Mathison v. Young
333 N.W.2d 477
Iowa
1983
Check Treatment

*1 equitable accounting fair and basis. The however, requirement,

fair equitable statutory

a on the It limitation deduction.

does to let purport taxpayer choose

an accounting enlarges method that the de- beyond

duction of federal tax amount paid

actually or accrued the consolidated

return.

Plaintiffs trying, understandably, are They

have the best of both worlds. seek to liability by filing

reduce federal a tax con- time, they

solidated return. At the same they

seek as if liability to reduce state tax showing separate

had filed federal returns greater liability. tax federal Section 422.-

35(4) allow does not them to have both

advantages. Having only paid or accrued tax liability federal shown on feder- returns,

al their state must deduction be

computed on that amount. plaintiffs’

We find no merit conten-

tions.

AFFIRMED. MATHISON, Plaintiff, M.

Jane YOUNG, Speights

The Honorable Gordon Judge of

Juvenile Court the Iowa Dis- County, Story

trict Court for Defendant. 67648, 68578,

Nos. 68583 and 68584.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April

478

McCORMICK, J. Plaintiff objections filed to the reduction of fees in each hearing instance. A was The here question legal concerns the concerning held one of the claims. She determining standard for reasonable com- offered evidence that law office overhead pensation appointed for an as attorney community averaged an hour and $38 indigent parents counsel for or children in that the ordinary customary charge and for juvenile cases. Plaintiff Jane M. Mathison juvenile community court services in the brought these consolidated certiorari ac- per overruling was hour. In his order $60 challenge tions to fee orders entered for her plaintiff’s objection, defendant said he de- juvenile by services in four proceedings de- termined the fee in accordance with the Judge fendant District Associate Gordon Denato, standard Parrish v. 262 N.W.2d Speights Young. We find that defendant (Iowa 1978), 281 Soldat Iowa District an employed legal incorrect standard in the for Emmet County, Court 283 N.W.2d 497 orders and therefore sustain the writs and (Iowa 1979). Specifically the judge ac- remand the cases for a new determination knowledged having reduced the fee to take of fees. into certainty account the from public treasury duty and the of an 232.141(1) Section the Iowa Code attorney represent In overrul- (1981) provides certain specified ex- plaintiff’s ing objections to the other three penses “upon judge certification of or orders, the judge said he discounted the other upon provided such authorization as fees on the same basis in proceedings. those by county law are a charge upon present actions, In the plaintiff certiorari subject which the are held ...” proceedings contends the erred in reducing the to a applicable limitation not here. “Rea- grounds. fees on those attorney ap- for an pointed by the court to serve as counsel or Wifvat, 707, In Hulse v. 306 N.W.2d 709 guardian specified ad litem” is one of the (Iowa 1981), this court observed that two 232.141(l)(d). expenses. dispute any § elements inhere in providing legal here to the standard for relates deter- for reasonable attorney fees: “The services compensation. must have reasonably been necessary and the valuation must be reasonable court-appointed Plaintiff served as coun- present amount.” The controversy con- juvenile sel or parents children four element, cerns only second the reasona- proceedings. After her services in each bleness of amount. proceeding complete, were she submitted a Plaintiff contends the court applied including claim an itemized state- legal an incorrect standard and abused its ment. at requested She discretion in determining a reasonable per rate of hour. She served notice of $60 amount for her separate fees. These are her county attorney, claims on the and the issues. Ascertaining the correct stan did not resist her claims. State Pursuant to dard an issue of law. Once the correct rule, district were by claims reviewed ascertained, legal standard is a court has panel judges. of three In each instance the broad applying discretion in it. Id. If dis panel recommended to defendant that he involved, cretion alone is we reverse if allow a fee lower than the amount claimed it “was grounds exercised on or for reasons but did not what the fee say should be. clearly untenable or to an extent clearly Although defendant found the services Buck, unreasonable.” State v. 275 N.W.2d and, reasonably necessary were minor 194, 195 (Iowa 1979). We will address these exceptions, that the time claimed was com- separately. issues pensable, the court awarded fees substan- tially less than the amounts claimed. One I. The The legal standard. stan- hour, claim was allowed at an a second $40 dard for reasonable compensa- hour, at an and the other two at court-appointed juve- $42.50 tion for attorneys $50 an hour. nile cases has not previously been decided. 232.141(l)(d) Reasonable for such services Because section lacks both by was first mandated this court’s decision legislative judicial history of section Ferguson County, v. Pottawattamie 815.7, interpretation its is not necessarily (1938). Iowa 278 N.W. 223 It has been by dictated cases interpreting former by mandated since 1966. See Iowa or present section 775.5 section 815.7. We (1966). 