276 N.W. 222 | Minn. | 1937
1. Plaintiff's evidence as to the condition of the crosswalk consisted of the testimony of herself and three other witnesses, two of whom were employed in stores situated at the corners of the intersection where the crosswalk is located and who had had occasion daily to witness the condition of the street and crosswalk. These witnesses testified that at the place where plaintiff fell the icy surface of the crosswalk was "ridgy" with "humps and lumps and foot prints and automobile ruts"; that the "humps of ice" walling the automobile ruts were from seven to nine inches deep and that footprints had caused ridges from four to five inches deep; that automobiles, starting from a "stop" sign on the street intersecting the crosswalk, churned the accumulated ice and snow and made the surface of the crosswalk "jagged" and irregular; that automobile and pedestrian traffic at this intersection, First avenue east and Superior street, was heavy; that this "ridgy" condition of "humps and lumps" on the icy surface of the street and crosswalk had existed for a week or two weeks and that they had witnessed no efforts by the city to obviate the condition by sanding the street or otherwise. From this testimony the jury could find that there existed on the crosswalk where plaintiff fell "slippery and dangerous ridges, depressions, hummocks, and irregularities" [see
2. The proof was amply sufficient to sustain a finding that the municipality had at least constructive notice of the dangerous condition, for the testimony shows it had existed for from one to two weeks. McClain v. City of Duluth,supra (condition existed six days, city held liable); Barrett v. City of Virginia, supra (condition existed one week, city liable); Callahan v. City of Duluth, supra (condition existed for from ten days to two weeks, city liable). The testimony of defendant's street foreman establishes that the city was so far apprised of the condition of the streets on and before the day of the accident that the street foreman and a crew of four were engaged in sanding the streets, and he testified that the sanding crew, on February 2, 1934, treated the particular street on which is located the crosswalk where plaintiff slipped and fell.
The evidence made a case for the jury, and it was error to direct a verdict for defendant. This error was properly corrected by the order granting a new trial.
The order is affirmed. *293