MATANUSKA-SUSITNA BOROUGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Matanuska-Susitna Borough, a Municipal Corporation, June Tull, Kenneth P. Fallon, Donald L. Moore, and Roy S. Carlson, Jr., individually as taxpayers of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough, Donald L. Moore, as parent and next friend for Tyler J. Moore and Isaac D. Moore, minor school students, and Roy S. Carlson, Jr., as parent and next friend of Reave C. Carlson and Amber L. Carlson, minor school students, Appellants, v. STATE of Alaska, Steve Cowper, Governor of the State of Alaska, William G. Demmert, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Education, and the State of Alaska Department of Education, Appellees.
No. S-5513.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
Jan. 31, 1997.
931 P.2d 391
IV. CONCLUSION
The superior court‘s rulings that the 1983 dissolution decree terminated Wetherelt‘s duty to support Roberta, that CSED abused its discretion by refusing to disestablish paternity, and that CSED would be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain support monies collected from Wetherelt prior to January 20, 1993, are REVERSED.15 The superior court‘s judgment requiring the State to pay Wetherelt $20,118.69 plus interest, costs, and attorney‘s fees is REVERSED and VACATED.
LuAnn E.B. Weyhrauch, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellees.
Before RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and EASTAUGH, JJ.
OPINION
COMPTON, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Matanuska-Susitna Borough (Borough), the Matanuska-Susitna School District (District), and several individual plaintiffs challenged Alaska public school funding laws, arguing that differences in treatment between regional educational attendance area (REAA) school districts 1 and city and borough school districts, and among the non-REAA districts, violated their right to equal protection of the law under the state constitution. The superior court dismissed the equal protection claims on summary judgment, awarded attorney‘s fees against the Borough and the District, and assessed costs against the Borough, the District, and the individual plaintiffs. We reverse the assessment of costs against the individual plaintiffs, but affirm the judgment in all other respects.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The Borough, the District, and the individual plaintiffs filed suit against the State in late 1986, alleging, inter alia, that the state system of school funding violated their right to equal protection of the law under
The parties stipulated to dismissal of the rest of the claims, and final judgment was entered. The superior court awarded attor-
The individual plaintiffs appeal the denial of their equal protection claims. The Borough and the District appeal the award of attorney‘s fees. All plaintiffs appeal the cost award.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Equal Protection
The individual plaintiffs claim that their interests as taxpayers and their children‘s interests in education are impaired by the state school funding laws, and that an insufficient nexus exists between the state interests that justify these laws and the disparate treatment the plaintiffs claim to receive under them.
1. The challenged funding laws
The individual plaintiffs challenge two school funding laws:
cerning the local contribution required when districts receive state aid for operating costs.
On its face, section 100(a) would appear to benefit borough school districts, such as the plaintiffs’ district, while denying REAAs a comparable benefit. The individual plaintiffs argue, however, that this section actually works to disadvantage them. For debts authorized after March 31, 1990, the section provides that the State will reimburse only seventy percent of the annual debt service costs incurred during the fiscal year of reimbursement.
In addition to school construction aid in the form of grants and debt reimbursement, school districts also receive state aid to help cover their operating costs.
The individual plaintiffs argue that the local contribution requirement establishes three classes of students and taxpayers: (a) those in districts contributing the four mill equivalent; (b) those in districts contributing thirty-five percent; and (c) those in REAA districts, which make no local contribution. They argue that
2. Equal protection analysis under the Alaska Constitution
First, it must be determined at the outset what weight should be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment. The nature of this interest is the most important variable in fixing the appropriate level of review. . . . Depending upon the primacy of the interest involved, the state will have a greater or lesser burden in justifying its legislation.
Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes served by a challenged statute. Depending on the level of review determined, the state may be required to show only that its objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, or, at the high end of the scale, that the legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest.
