Massick v. North Central Correctional Facility

Feb 13, 1998
96-3980NI
Versions:

rect and oversight costs is reserved for another day, and quite possibly another case.

V.

The District Court‘s decision to dismiss Dico‘s counterclaim on the ground that Dico has not exhausted its administrative remedies is affirmed, with instructions that the court make it clear that the dismissal is without prejudice.4 The judgment entered for the United States is vacated and the money judgment is set aside. The case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Philip B. Mears, Iowa City, IA, argued, for Appellant.

William A. Hill, Asst.Atty. Gen., Des Moines, IA, argued, for Appellees.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HEANEY and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

This is an action by an inmate against employees of the Iowa Department of Corrections. The complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that prison officials violated Jeffrey Massick‘s Eighth Amendment rights when he was placed in a cell with another inmate who tested positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Mr. Massick alleged that the inmate had been involved in a fight and was bleeding from open wounds. During the eight days the inmates shared an administrative segregation cell, Mr. Massick cleaned the cell, picking up towels, pillow cases, and sheets stained with his cell-mate‘s blood, and cleaning blood off the sink. When Mr. Massick learned that his cell-mate was HIV-positive, he demanded to be moved to another cell, and prison officials complied promptly with this request. So far as anyone knows, Mr. Massick was not infected with the virus. He alleges, however, that defendants have refused his request to be tested.

The District Court1 dismissed the complaint. The Court held that Mr. Massick‘s allegations lacked an arguable basis in fact and law. In addition, the Court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, on the ground that their conduct, at the time that it occurred, did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.

We affirm on the ground of qualified immunity. Eighth Amendment claims of this type are fact-intensive. The legal standard requires a plaintiff to show that defendants knew that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). Certainly the right, thus abstractly stated, was clearly established. However, “[t]he mere assertion of such a right ... will not be adequate: ‘[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.‘” Latimore v. Widseth, 7 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140 (1994), quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Here, there is no doubt that placing the HIV-positive inmate in the cell with Mr. Massick exposed the latter to a risk. On the other hand, the exposure was brief, and the inmates were separated as soon as Mr. Massick specifically complained about being placed with someone who was HIV-positive. Situations like this are inherently matters of degree, and we cannot say that the risk was so substantial, and the defendants’ reactions to it so unreasonable, as to negative a defense of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the judgment dismissing the complaint is

Affirmed.

Notes

1
The Hon. Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.
4
As we mentioned early in the opinion, after the District Court granted summary judgment to the United States in this case, the EPA moved the EAB for denial without a hearing of Dico‘s petition for reimbursement on grounds of res judicata. Dico‘s counsel told the Court at oral argument that the motion has been granted. Although we do not know the grounds on which the EAB‘s decision was made, and we therefore express no opinion on the merits thereof, we do point out that it is Dico‘s counterclaim, not the government‘s claim, that is said to be identical to the administrative petition for reimbursement. It should be remembered that the counterclaim was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, and there was no full and fair adjudication on the merits. Moreover, given our disposition of the present appeal, there is no final judgment from the District Court on the government‘s claim. See W.A. Lang Co. v. Anderberg-Lund Printing Co. (In re Anderberg-Lund Printing Co.), 109 F.3d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir.1997) (discussing elements of the rule of res judicata).