24 Or. 161 | Or. | 1893
delivered the opinion of the court:
The appeal presents but one question: What is the effect of a wilful, arbitrary, and intentional omission to assess a portion of the property benefitted by a local improvement, and placing the whole burden upon the remaining property ? The city charter invests the council
The converse of this rule must necessarily be true, that if there be property within the assessment district which has been benefitted by the local improvement, and wilfully, arbitrarily, and intentionally omitted therefrom, such assessment would be void; hut accidental omissions from taxation of persons or property that should be taxed, occurring through the negligence or default of officers to whom the execution of the taxing laws is intrusted, would not have the effect of vitiating the whole tax. When the omission has occurred through no purpose to evade or disregard official duty, the occasion which produced it seems wholly immaterial: Cooley, Taxation (2d Ed.), 216. The apportionment of the tax is always presumptively just and equal, and cannot be frustrated on any grounds of policy, nor can it be set aside on any showing that in particular cases its operation is unjust; but the requirement of apportionment is absolutely indispensable in any exercise of the power to tax. There can be no such thing as a valid taxation when the burden is laid without rule, either in respect to the subject of it, or to the extent to which each must contribute. In this respect the legislature is as powerless as any subordinate authority, it being impossible there should be taxation that is at once arbitrary and valid: Idem, 243. Appellants contend that the plaintiffs do not allege that any of the assessments levied against the separate parcels of land are in excess of the direct benefits conferred, and therefore they have no cause of suit. Judge Elliott in his valuable work on Eoads and Streets, in treating this question, says at page 186:
In City of Chicago v. Baer et al. 41 Ill. 306, Lawrence, J., says: “Suppose, for example, a street improvement costing ten thousand dollars was of such character as to increase to that amount the value of A’s property, and B and C each have property whose value is increased to the same amount, but nevertheless the entire cost of the improvement is assessed upon the property of A. Can his complaints be justly answered by telling him that he is not injured, because, although he pays ten thousand dollars, his property is increased in value to that amount? May he not truthfully reply that he has nevertheless been obliged to pay for benefits to the property of B and C, and to that extent his money has been taken for their use? We hold it to be clear, that while the power to make these special assessments may be sustained under the right of eminent domain, yet, in making them, the constitutional principle applies as fully as to the ordinary modes of taxation, — that one person’s property cannot be improved at the expense of another, and that no special assessment can be sustained which imposes all the cost upon a portion of the property benefited, and leaves other property, squally benefited, wholly exempt. That the exact ratio of benefits can be determined with mathematical nicety is of conrse impossible, but that is the principle upon which the assessment must be made, as correctly as possible to fallible human judgments.” Section 1 of article 9 of the constitu