty. buyer trial court found has use. The garage, paving used as surface driveway, relocating not been has Hayes’s property and Lovingoods’ area, across the easement as prop- access between property for alley driveway for vehicle access between 1969. At alley since at least erty and the buyer would re- garage. and the new prior fences were point some time driveway place the current addition of the easement area to enclose most built thereby pre- landscaping, house and backyards Lovingoods’ property within the venting vehicle access to Matoush’s pre- Hayes’s property. No evidence Ave. from N. Nevada the ease- regarding whether sented at trial Thereafter, brought an action Matoush right-of-way be- used as a ment was ever Martwick, Lovingoods, Hayes, against 1969, these 1969. Since tween 1901 and right to use to enforce her WellenSiek replaced. maintained or have been fences right-of-way for vehicle the easement as a link gate in the chain fence be- A small alley.10 her access between Hayes’s property and Lovingoods’ tween counterclaimed that use The defendants overgrown with shrub- property has been was terminat- unused, since at bery, thus has been posses- abandonment or adverse ed either 1980s, early gate least 1969. Since alternative, ar- the defendants sion. by a partially obstructed has been at least paved gued that use of the easement as Hayes’s property. Since short wood fence on Ma- driveway for vehicle access between 1990s, fully gate has been ob- the late alley outside the property and the toush’s Lovingoods’ fence on a tall wood structed scope of the easement. twenty-eight feet of the property. The west *6 parties presented evidence on these The and remains easement area is not fenced hearing Upon in a trial to the court. claims alley. trial court also found open to the The concluded, evidence, the trial court all the fiberglass shed located that a three-wall order, that the easement had not a written Lovingoods’ area on within the easement or by either abandonment been terminated permanent structure. property is not a trial Although the possession. adverse within the back- There are other structures unambiguous, its were court’s conclusions Hayes’s property and yards Lovingoods’ of not as analysis to treat abandonment seemed the they are not located within property, but claim, but rather as separate and distinct carriage A house situated easement area. termi- Lovingoods’ the claim to an element of property backyard Lovingoods’ of within the possession: the easement nate cor- the easement area’s southwest bounds A metal shed situated within ner. four-wall conclude, if it were would [trial] The Court Hayes’s property bounds the backyard of the general of adverse only considering the law corner. The rest area’s southeast easement have that Defendants possession, the grass with or the area is covered of easement the evidence proved by preponderance garden landscaping, including a rock other adversely possessed the that Hayes’s A backyard property. within the years. Their for over 18 easement area growing within the easement tree was once actual in that the possession has been area, years ago. it removed several but was easement, foot area on except for the 28 west, occupied fenced off and the has been attempted to sell her In Matoush possession has Their the Defendants. buyer inquired property to a who about Plaintiff. to the open been and obvious driveway access the easement as a for vehicle that alley. Their has been property and the Matoush’s between mentioned, pipes. water As Hayes’s such, for sewer and is cur- previously the easement 10. As trial, only is use of at issue in this case only pipes. the rently At the used for sewer the across easement as a surface parties stipulated would con- the that the easement properties. Lovingoods' property two tinue to burden Plaintiff has not been to use the of a claim terminate an easement ad- the able