Third, an evaluation of the state‘s interest in the particular means employed to further its goals must be undertaken. Once again, the state‘s burden will differ in accordance with the determination of the level of scrutiny under the first stage of analysis. At the low end of the sliding scale, we have held that a substantial relationship between means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the higher end of the scale, the fit between means and ends must be much closer. If the purpose can
be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative, the classification will be invalidated.
Alaska Pacific Assur. Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska 1984).
This court exercises its independent judgment in deciding equal protection claims. State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991); Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702, 704 (Alaska 1990).
3. The individual plaintiffs have failed to establish a foundation for an equal protection claim based on educational opportunity.
The individual plaintiffs claim that the educational interests of their children are adversely affected by the local contribution to operating costs required of the Borough by
Where there is no unequal treatment, there can be no violation of the right to equal protection of law. In the absence of any evidence of disparate treatment, there is no basis for an equal protection claim,7 and we need not subject the challenged laws to sliding scale scrutiny.
The individual plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence arguably showing that the educational interests of their children have been disparately affected by the local contribution to operating costs required of the Borough by
cussed above, the total money available to a district is set by a statutory formula: basic need less the required local contribution less ninety percent of federal impact aid.
4. The individual plaintiffs have failed to establish a foundation for an equal protection claim based on school construction aid.
The individual plaintiffs also have failed to present any evidence suggesting that there actually is an overall disparity in state aid for school construction. While REAAs are only required to contribute two percent of the costs of school construction to receive a grant under
Borough and city districts not only receive construction grants, but also enjoy the benefit of having their school construction debt reimbursed under
The individual plaintiffs have failed to show that the various laws providing state assistance for school construction arguably interact in such a way that the students and taxpayers of the Borough have been disadvantaged somehow relative to those residing in REAAs.10 In the absence of any evidence arguably showing an overall disparity in benefits and burdens, we are left with little more than a challenge to a debt reimbursement program that is available to the individual plaintiffs’ district, but unavailable to the REAAs themselves. We cannot see how the individual plaintiffs’ district is disadvantaged relative to REAAs by having the option of participating in this program. The equal protection challenge to
5. The individual plaintiffs’ taxation-based equal protection challenge to the required local contribution to operating costs fails because the State has established a substantial relationship between means and ends.
The only equal protection argument left to be addressed is the individual plaintiffs’ con-
tention that the local contribution to operating costs required by
The individual plaintiffs have not shown that they pay higher taxes as a result of the required local contribution, or that invalidating
First, we must weigh the importance of the interests affected. Assuming that the individual plaintiffs’ interests as taxpayers actually are impaired by the school funding laws, these interests are not interests afforded much weight under our equal protection analysis. “The interest involved here, freedom from disparate taxation, lies at the low end of the continuum of interests protected by the equal protection clause.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 705 P.2d 418, 437 (Alaska 1985) (footnote omitted), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 1043, 106 S.Ct. 774, 88 L.Ed.2d 754 (1986).12
This constitutional mandate for pervasive state authority in the field of education could not be more clear. First, the language is mandatory, not permissive. Second, the section not only requires that the legislature “establish” a school system, but also gives to that body the continuing obligation to “maintain” the system. Finally, the provision is unqualified; no other unit of government shares responsibility or authority. That the legislature has seen fit to delegate certain educational functions to local school boards in order that Alaska schools might be adapted to meet the varying conditions of different localities does not diminish this constitutionally mandated state control over education.
Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971) (footnotes omitted). By enacting a law to ensure equitable educational opportunities across the state, the legislature acted in furtherance of this constitutional mandate.
In the third and final step of our equal protection analysis, we must evaluate the State‘s interest in the particular means employed to further its goals. Because the individual interests affected lie “at the low end of the sliding scale,” we need only find a “fair and substantial relationship” between means and ends. Anthony, 810 P.2d at 159; Alaska Pacific, 687 P.2d at 269-70; see Coghill v. Coghill, 836 P.2d 921, 929 (Alaska 1992).
As mentioned above, REAAs are constitutionally unable to tax.
