83 Miss. 647 | Miss. | 1903
delivered the opinion of the court.
The first instruction granted by the court for the state stated
The defendant introduced several witnesses by whom he sought to prove “his general reputation for peace or violence, and that he was a peaceable and law-abiding citizen.” To this an objection interposed by the state was sustained. We are not advised upon what theory the testimony was rejected. The language of the trial judge in his final ruling upon the objection was: “I rule that character of testimony has no place in this sort of a case.” What meaning was meant to be conveyed by the expression “this sort of a case,” we are not advised. The general
There is another consideration which shows how vitally important it was to the cause of the appellant in the instant case-that the j ury should have had the opportunity of considering, in passing upon the question of his guilt, the character and reputation which he bore, and that is this: Under our law, in cases of homicide, it is for the jury to fix the penalty upon conviction. They have the power to say whether or not the defendant shall be hanged, whether he shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for life, or, in proper cases, whether he shall be convicted of manslaughter. It was certainly proper, therefore, that, in passing "upon the facts in this case, the jury should have been advised as to whether the accused was a hardened criminal, or whether previous to the homicide he had enjoyed a good reputation for peace among his neighbors. It might probably be that a jury would not inflict the same extreme penalty upon the man of peaceable habits, who stood for the first time on trial, that justice would ■demand should be imposed upon the depraved and habitual lawbreaker. The more critical the extremity of his situation, the weightier reason why he should be permitted to rely upon the •strength of his established reputation. We conclude, therefore, that it was manifest and reversible error in the court below to reject the testimony as to appellant’s previous good character.
We do not regard any other assignment of error contended for -by appellant as worthy of serious consideration.
Reversed and remanded.