alley. posses- Abandonment, area Their possession. easement for an court of verse the held, that no one sion has been exclusive in appeals is not an element of a claim to except the has been owner of the an posses- terminate easement pos- to use the Their able easement area. sion, is an separate but rather element of a has at least since been continuous session claim to and distinct terminate an easement probably longer. difficulty The 1969 and Accordingly, abandonment. the court argument is that with Defendants’ appeals ruling the trial reversed court’s majority country rule in is: “an this ease- the case back to that for remanded court nonuse, ment cannot be lost how- be mere findings fact and conclusions of law to continued, long accompanied ever unless area determine whether use the easement part affirmative act on the (1) adverse; notorious; open was: or indicating un- owner interruption without continuous equivocal intention to abandon.” statutorily-mandated period ad- of time for As to the element ad- trial court also concluded versity, appeals court of in- specifically prove failed use of defendants the trial court to structed determine whether paved driveway as a for vehicle easement building maintaining perpendicu- fences access between Matoush’s lar incompatible to the area was easement alley is outside the scope of the easement. irreconcilable Matoush’s to use the acknowledged trial court Matoush’s as a for access proposed driveway use of the easement as standard, alley. articulating legal incompatible with the defendants’ use of rejected argu- appeals court of backyard. easement area as Neverthe- ment that use of the easement is not area less, rejected the trial court the defendants’ trigger statutorily- will not adverse and finding claim based on its the defen- period of posses- mandated time for adverse present dants failed to credible evidence re- until sion holder needs to use garding use of the when it was it, demands to use and is conclusions, created. Based on these it, denied the in the as set forth trial court ruled that the easement would appellate New York intermediate court Lovingoods’ property continue to burden Schwartz, Castle Associates 63 A.D.2d Hayes’s righLof-way, and that (N.Y.App.Div.1978). N.Y.S.2d paved could be used as a drive- way for vehicle access between Matoush’s *7 Thereafter, petitioned Matoush Court property alley. and the review, arguing for certiorari that court Lovingoods The trial appealed court’s appeals rejected of erred when it rule as ruling, arguing that trial court incorrect- set Castle forth in Associates. con- Matoush ly required proof part of abandonment as of applies tends that the Castle Associates rule by their claim to terminate the easement to this case because the easement ex- was possession. Lovingoods adverse The also ar- by deed; pressly granted warranty because incorrectly that gued the trial court deter- there is no evidence that the has easement building maintaining that mined fences ever as a been used for access perpendicular to the area in- easement property alley; between Matoush’s and the adverse, law, sufficiently of to as matter neither prede- because Matoush nor her trigger statutorily-mandated period of cessors in interest needed to ease- use the possession time adverse of 2003, prospective buyer ment until when a Lovingoods challenge The did not the trial inquired as a about the easement regarding court’s conclusions of termination driveway. paved Lovingoods urge us to by abandonment or use of the rule, distinguish the Castle con- Associates paved driveway. easement narrowly highest struing it as New York’s appeal, Ferraro, appeals On the court of concluded appeals Spiegel court of did in v. 73 erroneously 15, 15, trial required 622, court 543 N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d 541 N.E.2d proof (1989), by satisfy noting abandonment to the elements 17 that the deed in Castle

