STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner-appellant, William Masterson (Masterson), appeals a ruling by the Perry Circuit Court denying his petition filed under Ind.Rules of Procedure, Post-Conviction Rule 1.
We reverse.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 9, 1983, Masterson was charged with various offenses and, pursuant to a plea agreement in which certain charges were dismissed, he entered his pleas оf guilty on March 20, 1984, to theft and burglary. Thereafter, he filed his petition under P.C. 1, which was granted on April 14, 1986. No motion to correct error was ever filed by the State, nor were any other procedures invoked to attack the judgment. On Septembеr 10, 1986,
White v. State
(1986), Ind.,
ISSUES
Masterson presents two issues on appeal. He claims:
I. The trial court exсeeded its jurisdiction when it set aside the April 14 P.C. 1 judgment 179 days after entry.
II. White cannot be applied retroactively.
Issue II is not well takеn, as that issue has been decided adversely to Masterson in a number of cаses, including White itself, which was a retroactive application. We will not address it further.
There are a number of ways in which a judgment can be attacked or mоdified. A motion to correct error under Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 59, is one way, but it must be filed within 60 days from the rendition of the judgment. T.R. 59(C). Under T.R. 59(B) and Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52(B), a trial court may, on its own motion, correct its judgment within 60 days. Under IND.CODE 33-1-6-3 a trial court retains jurisdiction over its judgment for 90 days, but that statute may have been superseded by the trial rules. It requires no citation of authority to show that compliance with thоse rules, and the time limits stated therein, is jurisdictional.
The case of
Pettiford v. State
(1987), Ind.App.,
Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rules 60(A) and (B)(1) through (8), provide procedures to attack a judgment in a variety of ways, for clerical mistakes, relief frоm default judgments, void judgments, fraud, where the judgment is satisfied, and the like. Here the State relies only upon T.R. 60(B)(7) and (8). Those sections provide:
(7) The judgment has been satisfied, rеleased, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been rеversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (8) Any reason justifying relief frоm the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).
However, T.R. 60(B) is not a substitute for a belated appeal, nor can it be used to revive an expired attempt to appeal.
York v. Miller
(1975),
The State cites nо cases or authority contravening the above, well settled doctrines. It mеrely cites cases which state that a T.R. 60(B) motion is addressed to the sound discrеtion of the trial court. We hold that upon entry of the April 14 judgment, the State’s remеdy under the facts of this case was to file a motion to correct error; none of the other trial rules are applicable. When it failed to do so, the trial court’s jurisdiction lapsed upon the expiration of the time limits. The above cases, including White, discuss at length the overriding policy that judgments must become final at a fixed, visible, and predictable point. We decline to muddy that policy by creating avenues of escape for litigants.
For the above reasons this cause is reversed. The trial court is ordered to vacate the October 10, 1986 order, and reinstate the April 14, 1986 judgment granting Mas-terson’s petition for post-conviction relief.
Judgment reversed.