The plaintiffs demand more of the State than equal protection requires, however. At the low end of the sliding scale “a substantial relationship between means and ends is constitutionally adequate.” Alaska Pacific, 687 P.2d at 269-70. “[I]f relaxed scrutiny is indicated . . . a greater degree of over/or underinclusiveness in the means-to-ends fit will be tolerated.” State Dep‘t of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1193). Even if the legislature overcompensated for the unique constitutional limitations on REAAs when it opted to exempt them entirely from the local contribution requirement, the fit between the means it chose and the goal of the legislation is close enough to withstand the relaxed scrutiny applicable to this case.
In order to meet its goal of ensuring equitable educational opportunity across the state, the legislature had to find some means of accommodating the fact that REAAs cannot raise taxes on their own. The means it chose may not have been those most protective of taxing equality, but they do bear a substantial relationship to the goals of the legislation. The classifications relied upon meet the minimal requirement that they
Given the differences in constitutional status between REAAs and borough and city districts, we hold that the legislative decision to exempt REAAs from the local contribution requirement, while requiring contributions from borough districts, was substantially related to the legislature‘s goal of ensuring an equitable level of educational opportunity across the state. Therefore, the REAA exemption did not deprive the individual plaintiffs of equal protection under law.
The State justifies the thirty-five percent cap on the required local contribution from borough and city districts by observing that requiring a contribution equivalent to a four mill tax from all borough or city districts would force some districts to contribute an amount that would actually exceed their total basic need.14 This, it is argued, would increase disparities in per pupil spending among districts, thereby defeating the goal of an equitable level of educational opportunity.15 The individual plaintiffs argue that the thirty-five percent ceiling is “so overinclusive [that it] cannot
bear a ‘fair and substantial relation’ to the state interest that it serves.” They suggest that a cap at one hundred percent of basic need would have avoided requiring a contribution in excess of basic need while bringing the applicable districts closer to the four mill contribution required of other districts.
Once again, the individual plaintiffs demand more of the State than equal protection requires. Under a one hundred percent cap, some districts would still be forced to contribute at a higher tax equivalent than others. Certain districts would still be paying less than the four mill equivalent, since that equivalent would exceed the cap. The legislature might have set the cap higher or lower; wherever it had set the cap, some taxpayers would have ended up residing in four mill districts while others reside in capped districts. Thus, different “classifications” of taxpayers would still have resulted. As discussed above, “a greater degree of over/or underinclusiveness in the means-to-ends fit will be tolerated” at the lower end of the equal protection scale. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1193.
The thirty-five percent cap ensures that excessive local contributions will not be required of districts; it thereby protects
We hold that any disparate impact on taxpayers in four mill districts that results from the thirty-five percent cap in
The opinions of courts in other jurisdictions that have decided equal protection challenges involving the disparate taxing of seemingly similarly situated people lend further support to our holding today.
In Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992), the Supreme Court upheld California‘s Proposition 13, under which property was assessed at its 1975-76 market value unless adjusted to current market value due to a change in ownership or a substantial improvement of the property. Id. 505 U.S. at 4-6. Over time, this “acquisition-value” system created large disparities in the taxes paid by similarly situated property owners. Nordlinger was paying approximately five times the property tax paid by another homeowner in her neighborhood on a similar house and lot. Id. at 6-8.
The Court found two reasons supporting the California assessment system. First, “the state had a legitimate interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability.” Id. at 12. Second, “a new owner at the time of acquiring his property does not have the same reliance interest warranting protection against higher
taxes as does an existing owner. . . . [A]n existing owner rationally may be thought to have vested expectations in his property or home that are more deserving of protection than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner at the point of purchase.” Id.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), the Court examined Texas‘s system of school financing, which relied on local property taxes for a significant portion of each school‘s budget. Unlike in Alaska, school budgets in Texas were not equalized between districts. Using a higher tax rate, the poorest district generated only a fraction of the local support that the most affluent district did. Id. at 11-14. The Court rejected an equal protection challenge, holding that the local taxation system rationally furthered the legitimate state purpose of local control of school districts. Id. at 49-56.