1269 years eighteen bring to specifically identify the such not Associates did after entry has location, action or make such ac- the easement in Castle easement’s first eighteen years after crued or within he or any pur- used for had never been Associates from, by, whom he those or under claims portion the ease- pose, the relevant possessed of the prem- have been or seized Castle Associates ment holder’s Eighteen years’ possession ises. adverse reviewing After developed. never had been any land shall be conclusive evidence of possession adverse Colorado cases on ownership. absolute jurisdictions ease other constru- law from rule, ing agree we Castle Associates added). (emphasis Id. applies rule this case. Matoush that the plainly the statute states Because interest, applies that it real Analysis III. distinguish and because statute does not recognizes a cause Whether Colorado possessory interests such as title to between by action an easement ad to terminate non-possessory interests such as land so, and, possession if what elements title to an we conclude that it questions comprise claim are of law such a applies seeking to an to terminate an action that we novo. See Lakeview As review de by possession. easement adverse (Colo. 580, Maes, v. P.2d socs. 907 583-84 claim, To the elements of such determine 1995) (“An court is not appellate bound turn, Lobato, did in Restate- we we courts.”). reached lower conclusions of law (Third) (2000). Property: ment Servitudes However, reverse the trial court’s we will not Lobato, (citing at 950 both See Colo- findings findings those are of fact unless case the Restatement in its rado law and clearly erroneous. C.R.C.P. claim of a to cre- discussion the elements possession). an adverse ate easement A. of an Easement Termination an explains Restatement Possession Adverse possession if be terminated adverse will previously considered wheth We have area adverse use of the easement continues an er use can terminate adverse period of statutorily-mandated time: statute, possession under adverse Colorado’s “To the extent that a use of violates (2007). 38-41-101(1), section C.R.S. Howev burdening a servitude er, ad previously we determined that person adversely to a enti- use is maintained an easement under verse use can create prescrip- servitude for tled enforce the statute. See Colorado’s period, person’s beneficial interest tive (Colo. Taylor, Lobato v. extinguished.” the servitude is modified 2002) (referencing pos Colorado’s adverse The Restatement further Restatement 7.7. in an action to session statute create claim of a to ter- explains the elements possession); Allen by adverse minate an easement Arvada, First Bank Colo. Nat’l claim to mirror the of a create elements (1949) (same). P.2d Id. 7.7 *8 Colorado, Assembly has de the General Powell, b; R. cmt. see Richard Powell also possession clared the law of adverse (2007) (“As § Property 34.21[1] on Real interest “any right extends to or of or by of an the case of the creation easement 38-41-101(1) § property.” (emphasis real adverse, must be con- prescription, the uses added). statute, eigh which declares tinuous, prescrip- and for the uninterrupted, statutorily-mandated years teen to be (internal period.”) cross-reference omit- tive possession, period of for adverse reads time ted). in full: Restatement, an ease person No shall commence or maintain an Under possession if the recovery pos- by ment is created adverse action for the title or “(1) notorious, open use or any right adverse is: session or to enforce or establish (2) interruption continued without effective or or to real or make interest period.” Restatement prescriptive for the entry an thereon unless commenced within § by 2.17. Colorado case law tracks the Restate- an easement posses- is created adverse sion, language regarding party a a ment’s the elements of uses land that is not in his or by pos- possession, way claim to create an her and does in a easement adverse so that is by prescription property rights party “An adverse to the session: easement is es- (1) contrast, possesses who prescriptive when the the land. when tablished use is: (2) notorious; an by pos- easement is adverse open or continued terminated without ef- session, party a uses land that is in his or her interruption fective prescriptive peri- for the (3) (a) possession, od; way but does so in a the use was either adverse or (b) property rights adverse to the of the ease- pursuant attempted, to an but ineffective possess ment holder who Lobato, does not the land. grant.” (citing P.3d at 950 Re- [1], Powell, words, supra, § 2.16-2.17). 34.21 In other Hence, §§ statement the ele- an dispossess because easement does not ments of a claim to terminate an easement by owner of the burdened the ease- by possession adverse mirror the elements of ment, by owner burdened by claim to create an easement adverse right the easement retains the use possession. Accordingly, an easement will property, area, including by possession upon be terminated adverse way that is consistent with the easement showing that use of the easement area was: holder’s Lazy Dog use (1) adverse to the easement holder’s Telluray Corp., Ranch v. Ranch 965 P.2d (2) easement; notorious; open use the or (Colo.1998); see also Restatement interruption continuous without effective § 4.9. statutorily-mandated period of time. conceptual Because of this differ Abandonment an is not element of ence, a evaluation court’s of the element of a claim by to terminate an easement adverse adversity will be different in a claim to termi possession, separate but rather is a and dis by possession nate an easement adverse than terminating tinct method for an easement. it is in a by claim to create an easement Queree, 146, 149-50, See Rivera v. 145 Colo. Powell, possession. adverse supra, 40, 42 (noting that an action 34.21[1], § A claim to terminate an easement by an terminate easement abandonment is by possession requires adverse stronger Colorado, long-established in citing Hoff showing of adverse than a claim use to create 56, 59, Corp., v. Girdler 104 Colo. by an possession adverse does. (1939)). 100, 102 a claim While to terminate instance, See id. For the element of adversi an easement abandonment focuses on the ty in a claim to terminate an easement holder, conduct of the easement a claim to possession requires adverse more than a terminate an easement possession adverse showing possession area, of the easement focuses on the nature of the the ease usually which is sufficient to demonstrate Rivera, Compare ment area. 145 Colo. at adversity in a claim to create 149-50, 358 P.2d at 42 (requiring proof that possession. Thompson, supra, adverse an easement holder intended to abandon the 60.08(b)(7)(i). § easement), (requir Restatement 7.7 ing proof that use of the easement area was Only “incompatible use that is adverse, notorious, continuous). open and irreconcilable with the [easement holder’s] authorized of use” will be sufficient to Adversity

