Matera v. Mystic Transportation, Inc.Matera v. Mystic Transportation, Inc.
—In eight related actions, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful death, (1) Mystic Transportation, Inc., and Mystic Bulk Carriers, Inc. (the plaintiffs in Action No. 2, the defendants in Action Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and defendants third-party plaintiffs in Action No. 8), and Frank P. Gangone (a defendant in Action Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and a defendant third-party plaintiff in Action No. 8), appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (LaCava, J.), entered January 29, 2002, as denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the negligence causes of action insofar as asserted against them, denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment on their causes of action against Michael Matera, David Matera, and Stephanie Laughlin as co-executors of the estate of Doris Matera, denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages pursuant to Navigation Law article 12 insofar as asserted against them, granted those branches of the separate motions of the New York State Thruway Authority (the plaintiff in Action No. 8), CNA Insurance Companies, as subrogee of New York State Thruway Authority (the plaintiff in Action No. 4), Zurich Insurance Company, as subrogee of New York State Thruway Authority (the plaintiff in Action No. 5), Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, as subrogee of New York State Thruway Authority (the plaintiff in Action No. 6), and Reliance National Insurance Company, as subrogee of New York State Thruway
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the motion of the New York State Thruway Authority which was, in effect, for summary judgment on the issue of liability against Mystic Transportation, Inc., and Mystic Bulk Carriers, Inc., on its cause of action to recover damages pursuant to Navigation Law article 12 and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with one bill of costs to the New York State Thruway Authority and the City of Yonkers payable by Mystic Transportation, Inc., and Mystic Bulk Carriers, Inc.
On the night of October 8, 1997, Frank Gangone was driving a truck for Mystic Transportation, Inc., and Mystic Bulk Carriers, Inc. (hereinafter collectively Mystic), pulling a tanker filled with gasoline owned by Texaco, Inc. He exited the New York State Thruway onto northbound Central Park Avenue in the City of Yonkers. Gangone stopped at the yield sign and entered the U-turn lane in order to access the southbound lanes of Central Park Avenue where the Texaco gas station was located. As Gangone was completing the U-turn, a car driven by the decedent, Alessio Matera, struck the side of the tanker at the location of the tanker’s wetlines. These are used for filling the tanker, and they contain gasoline. A fire erupted killing Matera and damaging an overpass owned by the New York State Thru way Authority (hereinafter NYSTA). Gasoline was discharged into nearby streams and catch basins, requiring a cleanup.
All the parties, including the City of Yonkers, NYSTA, Mystic, and Gangone, moved for summary judgment on the claims raised by them and asserted against them. The Supreme
“Although ‘issues of proximate cause are generally fact matters to be resolved by a jury’ (Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ.,
Moreover, Mystic and Gangone failed to demonstrate their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the causes of action against them to recover damages for their negligence (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,
However, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the motion of NYSTA which was, in effect, for summary judgment against Mystic on the issue of liability on its cause of action for damages pursuant to Navigation Law article 12. Pursuant to the Navigation Law, any person who has discharged petroleum is “strictly liable, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and all direct and indirect damages, no matter by whom sustained” (Navigation Law § 181 [1]). One purpose of the statute is to require the prompt
The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Smith, J.P., S. Miller, Crane and Cozier, JJ., concur.