Fourteen years before Nordlinger, the California Supreme Court itself upheld Proposition 13 against an equal protection challenge. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281 (1978). The court found that the “‘acquisition value’ approach to taxation finds reasonable support in a theory that the annual taxes which a property owner must pay should bear some rational relationship to the original cost of the property.” Id. 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251, 583 P.2d at 1293. The court noted several provisions of the state constitution that indicated that property with equal current value need not be taxed equally.17 Id. 149 Cal.Rptr. at 252, 583 P.2d at 1294.
In Savage v. Munn, 317 Or. 283, 856 P.2d 298 (1993), the Oregon Supreme Court addressed a challenge to an initiative which amended the Oregon Constitution to set limits on property taxes. If various taxing enti-
Each of these cases was decided under the minimal federal equal protection standard of rational basis review. The minimal equal protection standard under the Alaska Constitution, the substantial relationship standard we have applied in this case, is stricter in its protection of individual rights than its federal counterpart. Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1371 (Alaska 1987); Erickson v. State, 574 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Alaska 1978); Isakson, 550 P.2d at 362. We do not express any views as to whether these cases would have been decided the same way if they had been brought as equal protection challenges under the Alaska Constitution.
These cases from other jurisdictions are informative, however, insofar as they provide some indication of the latitude lawmakers are given in furthering public policy objectives even when the means chosen may happen to have severely disparate impacts on certain classes of taxpayers. In the case before us, the legislature was not only pursuing its own sense of public policy, but also was acting in furtherance of its constitutionally mandated duty to maintain and control a statewide system of public schools. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not shown clearly that they have been disparately affected, as the plaintiffs in Nordlinger and Rodriguez did, or that any potentially disparate effect on them even remotely approaches the same degree of imbalance and severity of burden found constitutional in those cases.
For the various reasons discussed above, all of the individual plaintiffs’ equal protection claims fail.
B. Attorney‘s Fees and Costs
1. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney‘s fees against the Borough and the District.
The superior court awarded attorney‘s fees of $20,000 against the Borough and the District. The court rejected their claims of public interest status, finding that they brought suit in order to increase the aid they receive or decrease the required local contribution. The Borough and District argue the award was error that should be reversed based on their claim to public interest litigant status.
This court has established four criteria for identifying public interest litigants:
(1) whether the case is designed to effectuate strong public policies; (2) whether, if the plaintiff succeeds, numerous people will benefit from the lawsuit; (3) whether only a private party could be expected to bring the suit; and (4) whether the litigant claiming public interest status would lack sufficient economic incentive to bring the lawsuit if it did not involve issues of general importance.
Oceanview Homeowners Ass‘n, Inc. v. Quadrant Constr. & Engineering, 680 P.2d 793, 799 (Alaska 1984) (citing Kenai Lumber Co. v. LeResche, 646 P.2d 215, 222-23 (Alaska 1982)).
The superior court‘s determination of public interest litigant status is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Kenai Lumber, 646 P.2d at 223; Carney v. State Bd. of Fisheries, 785 P.2d 544, 547 (Alaska 1990). Furthermore, this court has stated that, “any party challenging the superior court‘s decision in this regard has a heavy burden of persuasion.” Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage School Dist., 803 P.2d 402, 405 (Alaska 1990).
The Borough and District claim that they meet all of the criteria. The State mainly disputes economic interest, although it briefly argues that the Borough and District do not meet the other criteria. We hold that the economic interest compelling this suit is substantial enough to defeat the Borough and District claim of public interest litigant status.
In the case now before us, the Borough and District also stood to gain from bringing suit, either by increased state funding or decreased taxes. They had a substantial economic incentive for bringing suit against the State.