B. The Element of justify terminating an easement noted, Powell, 34.21[1], As we a claim to supra, Therefore, create party claiming to have terminat similar ato claim to terminate an ed an easement must *9 adverse Thompson prove 7 on Real “that the significantly use interferes 60.08(b)(7) (David ed., § Property enough A. Thomas enjoyment with the easement owner’s 2007) (“Just as an give easement can be won of the easement to notice that the ease prescription, possession, similar to adverse so ment is Thompson, supra, under threat.” lost.”). 60.08(b)(7)(i). can it be distinguishes § What challenge these of a court’s concept claims is a grasp. inquiry difficult adversity When into the element of is that

1271 by the can use property burdened easement definition of what easily no drawn “there is expands holder’s area to resemble the to an easement the easement use is adverse Thus, the ease- whether use of as if it rights.” right Id. owner’s to use incompatible or irreconcil- ment area is an At the unburdened were trigger sufficiently time, adverse right able use the easement holder’s same period of time for ad- statutorily-mandated greater protection the easement receives be- upon the circum- depends possession right the easement holder’s to use the cause of each case. Id. stances yet has not come into functional existence. is a cir of an easement

Nonuse part of that must be considered cumstance The modern rule such cases inquiry into the element of adversi a court’s area, way in a of the easement even Powell, ty. swpra, 34.21[1].11When See easement, prevents use of the is not use, the owner of the is not trigger statutorily- and will not enjoys by the easement property burdened posses period of time for adverse mandated action.” Id. enlarged scope privileged “an until the easement holder needs to use sion then, owner of a bur Logically it, demands to use and is enjoys largest by an easement dened to use it: refused action when the easement scope privileged been created but an easement has [W]here been used. When has never use, arisen for its no occasion has used, the easement hold created but never may tenement fence owner of the servient “tit property rights are said to remain er’s not deemed his land and such use will be Annotation, Macy, ular and dormant.” J.E. adverse to the existence of by Nonuser or Loss Private Easement (1) the need for the until such time as (1952). Possession, 1265 25 A.L.R.2d Adverse (2) arises, way is made demand illustrate or dormant easements Titular tenement that the owner of the dominant rights of the ease- the tension between the opened and the owner of easement be owner of the ment holder and those of the tenement refuses to do so. the servient by the easement. When property burdened Schwartz, v. 407 N.Y.S.2d at Castle Assocs. expressly created but never an easement is used, 723.12 the extent to which the owner Therefore, 1996). guiding Restatement’s treatment of Usually, helpful Restatement is

11. unclear, impression. See of issues of first and we look to other author our discussion this issue is Lobato, III.A., supra; 71 P.3d at Part see also ity- Ranch, 950; Lazy Dog 965 P.2d at 1234. How- ever, expressly address cases, the Restatement does not appeared such as rule in earlier 12. This of an easement alters a court's whether nonuse which the court in Castle the 1860 decision from adversity, stating inquiry into the element of holding. As derived its See Castle Associates period prescriptive be- that "[t]he its comments socs., (citing Smyles v. Has N.Y.S.2d at 723 407 gins an actionable when a use that constitutes 217, (1860)). tings, 224 See also Storrow 22 N.Y. occurs." Restatement violation of the servitude 339, Green, 123, Cal.App. P. 341 39 178 v. b. 7.7 cmt. (noting holder “had no occasion that easement illustrations, explains the Restatement In its Simpson, right-of-way); v. 295 go across” Schade perpendi building maintaining a fence 801, 45, (1943) (noting Ky. 802-03 173 S.W.2d statutorily-mandat cular to an easement for the arisen”); “had Litch need for easement time, thereby preventing period the ease ed 302, 472, Boogher, Mo. 142 S.W. 304 238 field right- easement as a ment holder from (1911) (noting holder had "no that easement of-way, will terminate the easement Nace, alley”); 2 but see Yeaklev. occasion to use or cir in the absence of other facts (Pa. 1837) (terminating easement Whart. 123 § 7.7 1. The Restatement cumstances. Id. illus. though easement had even text, comments, in its or illus does not indicate bur been used because owner never is a whether nonuse of an easement trations perpendicular fences dened easement built changes of such a circumstance that the outcome them for statuto easement area and maintained however, notes, reporter's cite cases case. The time). early period rily-mandated cases, In these that turn on the circumstance of the treatment between courts’ the distinction See Kolouch v. holder's nonuse of the easement. clearly unused easements "is not Kramer, (1991); of used and P.2d 120 Idaho fully frequently are not drawn ... and the facts Country Estates Ass’n v. see also Sabino Town & Carr, reported.” Macy, supra, (Ct.App. 25 A.L.R.2d Ariz. *10 1272 “definitively easements that not been