232.52 Code § believe, however, legislative that the defini- *3 parties present The in case each the read tion of compensation reasonable in section interpreting the caselaw governing statutes is persuasive 815.7 for authority giving the court-appointment cases criminal as to interpretation legislature’s same the con- controlling. We believe those eases shed current of use the same term in section problem on light the but are not determina- 232.141(l)(d). Dowell, See State 297 tive. 93, (Iowa 96 1980). N.W.2d We therefore the (1977) Section 775.5 of Iowa Code hold that the standard of com- reasonable provided compensation” for “reasonable pensation 232.141(l)(d) under section is the appointments. criminal case court In same as the of compen- reasonable Anderson, Woodbury County v. 164 N.W.2d sation in section 815.7 as delineated in 1969), 129, (Iowa judi- 132 a put this court Hulse. gloss by holding it cial on that statute did suggests this interpretation State to purport provide compensation not full or attorney’s overlooks obligation an ethical to charged the same fee as would be to nonin- represent poor oppressed. the and the We digent clients. The court noted the not agree. do We that the vast had been to remove provisions amended majority lawyers provide gratuitous of or providing fees set amounts in an effort to the financial on substantially “alleviate burden indi- discounted on a daily services light vidual the lawyers developing of persons basis to to pay regular unable fees. indigent’s of right law an to counsel under As the Code of Professional Responsibility the recent decisions of United Su- States notes, however, these services address preme Court and this court.” Id. part of the need: of Iowa Section 815.7 the Code Historically, legal the need for services (1979) supplanted 775.5. It section included pay of those unable to reasonable fees has language defining compensation reasonable part by met lawyers been who donated as “the ordinary customary charges for accepted appoint- their services or court community....” services in the like We ments on behalf of such individuals. The Hulse, held in at 306 N.W.2d that for responsibility providing legal basic making the change legislature the intended pay services for those unable to ultimate- compensation court-ap that “reasonable for ly upon rests the individual lawyer, and pointed lawyers set be under the criteria personal problems involvement in the of govern compensation which reasonable disadvantaged can be one of the most litigation other services.” Thus section rewarding experiences in the life of a provided legislative definition 815.7 of lawyer. Every lawyer, pro- of regardless reasonable that differed from prominence professional or fessional judicial definition. The previous court workload, to participate should find time change “The this is to said: effect of make rendi- serving disadvantaged. The reasonable full compensation. legal of free services to tion those unable on required No discount now based an pay to fees continues to be an reasonable duty represent attorney’s poor.” obligation of but lawyer, each the efforts at 711. of Certainty N.W.2d of lawyers individual are often not recognized the fee was as a factor enough to meet the need. Thus it has be should taken into consideration in deter necessary profession been for the to insti- compensation, along programs provide legal tute additional Parrish, other factors discussed in offices, at Accordingly, 262 N.W.2d aid legal services. services, referral and other lawyer obligation poor. Ample relat- to assist the oppor- programs developed, ed have been tunity exists for to do so outside the them developed, by profes- others will be of mandatory court-appointment field serv- Every lawyer sion. should support all 232.141(l)(d) ices. We find that section to meet proper efforts this need for does authorize a discount from other- services. wise reasonable based on an attorney’s duty help 2-27, E.C. Iowa Code of Professional Re- sponsibility Lawyers. We hold that the employed The critical problem providing legal an incorrect standard in services to being is now addressed plaintiff’s compensation. The fees should through public well private programs. as as not have been reduced based ethical however, best, At public programs consideration. Instead the factors listed in merely part alleviate of the burden borne Hulse, 711-12, 306 N.W.2d at should have *4 by private the This court recog- bar. has been utilized. Those factors are the time magnitude nized the of the task in request- spent, necessarily the nature and extent of ing the organized develop bar to additional services, penal consequence the in programs provide legal to services to the volved, the difficulty handling of and im poor Denying lawyers in civil cases. rea- portance issue, of responsibilities as mandatory court- obtained, sumed and results the standing appointed crippling services could have a experience and of the attorney, the custom respond effect their to ability to this ary charge for similar services in the com need. The is in concept same reflected munity, and the certainty payment. of Id. relating obtaining ethical consideration to Plaintiff contends that certainty pay- of private reasonable from ment should not be relevant. offered She legal profession clients: “The cannot re- evidence that lawyers several Ames collect main a force in fulfilling viable its role in nearly percent of the they charge fees our society unless its members receive ade- private to argues clients. From this she quate compensation rendered, for services private that of fees is not uncer- charged reasonable should be tain. In fact argues public she fees are appropriate pay cases to clients able to because, illustrate, uncertain as these cases Id., them.” E.C. 2-18. they are not assured they until are allowed. Providing legal poor services to the is no persuaded We are not that the collectibility principle providing different than them private of fees for nearly clients is so cer- with medical and other basic services. The plaintiff tain as argues, nor do we think problem by is exacerbated the complexity uncertainty of equated amount should be of by modern life as well as the constitu- uncertainty payment. of We adhere tionally-mandated expansion right of the to holding to our in Hulse. juvenile penal services cases. judge The bar of has a Because the did not proud apply this state tradition the cor- standard, Yet, bar, of rect we service to the as the sustain the writs of permit certiorari and remand to Congress, Assembly and the Iowa General the fees to have be determined anew. recognized, the entire need cannot sat- isfactorily by be met donated services. II. Abuse of discretion. We find no evi- providing

