Pursuant to a granted application for interlocutory appeal, MasTec North America, Inc. (“MasTec”), and Gregory Piccione, defendants below, challenge an order of the State Court of Carroll County denying their joint motion for partial summary judgment on Gilda
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). “Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal, аnd an appellate court must satisfy itself de novo that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been met.” (Citations omitted.) Cowart v. Widener,
So viewed, the record shows the following. In her complaint, Wilson alleges that, on May 8, 2009, Piccione, while driving a commercial pickup truck owned by MasTec, ran a red light and struck the car that she was driving, causing her serious injuries. Piccione denied that the accident was his fault and contends that Wilson ran the light. The record shows that, on the day of the collision, Piccione was on his way to pick up a work crew. MasTec admits that Piccione was in the course of his employment when the accident occurred. Piccione deposed that he was in no rush to meet the crew, he was alert and well-rested, he was not sick or impaired in any way, he had not consumed any medication or alcohol, and he was focused on the road. Although Piccione was talking to his fiancée on the phone when the collision occurred, he was using a hаndsfree device.
The collision occurred during morning traffic at the intersection of Highway 166 and South Park Street, a double intersection with two sets of traffic lights on either side of a median. Wilson, who was ejected from her car during the collision, was cited for failing to wear her seatbelt. Given the conflicting accounts of how the accident occurred by the drivers and the eyewitnesses, the police cited both parties for running the red light.
Piccione was not convicted of running the red light. Rather, without the advice of counsel and to avоid legal expenses, he pled guilty to a “reduced” charge of driving “too fast for conditions.”
Wilson sued Piсcione for negligence, and she sued MasTec under a theory of imputed liability. Wilson also sought punitive damages against both defendants and brought a separate claim for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, training, and entrustment against MasTec. In support of her claims аgainst MasTec for punitive damages and negligent hiring, Wilson showed that MasTec had done a background check on Piccione on March 3,2008, and that it knew that Piccione had been convicted three times for speeding, twice in 2002 and once in 2005, and that he also had bеen convicted in 2004 for failing to obey a stop sign.
The citations were issued to Piccione while he was driving his personal vehicle. There is no evidence that Piccione had been cited for a traffic violation while driving a commercial vehicle. Piccionе was 46 years old at the time of the accident and had been driving for 31 years. He had obtained his “class five” driver’s license (the predecessor to a commercial driver’s license) around 1985. Around 1998, he obtained a commercial driver’s license and he has maintainеd the license continuously since then.
When Piccione was hired by MasTec in March 2008, he had never been in an automobile accident before the instant one,
Both Piccione and MasTec argue that the undisputed facts do not support an award of punitive damages against them and that the trial court erred in denying its motion as to these claims. And, since a punitive damages claim is required to support Wilson’s claim against MasTec for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training, MasTec argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim, too. We agree.
Absent evidence supporting a valid claim for punitivе damages against MasTec, Wilson’s claims sounding in negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention fail. As we have explained,
when an employer admits the applicability of respondeat superior, it is entitled to summary judgment on claims for negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention. The rationale fоr this is that, since the employer would be liable for the employee’s negligence under respondeat superior, allowing claims for negligent entrustment, hiring, and retention would not entitle the plaintiff to a greater recovery, but would merely serve to prejudice the employer. An exception exists for this general rule, however, where a plaintiff has a valid claim for punitive damages against the employer based on its independent negligence in hiring and retaining the employee or entrusting a vehicle to such employeе. In such case, it cannot be said that the negligence claims against the employer are merely duplicative of the respondeat superior claim. Under these circumstances, the employer is not entitled to summary judgment on the negligent entrustment, hiring, and retentiоn claims.
(Punctuation and footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Kelley v. Blue Line Carriers,
Thus, to support its claims against MasTec based on its alleged independent negligence, it was incumbent upon Wilson to produce evidence sufficient to support an award of punitive damages with respect to that alleged negligence. OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (c) prоvides that“[p]unitive damages shall be awarded not as compensation to a plaintiff but solely to punish, penalize, or deter a defendant.” Given the punitive nature of such damages, OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b) provides that
[p]unitive damages maybe awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.
Negligеnce, even if gross, will not alone authorize the recovery of punitive damages; there must be circumstances of aggravation and outrage. See Western Indus, v. Poole,
At summary judgment, the question is whether Wilson produced evidence from which a jury could infer that MasTec’s actions showed a conscious indifference to the consequences as alleged in the complaint. See Western Indus, v. Poole,
Here, it is undisputed that MasTec checked Piccione’s driving record before hiring him, reviewed it during his first year of employment, and required Piccione to comply with driver training and safety rules. Although Piccione had some moving violations on his record, he was cited while in his personal vehiсle as opposed to while operating a commercial vehicle for an employer, and the most recent violation was more than three years old. Moreover, Piccione had never been in an accident. These facts do not rise to thе level of clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that MasTec should have known that Piccione was a habitually reckless or dangerous driver or that MasTec acted with the requisite want of care sufficient to raise a presumption of consciоus indifference to the consequences in hiring, retaining, supervising, or entrusting Piccione with a company vehicle. See Bartja v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co.,
Additionally, Wilson has not presented evidence from which the jury could infer that the accident at issue was the result of Piccione’s wilful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences. “In cases involving automobile collisions, punitive damagеs are authorized when the accident results from a pattern or policy of dangerous driving, such as excessive speeding or driving while intoxicated, but not when a driver simply violates a rule of the road.” (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lindsey v. Clinch County Glass,
The record before us does not contain clear аnd convincing evidence that the collision was the result of either wilful conduct or a pattern or policy of dangerous driving on Piccione’s part. Although the record shows that Piccione pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor traffic violation “too fast for cоnditions,” whether Piccione’s rate of travel contributed to the accident is disputed. In fact, there is no evidence in the record that Piccione was violating the posted speed limit. Wilson contends that the proximate cause of the accident was Picсione’s having run a red light. Piccione has only one prior citation for failing to obey a stop sign. Further, Piccione has never had an accident as a result of any of his traffic violations, and he has never been cited while driving a commercial vehicle. The reсord does not support an inference that Piccione caused the instant collision as a result of a “pattern or policy of dangerous driving.” See, e.g., Lindsey v. Clinch County Glass,
The facts presented in this case do not support an award of punitive damages against either Piccione or MasTec as a matter of law; consequently, the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment as to these claims. Further, because the punitive damages claim against MasTec fails, Wilson’s claim against MasTec for negligence in the hiring, entrustment, supеrvision, or retention of Piccione is duplicative of the negligence claim against the employee, for which the employer admitted responsibility under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Kelley v. Blue Line Carriers,
Judgment reversed.
Notes
OCGA §§ 40-6-180 (requiring reasonable and prudent speeds); 40-6-1 (a misdemeanor).
Although the record does not indicate that MasTec is subject to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, those regulations require that certain employers investigate a prospective employee’s driving record for the previous three years. 49 CFR § 391.23 (a).