Castle is the first modern state- have Associates rule, through it developed Spiegel ment of has been followed in located and use.” Ferraro, 15, jurisdictions.13 The easement v. 543 541 N.E.2d at 17 numerous N.Y.S.2d (refusing apply created to the Castle Associates rule Castle Associates was ingress egress “definitively deed in across a to an easement that was 1903 for functionally but a piece property, right-of-way of the location of the existence” specifically prior a easement was not identified in to the construction of fence that 1976, conveyance. prevented right-of-way). the at 722. In The Id. seven- use of the ty-three years conveyance, Spiegel explained after the the court the Castle Asso- general develop por- easement to the ciates rule is consistent the law holder decided tion near the of because the rule of the easement and en- brought property right locate and use the ease- sures that the of the action to owner right-of-way. ment as a Id. The owner of the has notice that or her is under his property burdened the easement counter- threat: claimed, arguing that he had terminated the theory underlying exception The is possession by building easement definitively that easements not located and boundary fences around the of the yet developed through use are not in func- 1957, by maintaining 1956 and tional and therefore the owner of existence then, thereby preventing fences since expected the easement not be could to easement holder from have notice of adverse claim until ei- statutorily-mandated period of time. opened ther the easement or the owner disagreed, Id. The Castle Associates court opened. only demands that it It is be at noting building on fence therefore, point, such that the use of the “prior burdened to the easement de- another is deemed to be ad- right way of opening mand for an of was prescriptive verse to the owner not adverse to the existence of the ease- understood, period begins run. So to ment.” at Id. Castle Associates exception general with the consistent court concluded that easement holder theory real —that was entitled to use the and de- may, by unequivocal owner acts of the termined that the location usurper, notice of the hostile claim

would be northwest across the corner of the thereby upon and be called to assert his burdened Id. legal title. (internal highest appellate quotation

New court Id. York’s later citations marks omitted). Spiegel construed the Associates rule to court did not Castle be define applies only phrase “definitively which exception” “narrow located and devel- Indus., Vandeleigh Storage 13. See LLCv. Partners courl “need not address the non-use of a deeded Kirkwood, 91, LLC, (Del.2006); despite question,” por- A.2d 901 105 evidence Kolouch, 879; Turner, 813 P.2d at Halverson v. tion of the easement had never area been used 168, 1285, (1994); City holders). 268 Mont. 1290 Williams, 632, Wash.App. Edmonds v. 54 774 disapprove At least one court seemed of the 1241, (1989); Hoblyn, P.2d rule, 1244 Mueller v. 887 although we Castle Associates note that the 500, (Wyo.1994); P.2d 507 see also Sabino Town "Although disapproval in dicta: we need was Ass’n, Country (applying & Estates at 30 point, reach the least doubtful it is at that the law only partial extinguishment rule for "claims is consistent this Commonwealth with the use”). scope an easement’s O’Brien, Yagjian Castle Associates decision.” v. 733, 202, Mass.App.Ct. cases, 477 N.E.2d 204 n. 5 apply the courts some recent neither Mueller, (1985); (Thom rule, see also 887 P.2d at 511 nor address the Castle Associates even as, J., (disapproving dissenting) majority’s though appears it that the easement at issue had rule). Castle particular decision to follow the Associates purpose never been used however, See, recently, seeking More the Massachusetts Land e.g., claimant terminate. Conner, 260, opinion unpublished Court issued an it Conn.App. which v. Boccanfuso 208, applied (treating the Castle Associates rule to case A.2d evidence that where ease- located, express, parked predecessors ment "an record easement” had been holder’s had cars in prior purposes use of used for "some but not others.” area as easement as a Lambert, right-of-way); Geraghty, No. White v. 175 W.Va. Brooks 2005 WL (Mass.Land 2005). (concluding Apr.6, 332 S.E.2d Ct. 267-68 *11 *11 right use,” guard to his or her to use the ease it unclear whether through oped noted; “[Wjithout ment, loca- that the easement’s one court such a phrase means as conveyance, in the specified rule, may compelled tion was feel [easement holders] un- property remained the easement holder’s obstacles, litigation, to start clear other never the easement had developed, or that merely keep ... wise force an issue to alive used.14 been right, though record easement even the need yet fully ma to use the easement has not uncertainty created Despite possible Geraghty, tured.” Brooks v. No. the factual circumstances Spiegel as to (Mass.Land applies, Apr.6, rule at *9 Ct. which the Castle Associates WL 2005). jurisdictions applied have courts in other Courts myriad