We do not believe that dence that the judge abused his discretion reasonable from the public the fees. Rather the record treasury attorneys appointed rep- he thorough shows made a and conscien- juvenile resent the cases the legisla- tious examination plaintiff’s of claims and purported ture to demand a subsidy carefully applied from he what conceived to be private bar. Instead we believe law- the appropriate legal standard. disa- Our yers remain free to greement standard, determine how and in is with the choice of what they discharge cases will their ethical with way applied. in which it was We do not intimate what the fees should We to permit

be. remand WELP, William L. Executor that make determination under the correct Chadderdon, Neil T. Estate of making In standard. that determination he Deceased, Appellee, is not bound to award the amounts claimed. The claims are based on rigid hourly rate rather than the characteristics of the serv- REVENUE, IOWA DEPARTMENT OF ices, which from case vary to case. While Appellant. we the convenience of determin- No. 68654. ing alone, fees based on time approach is not only simplistic contrary but to our Supreme Court of Iowa. holding in Hulse that time expended April one to be factors considered deter- compensation. Plaintiff independently challenged has fee equal protection grounds, orders on

asserting protection she equal was denied

by court’s of a fee application different in juvenile applicable cases than is

in criminal In cases. view of holding, our do question.

we not reach the constitutional

WRITS AND SUSTAINED CASES RE-

MANDED.

All Justices concur except HARRIS and

McGIVERIN, JJ., who dissent.

WOLLE, J., part. no takes

HARRIS, (dissenting). Justice

I dissent for the reasons stated in the

dissenting Wifvat, opinion Hulse v. (Iowa

N.W.2d I 1981). 714-16 do not the legislature, adopting

think Iowa Code 232.141(l)(d), intended to make it illegal

§ the judge obliga- to consider a lawyer’s fixing

tion assist the when “[r]ea- compensation.” I no and, to the prior majority holdings Hulse,

here and in no rule which makes it give consideration to that

illegal long-

recognized obligation.

The majority say, cannot and does not

say, fees allowed here were unreason- entirely

able. fees strike me as reason-

able this is all the legislature required

them be.

I would annul the writ.

McGIVERIN, J., joins this dissent.