13 Barb. 234 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1852
A collision is a peril, insured against by a policy, under the general terms perils of the sea, or perils of the lakes. And where another vessel is injured by a collision, in such a manner that the insured are compelled to respond in damages, the insurers are liable to the insured for such damages, under the contract. This general proposition seems to be now well established as a principle of the law of marine insurance in this country. (Peters v. The Warren Insurance Company, 14 Peters, 99. Hall v. The Washington Insurance Company, 2 Story's Rep. 176.) It is objected by the defendants’ counsel that the insured vessel in this case was not injured by the collision, hut wont safely upon her voyage. But that circumstance can make no difference if the damage falls within the contract. In the two eases cited it is true the insured vessels were more or less injured by the collision. But I do not perceive that the claim of the owners of the other vessel upon the insured for damages, nor the question whether such damage falls within the contract of insurance, is in the least affected by the fact that the insured vessel was not crippled or injured by the collision. The damage to the injured vessel either falls within the policy, and is covered by it, or it does not. If it falls within it, it is perfectly immaterial what further injury or mischief ensued, or whether any other did ensue. It is still an injury flowing directly from the collision, and to its extent is just as prejudicial to the insured as though inflicted wholly upon their own vessel.
But the cause of the collision is alledged to have been the carelessness and negligence of the master and crew of the in
In Massachusetts the supreme court has receded from the grounds assumed in Cleveland v. The Union Ins. Co., and established the rule in accordance with the decisions of the United States court. (Copeland v. New England Ins. Co., 2 Metc. 432.) The supreme court of Ohio has also followed the example and overruled the former decisions in that state. (Perrin v. Protection Ins. Co., 11 Ohio R. 147.) Chancellor Kent, (3 Kent’s Com. 304, n. a,) declares that the weight of authority is decidedly against the ruling in Grier v. The Phenix Ins. Co. Verplanck, senator, in the case of Am. Ins. Co. v. Bryan, in the court for the correction of errors, (26 Wend. 583,) says, “ In late years our courts have held upon good reasons of policy and equity, that underwriters were not discharged from risks expressly assumed, because the losses were incurred remotely or
It was very ingeniously argued by the defendants’ counsel that the proximate cause of the loss here must have been the negligence of the master and crew of the • Ontario, as without proof of that, no recovery for the loss or damage could have been had against the plaintiffs by the owners of the injured vessel. It is true that it must have appeared that the collision was consequent upon the carelessness and negligence, or no recovery could have been had. But it does not follow from this that the proximate cause was not the collision. Whether the collision is the proximate cause of an injury or not does not depend upon the nature of the causes which produced the collision. The proximate cause is the same whether the collision results from an act of God or human agency. Nor was it essential to the recovery against the plaintiffs that the proximate cause of the injury should have been the negligence. All that was essential to show was that the collision was the consequence of the negligence.
It is clear enough that the collision was, as it has always been held, the proximate cause of the damage for which the recovery was had. That being a peril insured against by the terms' and
Selden, T. R. Strong and Johnson, Justices.]