rule to factual circumstances. Lovingoods argue that the Castle As- irrespective Associates rule apply the Castle imposes sociates rule an additional element spe- the easement’s location was of whether contemplated that is not Colorado’s ad- conveyance, or cifically in the identified statute and case law. We property had the easement holder’s whether think otherwise. Although these cases are developed.15 been consistently ap- factually unique, courts have applied, As the Castle Associates rule to cases plied the Castle Associates rule does not create a new element for claims expressly which the easement at issue was posses terminate an easement created never used. but Rather, the rule informs a court’s in sion. policy reasons that There are a number of adversity, specifi quiry to the element of as First, rule. as support the Castle Associates cally when use of the easement area becomes explained, is consis- previously we the rule trigger incompatible or irreconcilable so as to of the tent the notion that the owner statutorily-mandated period for adverse retains property burdened possession in cases where the easement right his or her expressly created but never used. The Cas way interfere with the ease- that does not only tle Associates rule not reinforces Colo ment holder’s regarding policy rado’s concerns land use but Second, comports long- with the the rule posses also conforms to the state’s adverse that an cannot principle established basis, we sion statute and case law. On this Third, this rule be lost mere nonuse. rule and hold follow Castle Associates easements, respects which are easi- recorded if created but an easement ly through title instruments. traceable used, area is never then use of the easement Fourth, duty have a purchasers trigger not adverse and will not the statutori inquiry whether an easement to determine period pos time for adverse ly-mandated and are on constructive burdens until the easement holder needs session Fifth, pur- of such easements. notice use the easement. price reflects the benefit or chase of an and the rule rein- burden Application C. buyers bargains made between forces Lovingoods allege In this Last, prevents the rule an easement sellers. adversely possessed Ma- expense incurring litigation from holder "hiking, jogging, through use of easement for 14. One court has Castle Associates characterized involving passage” riding, moped riding”). easement of “an unlocated horseback some "undeveloped Yagjian, 477 backland.” across following factually differ from Castle cases N.E.2d at 204 n. 5. the easement holder’s land had Associates in that Country developed: Sabino Town & Estates been factually following from Cas 15. The cases differ Ass’n, (residence); Vandeleigh 920 P.2d at 29 in that the easement’s location was tle Associates LLC, Indus., (storage facility); 901 A.2d at 93 conveyance: specifically Vande identified in Halverson, (residence). Kolouch, at 1287-88 See LLC, 92-93; Indus., leigh 901 A.2d at Mueller, develop (implying 1287; at 503 877; Halverson, also 885 P.2d at 813 P.2d at noting properties by Mueller, ment of easement holders’ Town 887 P.2d at 503. See also Sabino Ass’n, properties (noting that easement holders accessed their Country 920 P.2d at 29 & Estates driveway”). "mile-long developed had been via that easement’s location right- paved driveway toush’s to use the scope easement as is within the of-way by maintaining perpendicular fences easement. Our review of the record reveals *12 area, thereby presented that there preventing was no evidence at trial regarding access whether the easement between Matoush’s and the was ever alley right-of-way used as a statutorily-mandated period between 1901 and 1969. time. Matoush contends that the Castle As- applies argues sociates rule here and that the gate note that a We small is located in the Lovingoods’ use of the easement area was chain link Lovingoods’ proper- fence between not adverse until she needed use the ease- ty Hayes’s property, but it has been 2003, right-of-way ment as a surface in when overgrown shrubbery since at least 1969 prospective buyer inquired about and has been obstructed at least one fence paved driveway. easement as a The Lovin- early since the 1980s. Whether the existence goods argue that the Castle Associates rule gate small this demonstrates that apply does not to this case because the ease- right-of-way has been used as a specifically ment’s location is in identified has argued by parties. never been For

