118 P. 781 | Utah | 1911
The respondent filed a claim against the estate of Mariah P. Tingey, deceased, respondent’s mother, for services which respondent alleged were rendered by her for her mother during the last two years of her life. The appellant, as administrator of said estate, disallowed respondent’s claim, and she
There is practically but one question presented for review, which is that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Nor that reason, it is contended that the judgment ought to be reversed. Appellant’s counsel strenuously insists that, in view that the services in question were
“As a general rule, a child -who is living with its parents is not entitled to compensation for services rendered to the parent, even though the child be an adult or otherwise emancipated, for such services are presumed to he gratuitous, and a promise on the part of the parent to pay for them will not be implied from their mere rendition. But the parent may contract to pay the child for' its services, and in st;ch case the child’s claim for the amount due is good as against the parent and his creditors. It is not even necessary that there should he an express and definite contract between the parents and child, but mutual understanding that the services are to he paid for is sufficient to entitle the child to payment; and if from the circumstances a contract by the parent to pay for the services may be inferred the child is entitled to recover therefor.”
In other words, if from all tbe facts and circumstances surrounding tbe parties, and under wbicb tbe services were com
The facts and circumstances with regard to whether the general rule or the exception thereto as indicated above shall prevail are not always of that clear and convincing character that all reasonable men will arrive at the same conclusion as to whether the facts bring the case within the general rule or within the exception. The conditions which usually exist between parent and child, who either live in one or in separate families, are so variant, and are controlled by such variable circumstances, that most courts have either hesitated or entirely refrained from laying down a hard and fast rule with regard to when remuneration for services rendered by an adult child for a parent may or may not be recovered. But instead, as a general rule, such courts require the whole facts and circumstances to be passed on by a jury, who from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties in interest, when fully and fairly considered, may determine the question whether there was a promise, express or implied, to pay for particular services. In an early Massachusetts case (Guild v. Guild, 15 Pick. 130), Mr. Chief Justice Shaw," in considering this subject, in the course of his opinion says:
*564 “It would be quite competent for the jury to infer a promise from all the circumstances of the case; that, although the burden of proof is upon plaintiff, as in other cases, the jury ought to be instructed that if, under all the circumstances of the case, the services were of such a nature as to lead to a reasonable belief that it was the understanding of the parties that pecuniary compensation should he made for them then the jury should find an implied promise.”
In Crampton v. Logan, 28 Ind. App. 408, 63 N. E. 52, Mr. Justice Black, after discussing tbe general rule applicable between parent and child which we have quoted from Oye., supra, proceeds:
“For the recovery of compensation for services rendered by a member of a family, as in all other cases of recovery for services, a contract must he shown, either express or implied; and if the circumstances authorized the person rendering the services reasonably to expect payment therefor, by way of furtherance of the understanding of the parties, or because reason and justice requires compensation, the law will imply a contract therefor. The question as to whether or not there was either an express contract or an implied contract to pay for the services is matter of fact for the jury to determine upon the evidence.”
In McCormick, Ex’r v. McCormick, 1 Ind. App. 594, 28 N. E. 122, it is said:
“No precise rule can be stated as to what circumstances will raise an implied contract to pay for services rendered by an adult person for his parent.”
The following well-considered cases, among a very large number which might be cited, support the foregoing doctrine: Crampton v. Logan, supra; McCormick, Ex'r v. McCormick, supra; Sammon v. Wood, 107 Mich. 506, 65 N. W. 529; Koch v. Hebel, 32 Mo. App. 103; Hart v. Hess, 41 Mo. 442; Allen v. Allen, 101 Mo. App. 676, 74 S. W. 396; Heffron v. Brown, 155 Ill. 326, 40 N. E. 583; Scully v. Scully, 28 Iowa, 548; Murdock v. Murdock, 7 Cal. 511.
In Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 129 Pa. 229, 18 Atl. 129, 15 Am. St. Rep. 720, in Hinkle v. Sage, 67 Ohio St. 256, 65 N. E. 999, and in some other cases, it is held that no recovery can be had, except upon an express contract or promise by the
In this case the court instructed the jury in accordance with such rales, and appellant does not complain of the instructions. Do the facts and circumstances of the case at bar bring it within those rales ? Briefly stated, the facts developed by respondent’s evidence are: That at the time of the trial (June, 1910) respondent was thirty-five years of age; that from and
While the reason we should not at long range interfere with the findings of a jury in any law case where there is some substantial evidence to support their findings is obvious, yet the reason w'e should not do so is more apparent still in cases involving family relations, where the result to be reached must be arrived at from a full and fair consideration of all the facts and circumstances which surround the parties, including their motives, expressed and implied, as the latter may be gleaned from the conduct of the parties. When it is manifest that valuable services have been rendered, and there is some substantial evidence from which a contract, either express or implied, may be deduced, then, as a general rule, it is safe to submit the case to the jury under proper instructions, and permit them to determine whether there is an express contract to pay for the services; or, in case there is no express contract, whether, from all the facts and circumstances, a promise to pay may be implied. If it should appear that the services in question were rendered as a mere matter of duty upon the part of the child, or that both the child and the parent intended the services to be gratuitous, it is not at all likely that the jury will allow pay for services thus rendered. While, in view of all the evidence, this case may be said to be a border line one, yet, for the reasons given, we are not authorized to interfere with the verdict or judgment.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs to respondent.