Both sides to this appeal cite City of Valdez v. Copper Valley Electric Association, Inc., 740 P.2d 462, 466 (Alaska 1987), a case in which the Copper Valley Electric Association (CVEA) sued the City of Valdez, alleging a “wrongful withholding of payments which CVEA is allegedly entitled to receive directly from the state, and which should have been credited on the customer‘s bill, thus lowering the cost of electricity to the citizens of Valdez.” Id. at 466. We noted “a good deal of self-interest at stake for CVEA,” but noted as well that CVEA sought to effectuate public policy and CVEA‘s customers would have received benefits. Id. We also noted that “CVEA was probably in the best legal position to sue, since by statute it was CVEA which was to demonstrate eligibility and receive direct payments.” Id. For these reasons, we held that CVEA was entitled to public interest litigant status. Id.
In the instant case, however, the Borough and the District were not “in the best legal position to sue,” since they have no equal protection rights. Furthermore, the Borough and District had a substantial economic interest distinguishable from CVEA‘s; unlike the Borough and District, CVEA was required by law to pass along savings to its customers.
Where the sums at stake in a suit are large enough to prompt suit regardless of the public interest, public interest litigant status will be denied. Gold Bondholders Protective Council v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 658 P.2d 776, 778 (Alaska 1983) (half a million dollars substantial economic motivation); Thomas v. Bailey, 611 P.2d 536, 539 n. 9 (Alaska 1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Comm‘n, 518 P.2d 92, 103 (Alaska 1974). State construction grants to the Borough totalled over $23 million from 1981-1990. State debt support to the Borough during this period totalled over $151 million.
The superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Borough and the District public interest litigant status due to their substantial economic interest in the action.
2. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs against the Borough and District, but it did abuse its discretion in awarding costs against the individual plaintiffs.
The superior court awarded the State costs of $6,557.28. Of this, $5,500.00 was for the cost of preparing charts for use as summary judgment exhibits. The plaintiffs argue that this part of the cost award should be reversed, as “[e]xpert preparation costs are not allowed as costs of producing exhibits,” citing
In CTA Architects, the respondent argued that “expert fees incurred in preparing exhibits may be recovered as costs under Civil Rule 79,” which allows costs for “the necessary expense of . . . producing exhibits.” Id. at 1366. We disagreed, holding that “produce” did not mean “compose,” but rather produce in the discovery sense. Id.
In concurrence, Justice Rabinowitz, joined by Justice Burke, agreed with the court‘s result, but noted that the “catchall” provision
The superior court found the concurrence persuasive and held that the cost issue depended on whether the expert‘s “services were more like those of an expert who was retained to prepare for and testify at trial on a material issue, but never did testify, or were services similar to sophisticated graphic artistry or other similar demonstrative skill necessary to help the trier of fact obtain a clear understanding of complicated issues.”
We agree with the reasoning of the superior court, and hold that this case presents the type of situation foreseen in the concurrence to CTA Architects, namely, a situation in which it was within the trial court‘s discretion to allow full exhibit preparation costs because these costs were necessary to secure some right. While case law is clear that a party may not recover fees for an expert who does not testify,19 these cases are decided under
of
While we hold that it was within the superior court‘s discretion to award full exhibit preparation costs, we conclude that the award of costs against the individual plaintiffs was an abuse of discretion. For the reasons discussed above, the Borough and District were not public interest litigants. These plaintiffs are therefore liable for costs in addition to attorney‘s fees. As to the individual plaintiffs, however, we hold that they have met the criteria for public interest litigant status, and that the award of costs against them was therefore inappropriate.
The individual plaintiffs have met the four Oceanview criteria, discussed above, for identifying public interest litigants. See Oceanview, 680 P.2d at 799. Of these criteria, it is particularly significant that the individual plaintiffs, unlike the Borough and the District, lacked a sufficient economic incentive to bring this suit. While the Borough and District stood to gain substantial economic advantages had they prevailed in this suit, the same cannot be said for the individual plaintiffs. Any economic benefits that they might have gained as taxpayers would have been so diffusely spread among the taxpayers of the Borough that it seems highly unlikely that any individual plaintiff would have had a sufficient personal incentive to bring suit. Indeed, it is unclear whether the individual plaintiffs even would have derived any economic benefit had they prevailed; as discussed above, the plaintiffs never really showed that they stood to gain as taxpayers,
Because the individual plaintiffs met the criteria for public interest litigant status, we reverse the superior court‘s award of costs against these plaintiffs, and remand the case for further proceedings. On remand, the court will need to determine whether the Borough and District should be liable for the entire award of costs, or whether the award should be reduced to reflect the fact that costs cannot be assessed against the individual plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the superior court‘s assessment of costs against the individual plaintiffs, and REMAND for a determination of whether the Borough and District should be liable for the full award of costs, or whether the award of costs should be reduced. We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court in all other respects.