warranty deed and because the easement has reason, this Lovingoods because the do been used pipes. Matoush for sewer challenge sufficiency pre- not of evidence trial, at sented we defer to the trial court’s discussed, previously jurisdictions As other findings of fact. See First Interstate Bank v. applied the Castle Associates rule even Tanktech, Inc., (Colo.1993) 116, 864 P.2d 122 if the specifically easement’s location was (‘We findings defer to of fact the trial conveyance identified in the and even if the clearly court unless sup- erroneous and not only part claim was to terminate of the ease- record.”). ported by the words, ment In other jurisdictions in courts other determine Although the trial findings court made its applies by whether the Castle Associates rule of fact in connection with a different claim considering whether the easement was ex- than the one that in appeal, is raised this we pressly created and whether the easement findings conclude the trial court’s of fact has ever particular purpose been used for the adequately developed are sufficiently re seeking Hence, the claimant is to terminate. key legal lated to the appeal issue this applies whether the Castle Associates rule support our decision to resolve this case on argues, depends upon as Matoush the merits. See ITT Credit Diversified whether the expressly easement was created Couch, (Colo. 1355, Corp. v. and whether it right- has ever been used as a 1983) (resolving case on the merits where of-way. The fact that the easement has been disputed pivotal facts were not issues pipes used for sewer since least 1969 is law); questions involved People see also Lovingoods’ irrelevant to the claim that D.F., (Colo.1997) 9, (noting have terminated Matoush’s to use the findings we remand for further of fact when right-of-way. easement as a surface appellate review is hindered an absence of findings of key facts that are to contested undisputed It the easement was issues, or when evidentiary unresolved con by warranty created deed facts). regard flicts exist with to material undisputed It is also that the easement has not right-of-way been used as a for access Because there was no presented evidence between alley Matoush’s regarding at trial use of the since at least 1969. As to whether the regarding ease- whether the easement was ever ment right-of-way was used as a prior to used as a between 1901 and the trial court found that there was no and because there is undisputed evi- presented regarding evidence at trial use of dence that the easement has never been used the easement in speculation other than since at least we hold that the Castle may that the easement have been used for applies Associates rule to this case and that coal wagon. finding deliveries Lovingoods’ This of fact use of the easement area was made in connection with the trial court’s was not adverse to Matoush’s to use the determination that use of the easement as easement as a until Matoush purpose adversity show when the easement holder needed to use the easement Therefore, Lovingoods way. not developed have not has in 2003. Where, here, right to the ease- an easement holder use has terminated right-of-way. developed the servient ment as a surface estate may owner the easement area to a far Conclusion IV. in a greater involving extent than case developed By way example, easement. let decision, appeals’ the court We reverse suppose developed had us that Matoush ruling affirm trial court’s that Matoush *13 driveway in order to access the retains her Then, alley the vehicle. with her let us right-of-way for access between her suppose Lovingoods erected that the the this the alley, and and return case to the driveway structures did over the that returned the trial appeals court of to be to shed). (i.e., the fencing, grass, the judgment entry court an consistent easily area would Those uses of the easement opinion. with this incompatible deemed

be inconsistent having with interest in EID, concurring. Matoush’s clear Justice contrast, Here, by path alley. to the Ma- join I opinion I of the court. write developed toush had not however, my separately, disagree- to note that were therefore the structures built dissenting opinion’s suggestion ment with the Lovingoods easily could be of which —all ruling is inconsistent with the court’s point removed at future when some Matoush principles and based on “bor- Colorado law wanted to not use the easement —were incon- op. Dissent at from elsewhere. row[ed]” incompatible sistent or with inter- Adversity est. of use cannot be determined It is under Colorado law well established vacuum, in a rather must be determined but owners, such as the Lo servient estate comparison sought in to the interest to be any way vingoods, may their use extinguished undeveloped this —in not the easement holder’s inconsistent with easement. See, Dog e.g., Lazy Ranch v. Tellu interest. 1229, (Colo. ray Corp., 965 P.2d 1234 Ranch my view, analysis employs In the court 1998); Irrigation Empire Bijou Dist. v. longstand- today application of a simply an (Colo.1991) Club, 175, (citing P.2d 183 804 namely, ing principle of Colorado law— eases). Thus, the servient estate owner can may his prop- the servient owner use estate possession simply demonstrate erty long as to the extent as that use fullest showing property, that he used be is not with the holder’s inconsistent clearly entitled to do as the cause he is so interest, only a use and that therefore that is Instead, property. owner of the servient incompatible clearly with inconsistent particular show that his estate owner must “adverse” —to a that interest be deemed will clearly inconsistent use undeveloped involving situation easement. the easement holder’s incompatible with such, principle it from As does not borrow truly that the use is interest in order to show jurisdictions, suggests, other as the dissent 1270-71; Maj. op. 38-41- “adverse.” rather instructive number of but finds 101(1), (2007). C.R.S. jurisdictions apply from cases other recognized to ease, principle facts what same we we consider sort of this Zab, presented here.1 See required owner is similar those servient estate Williams, 632, 1241, alia, Wash.App. (citing, maj. op. Ko v. 54 1. See at 1271-73 inter 65, Kramer, 876, (1989) (same); Hoblyn, louch 120 Idaho v. Mueller v. 887 1243-44 (1991)(applying principle that servient 500, (same); 879-80 504, (Wyo.1994) v. P.2d 507 Brooks clearly estate use must be inconsistent owner’s 767867, 288354, Geraghty, 2005 WL at *6 No. adverse); interest be easement holder’s 2005) (same)). (Mass.Land Apr.6, See also Ct. Indus., Storage Vandeleigh LLC v. Partners of 510, 382, Muellner, 932 v. 283 Conn. A.2d Smith LLC, 91, (Del.2006) Kirkwood, 901 A.2d 105 temporary (concluding that struc- 389-90 Turner, 168, (same); 268 885 Halverson v. Mont. area were not inconsistent tures 1285, (1994) (same); City P.2d Edmonds 1290 1276 Berenergy Corp., precise

Inc. v. 136 yet P.3d locations of which are as undeter- (Colo.2006)(Eid, J., Ferraro, specially concurring). Spiegel mined. See 73 N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d N.E.2d COATS, dissenting.

