MATHEWS et al. v. CLOUD et al.
S13A1807
Supreme Court of Georgia
January 21, 2014
754 SE2d 70
This сase arises out of a dispute over title and right of possession of certain real property in Randolph County. In essence, the dispute involves the location of the boundary between two adjoining parcels. The facts construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party show that Marion A. Cloud, now deceased, acquired title by warranty deed dated October 31, 1956, which purported to grant to her the whole of Land Lot 253, along with other adjoining Land Lots, in the Ninth Land District of Randolph County. The warranty deed referenced a survey plat that the evidence shows was initially prepared in 1946 by T. R. Mathews, also now deceased, the owner of adjoining Land Lot 254 immediately south of the Cloud property. The record shows the plat was revised in 1953 and recorded in 1954 by Mathews, and it reflects certain metes and bounds measurements of Land Lot 253. T. R. Mathews acquired title to the property located within Land Lot 254, along with other property, by quitclaim deed dated July 7, 1934. That deed, however, contains a vague description with no measured boundaries, and it references an equally vague security deed and sketch that, according to expert witness testimony, does not serve as an acceptable plat for purposes of estаblishing boundaries. A pond formed by a dam is located near the southern portion of Land Lot 253. The issue in this case is whether the pond in its entirety and the land immediately to the south and west of it is owned by the Cloud estate or whether the southern portion of the pond, along with the disputed land around the pond, is owned by the heirs of Mr. Mathews.
With respect to possession of the disputed land, members of the Mathews family claim they used the southern portion of the pond and the disputed land around the pond over a period of years, but the Cloud heirs dispute that claim. The Clouds contend that, with the exception of a dispute in 1967 over whethеr a timber crew hired by the Mathews family to cut trees on Lot 254 had encroached on the Cloud property, there was no dispute over the possession of the property until after the deaths of Mrs. Cloud and Mr. Mathews. Claiming that the Mathews heirs began encroaching onto Lot 253 in 2008, the Cloud estate filed suit in 2010 seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and seeking award of title to all of Land Lot 253 pursuant to record title or, alternatively, under the doctrine of title by prescription or the doctrine of adverse possession. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the Clouds with respect to the disputed property. The trial court then entered judgment in favor of the
1. At the close of the Cloud estate‘s case, the Mathews heirs’ attоrney filed a motion for directed verdict with respect to the Cloud estate‘s claim for relief under record title. The Mathews heirs assert the trial court erred in denying the motion, which they argue resulted in the jury being unnecessarily charged with determination of factual issues regarding this claim for relief. A directed verdict mаy be granted only where the evidence as to any material issue “demand[s] a particular verdict. . . .”
Relying upon Brooks v. Green, 277 Ga. 722 (594 SE2d 629) (2004), the Mathews heirs assert that the Clouds failed to make a prima faсie case of good record title because they failed to establish that Mrs. Cloud‘s grantor was vested with good title.1 Brooks is distinguishable as the plaintiff in that case was required to establish his grantor had good record title because he acquired his own title less than 40 years before the date he filed his petition for ejеctment. Id. at 723 (1). In the current case, the deed by which the Clouds claimed record title was, itself, more than 40 years old. Relying upon this Court‘s discussion of the common grantor rule in North Ga. Production Credit Assn. v. Vandergrift, 239 Ga. 755 (238 SE2d 869) (1977), the Mathews heirs assert that the Clouds were required to track their title back to the
government or a common grantor of the opposing party, whiсh they failed to do. In the Vandergrift case, however, the plaintiff relied only upon the common grantor rule to establish its prima facie case of title to the disputed property because, as in the Brooks case, the plaintiff acquired title less than 40 years prior to filing suit. Id. at 761 (2). Pursuant to
2. The Mathews heirs assert the trial court erred in denying their motion for new trial because the verdict was not supported by the evidence. The verdict does not indicate whether the jury found in favor
Alternatively, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the Clouds were entitled to judgment in their favor pursuant to a theory of prescriptive title by adverse possession under color of title. The record is replete with testimony аnd other evidence from which the jury could find that the Clouds were in possession of the disputed property continuously from 1956 to the time the complaint was filed. In addition to many other facts, the evidence showed that the dam creating the pond broke in 1994 resulting in the pond being drained. It was undisputed that the Clouds entered onto the disputed land in 1995 to disturb the land in order to reconstruct the dam at substantial cost borne solely by the Clouds and that the Mathews heirs raised no objection to this act of actual possession and ownership.2 The work on the dam would have been visible from the public road that also crossed the Mathews property. This evidence, alone, is sufficient to establish open and notorious occupation to put the world on notice of actual possession of the disputed land. See Cheek v. Wainwright, 246 Ga. 171 (1) (269 SE2d 443) (1980) (planting trees in a row along a public road gives clear and lasting notice that someone is exercising possеssion by even changing the nature of the real estate). The Mathews heirs, however, argue that reconstruction of the dam does not show actual possession of all of the disputed area. Importantly, however, “[p]ossession under a duly recorded deed shall be construed to extend to all the contiguous property embraced in such deed. . . .”