MOORE, C.J., not participating.
MATTHEWS, Justice, with whom RABINOWITZ, Justice, joins, concurring.
I concur in the result of today‘s opinion.
No serious claim is made in this case that substantially different levels of per pupil expenditures (adjusted for cost of living differences) exist among the various school districts of Alaska. Similarly, there is here no claim that funds available to any Alaska school district are insufficient to pay for a level of education which meets standards of minimal adequacy. Such claims have been brought in other states with varying degrees of success. See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. Of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 86 N.Y.2d 279, 631 N.Y.S.2d 551, 655 N.E.2d 647 (1995); Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 468 S.E.2d 543 (1996), rev. allowed, 343 N.C. 512, 472 S.E.2d 14 (1996); Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn.1993). Nothing in today‘s opinion, or in this concurrence, should be read as suggesting that such claims might not be maintainable, if supported factually, based on the equal rights1 and public schools2 clauses of the Alaska Constitution.
Two claims are presented in this case. The first is a claim of unequal State spending. Individual plaintiffs argue that the State spends more money on education in other districts than in their district. Thus plaintiffs’ district must rely on local revenue sources, including taxes paid by plaintiffs, to partially fund the public schools. The second is a claim of inter-jurisdictional tax inequality. Individual taxpayers in one school district are complaining because the taxes they pay for their schools are greater than the taxes paid by other taxpayers in other districts for schools. For the reasons which I develop below, I do not think that either claim is cognizable.
Today‘s opinion treats the individual plaintiffs’ claim of unequal State spending on its merits, holding that plaintiffs have not proven an overall disparity in benefits and burdens and thus have not shown a violation of the equal rights clause of the Alaska Constitution. Op. at 399-400. This may imply that if the plaintiffs had proven a substantial dis-
The individual plaintiffs also claim that they pay more in property taxes than taxpayers in more economically favored communities and than property owners in REAAs (who pay no property taxes). Again, I do not think that this is a cognizable equal rights claim. There is no inter-jurisdictional right to tax equality. The people of one local government will want certain levels of fire and police protection and zoning enforcement, while the people of another local government will want other levels, and the tax rates will reflect these differences. Likewise, different municipalities will decide to support their schools at different levels, and their tax rates will again be different.
The following language from San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1973), speaks to this point:
But any scheme of local taxation—indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental units—requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. It is equally inevitable that some localities are going to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.*
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional method of providing for education then it might be an equally impermissible means of providing other necessary services customarily financed largely from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. . . . It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens live.
* This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining political subdivisions within the States and has never found in the Equal Protection Clause any per se rule of “territorial uniformity.” . . .
The individual taxpayers’ claim that they are being unfairly treated vis-a-vis property owners in REAAs is subject to the same observations. The State legislature acts as the local lawmaking body for unorganized areas such as REAAs. Further, if the State had a duty to tax property in REAAs, there would be no particular reason why the tax imposed should be measured by the rate paid by taxpayers in one particular municipality, rather than by lower or higher rates imposed by other municipalities. In my view the legislature can decide whether and how much to tax property in REAAs free from legally maintainable claims brought by taxpayers in other taxing jurisdictions that its decision is wrong. Here, as with State spending decisions, any available remedy must be pursued through majoritarian processes rather than through the courts.
Notes
This constitution is dedicated to the principles that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry; that all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law; and that all persons have corresponding obligations to the people and to the State.