Justice (explaining addressing only Castle as easements, actually unlocated like one I too would find that an easement is a case). involved in that At least when limited property, or interest in real the exer- fashion, rationally this the rule is related may cise enforcement of which be lost important requirement of notice to the failing appropriate to take action within the estate, always dominant which has been inte- statutorily prescribed period; limitations but gral acquisition by possession. majority, justification unlike I can find no contrast, By where, nonuse notwithstand- judicial imposition special of a rule of ing, certainty there is about the location of easements, accrual for one narrow class (as case) majority’s largely exempting them from loss justifications policy amount to little more majori- It seems clear that the arguments against than adhering to the doc- rule, ty’s new modeled after variations re- *14 possession. By trine of shifting the cently adopted in jurisdic- a handful of other “adversity” tiny focus of for this class of tions, does not reflect the common law of cases, from a concern for the nature and and, determine, England as I best can does permanence of the encroachment itself to a embody jurisdic- not even the rationale of the strictly existing concern easement- thought tion that it up. importantly, Most it, holder’s in putting interest an end to however, even if I considered such a rule (but majority’s rigid, universally mechanical policy, I meritorious would nevertheless re- applicable) actually rule1 flies the face of ject judicial adoption flagrant usurpa- its policies equities furthered function, legislative tion of the allocated else- doctrine of adverse Presumably, where our constitution. majority’s permit rule would a forced Despite majority’s protestations removal of a long-standing permanent even contrary, my view it out an excep- carves structure, house, like a long as the ease- tion to section 38^41-101 of the revised stat- ment brings holder his eighteen action within utes, legislatively prescribed any bar to years actually deciding that he wants to action to enforce an interest real make use of expressly his easement and de- not brought eighteen years within after the manding the structure’s removal. Solely to do so first accrues. for ease- majority’s Whether rule has merit ments that expressly were created but never however, policy perspective, from a I consid- use, yet put majority declares that a legislative er a majority, matter. which cause of action to enforce the easement dates its so-called “modern rule” from against obstruction the servient estate does not assert that it at existed the common only need, demand, upon refusal, accrues law, Assembly as the General has allowed simply notorious, rather than upon open, that law to remain in jurisdic- effect in this incompatible usage by the servient estate. tion, 2-4-111, (2007), see C.R.S. York, Even in New the state from which Restatement certainly most does not. See majority borrows the idea for excep (Third) Property: Restatement Servitudes tion, Schwartz, see (2000). Castle Associates v. 7.7 Nor do I consider this court A.D.2d 407 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y.App. constitutionally empowered to develop new Div.1978), jurisdiction’s high court exceptions limits accepted common law doc- exception’s applicability trines, any easements the legislative provisions, more than undeveloped with easement holder's adversity. "Following interest in precedent ju- in other adverse). risdictions,” easement and thus were maj. op. majority accrual, adopts preventing a hard and fast rule of Despite concurring opinion’s attempt noble period commencement of the limitations until majority to terms, palatable recast the rule in more the easement holder decides to make use of his unyielding language majority's though even a servient estate’s en- holding simply merely cannot be read to incompatible every include croachment be conceiv- nonuse as a consideration in the determination able use the holder. government I evidentiary Because believe our form of guise announcing under the decide, Assembly legis- to the General such majority does allocates as the guidelines. To decisions, respectfully lative I dissent. today, in the limited case easements, never used created but an obstructed bring an action to enforce only upon actual need

easement accrues hold- demand

unsuccessful

er, openly incompa- upon than rather holder’s

tible with the easement judi-

interest, nothing than amounts to less

cially legislating law. substantive

Case Details

Case Name: Matoush v. Lovingood
Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado
Date Published: Mar 3, 2008
Citation: 177 P.3d 1262
Docket Number: 06SC823
Court Abbreviation: Colo.
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