Ample evidence was presented of the Cloud family‘s actual or constructive possession of the entirety of the property described in their deed well in excess of the time period required to establish prescriptive title by adverse possession pursuant to
defeated by
“One of the most basic rules of appellate review is that, if there is any evidence to support the jury‘s verdict and court‘s judgment, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal.” Scott v. Scott, 243 Ga. 472, 473 (254 SE2d 852) (1979); see also Wallis v. Porter, 290 Ga. 218 (1) (719 SE2d 419) (2011) (applying this rule to the review of an order denying motion for new trial in a case involving a boundary dispute). Because sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the verdict under the Clouds’ claim of superior title or their claim of title by prescription arising out of adverse possession under written evidence of title pursuant to
3. Based upon a discussion between the judgе and counsel for the parties, the judge submitted three alternative verdict forms to the jury for them to use at their discretion. One was a form that asked the jury to establish the property line between Lots 253 and 254, one permitted the jury to fashion the language and terms of the verdict as they saw fit, and one was a form that posed three questions to the jury, asking them to award either to plaintiff or defendant three areas of disputed land — the pond, the property west of the pond, and the property south of the pond. The jury returned a verdict on the form that asked them to make an election between the plaintiff and dеfendant regarding the three listed areas of land in dispute and the jury placed an “X” on the line next to the word “Plaintiff” with respect to each of the three areas. Reciting that the jury had found for the plaintiffs, the court entered judgment in favor of the Clouds, stating:
Plaintiffs are hereby awarded all title, right, ownership and exсlusive use of the pond once known as Sealy‘s Mill Pond located in Land Lot 254 in the 9th Land District of Randolph County, Georgia, and all land in Land Lot 253 . . . located
west and south of said Sealy‘s Mill Pond with said Land Lot‘s south border being at S 89° 16’ 20” E (1495.81‘), N 89° 16’ 20” W (1621.42‘), as shown on that certain plat entitled “Status Print, Survey for: Estate of Marion A. Cloud, Estate of W.O. Cloud and T. R. Mathews, Jr., et al” dated 04-23-2008, as revised 08-23-2010, which was entered into Evidence in the trial as Exhibit P-5, incorporated herein for all purposes by this reference . . . .
The attorney for the Mathews heirs objected to the form of the verdict. On appeal, they assert the court erred in making a substantial change to the verdict by arbitrarily еstablishing a boundary line even though the evidence concerning the location of the line was conflicting and the jury made no specific determination locating the line.
“In a proper case, the superior court may mold the verdict so as to do full justice to the parties in the same manner as а decree in equity.”
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JANUARY 21, 2014.
Title to land. Randolph Superior Court. Before Judge Bishop.
James E. Friese, for appellants.
John G. C. Durham, Jared L. Roberts, for appellees.