As we observed in Kenai Peninsula Borough, “[t]he purpose of the Alaska due process and equal protection clauses is to protect people from abuses of government, not to protect political subdivisions of the state from the actions of other units of state government.” 751 P.2d at 18-19. Under this rationale, the District also lacks any equal protection rights, since it, like the Borough, is not a “person” entitled to equal protection. See State ex rel. Brentwood Sch. Dist. v. State Tax Comm‘n, 589 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (school districts are not “persons” and may not charge the state with due process violations).
The legislature shall by general law establish and maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the State, and may provide for other public educational institutions. Schools and institutions so established shall be free from sectarian control. No money shall be paid from public funds for the direct benefit of any religious or other private educational institution.
(a) During each fiscal year, the state shall allocate to a municipality that is a school district, the following sums:
. . . .
(6) . . . 70 percent of payments made by the municipality during the fiscal year for the retirement of principal and interest on outstanding bonds, notes, or other indebtedness authorized by the qualified voters of the municipality on or after April 30, 1993, to pay costs of school construction, additions to schools, and major rehabilitation projects that exceed $200,000 . . . .
(7) . . . 70 percent of payments made by the municipality during the fiscal year for the retirement of principal and interest on outstanding bonds, notes, or other indebtedness authorized by the qualified voters of the municipality after March 31, 1990, but before April 30, 1993, to pay costs of school construction, additions to schools, and major rehabilitation projects.
To be distinguished are spending for individual benefits such as welfare programs or permanent fund dividends, which are subject to equal rights scrutiny. Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1990); Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1980), rev‘d, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982).(a) Local contributions to a city or borough school district shall include at least the lesser of
(1) the equivalent of a four mill levy on the full and true value of the taxable real and personal property in the district as of January 1 of the second preceding fiscal year . . . or
(2) 35 percent of the district‘s basic need for the preceding fiscal year, as determined under
. . . .
(d) Local contributions are not required in a regional educational attendance area. . . .
The required share may be waived by the commissioner if a district can make a required showing of hardship.
Michael W. Worley, tax assessor for the State, affied that the available tax base in REAAs is limited by a number of factors: the tax-exempt status of certain Native-owned lands, the widespread lack of ownership records, and the fact that property ownership is often poorly defined in these areas. He also stated that “[b]orough organization generally occurs when a tax base develops or is discovered in the area which is adequate to support local government and to yield, in addition, greater services than are otherwise provided by the state.”
On remand the superior court is directed to enter a modified judgment against the State requiring it to pay Wetherelt any sums garnished by CSED during this three-month period together with costs, interest, and an award of attorney‘s fees, if deemed appropriate.
We conclude it is unnecessary to address any other issues raised in this appeal.
The State also argues that paying the remaining sixty-five percent of basic need in the wealthiest districts furthers the goal of state authority and control over public education since, “as a practical matter,” this aid gives the State leverage over districts, allowing the State to have a greater say in setting standards. In briefing this asserted purpose, the State does not refer us to any legislative history or other authority that might indicate that one of the goals of capping the required local contribution at thirty-five percent was to maintain state leverage. Furthermore, this goal does not appear anywhere in the legislature‘s statement of purpose.In State v. Anthony, we refused to consider one of the legislative purposes asserted by the State because we did not find any explicit indication in the legislative history that the asserted purpose was one of the purposes behind the act at issue. 810 P.2d at 159. While a “[c]lose examination of the statutory scheme will usually yield several concrete legislative purposes having a substantial basis in reality, even if these purposes are not specifically identified in a statutory purpose clause,” Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm‘n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1264-65 n. 39 (Alaska 1980), we see no reason to assume that one of the legislature‘s goals in capping the required local contribution was to ensure continued financial leverage over the districts. Thus, we will not consider this suggested purpose.
In addition to the items allowed as costs by law and in these rules, a party shall be allowed any other expenses necessarily incurred in order to enable a party to secure some right accorded the party in the action or proceeding.